C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 001069
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, D, DRL, PRM; LONDON AND PARIS FOR
AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREF, ASEC, CD, SU
SUBJECT: CHAD/SUDAN: THE SUDANESE REBELS' "LONG GOOD-BYE"
FROM CHAD
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Classified By: ECONOMIC/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
) and (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: As part of the recent agreement between Chad
and Sudan, Sudanese rebels loyal to the Justice and Equality
Movement and the recently-formed National Redemption Front
(NRF) have been asked by the GOC to leave Chad. According to
representatives of the NRF, Sudanese rebels will continue to
combat Sudanese armed forces and forces loyal to Minni
Minnawi, as long as they continue to threaten NRF supporters
and civilians in Darfur. NRF representatives asserted that
Sudanese rebels will consider laying down their arms as long
as there is an open dialogue about the shortcomings of the
Darfur Peace Accords. At the same time, Minni's supporters
in N'Djamena, who have no intention of leaving Chad, contend
that the GOC is actually planning to relocate the NRF to the
Chad-Sudan border, where it can continue to assist the
organization in carrying out its activities against Khartoum.
The UN 1591 Sanctions committee, close to the end of their
investigation on possible Chadian support for Sudanese rebel
movements, has obtained some information corroborating
reports of such support, but seek additional evidence. END
SUMMARY.
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JEM SAYS GOOD-BYE TO THE AMBASSADOR
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2. (C) On August 14, Justice and Equality Movement
Representatives Ahmed Tougod and Tadjadine Niam paid a visit
to Ambassador Wall to announce their plans to depart Chad in
the comings days. Tougod told the Ambassador that following
the agreement reached between the governments of Chad and
Sudan, Chadian authorities asked members of all rebel groups
in N'Djamena to leave the country. Tougod said that most
representatives of JEM and other members of the National
Redemption Front would either return to the field in Darfur
to continue operations against Khartoum or go to Addis if
requested by the African Union. Tougod himself planned to go
to London to continue the JEM's political activities.
3. (C) Ambassador Wall asked what this meant for the JEM's
relations with Chad, and any possible support to the JEM and
NRF's activities from the Chadian government. Tougod said
that for the time being, Chad would provide no political
support (which he defined as the right of transit from Chad
to Darfur and the right to reside within the country) to any
Sudanese rebel movements. Tougod stated that the Chadian
government had never provided arms or military equipment to
the NRF's efforts in Darfur. When the Ambassador asked how
the NRF was waging its battle against its opponents, Tougod
and Niam asserted that the Sudanese rebels were well-supplied
and well-armed with equipment they confiscated following
battles against Sudanese Armed Forces and Sudanese Liberation
Movement forces loyal to Minni Minnawi.
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SUDAN AND MINNI WILL NOT DEFEAT US
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4. (C) Tougod said that while the NRF would no longer be in
N'Djamena, it would continue its political and military
activities. The NRF was a political movement, and was
prepared at any time to cease their military operations if
their opponents and the international community were ready to
examine the shortcomings of the Darfur Peace Agreement.
Tougod noted that he and other political representatives
intended to contact the Department of State to request
meetings with senior officials to convey the NRF's position
on the DPA. The Ambassador told Tougod that, while he was
welcome to contact authorities in Washington, the U.S.
remains convinced that the DPA was the best solution for
peace in Darfur, and asked him and his fellow NRF members to
reconsider their position and assist in the implementation of
the agreement. In response, Tougod reiterated the NRF's
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concerns over compensation, political representation, as well
as the lack of a definite timeframe for disarmament of the
janjaweed, and argued that the DPA could not be implemented
until these shortcomings were addressed.
5. (C) Tougod and Niam both noted that while the NRF was a
political movement, it would have to resort to force if the
GOS and Minni-loyalists continued to attack their supporters.
The NRF believed the attacks would continue, based on the
build-up of GOS forces in Darfur and the public intentions by
the GOS to destroy DPA non-signatories Following his visit to
the Embassy, Niam called Economic/Consular Officer on August
16 to inform him that the GOS had told the African Union
Mission in Sudan that all Sudanese rebel groups should plan
on leaving Sudan, as their safety could no longer be
guaranteed.
6. (C) The JEM representatives claimed that the NRF was
capable of defeating Sudanese forces. Tougod stated that NRF
loyalists who were part of the Sudanese Armed Forces were
feeding intelligence to NRF field commanders on SAF
activities. He also said that Minni's forces were severely
decimated from attacks they launched against NRF positions in
June and July, and lacked the capability to challenge the NRF
in Darfur. As for whether the NRF's goal was to dethrone the
regime in Khartoum, Niam stated that the primary goal was to
defend the rights of the Darfurian people. However, to
ensure that Darfurians were not harmed in efforts to combat
the GOS, the NRF was willing to take the battle to Khartoum.
According to Niam, the July attack in Kordofan was a warning
to the GOS that the NRF had the means to fight and defeat
Sudanese forces on their own turf.
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JEM AND NRF ARE NOT LEAVING CHAD
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7. (C) On August 15, Djabadien Hussein, representative for
Sudanese Liberation Movement members loyal to Minni Minnawi
in N'Djamena, told Economic/Consular Officer that no Chadian
authorities had asked the group to leave N'Djamena, and their
immediate plans were to stay in the Chadian capital.
Furthermore, he noted that while members of the NRF may say
they are leaving N'Djamena, Chadian authorities were planning
to assist NRF representatives in N'Djamena to relocate to the
Chadian village of Um-Jarasse, which is north of the border
town of Tine and the home village of President Deby. He also
stated that a JEM field commander named Nourene Bachim was in
the Dar Sila region of Chad to recruit fighters from the
Djadjo community, an ethnic group indigenous to the border
region south of Adre.
8. (C) During a meeting with Economic/Consular officer on
August 16, Adam Idriss Ahmat, a local leader in Dar Sila,
confirmed and clarified Hussein's earlier account. According
to him, on August 12, members of the NRF met with President
Deby, advisor and half-brother to the President Daoussa Deby,
Daoussa's special advisor Moussa Sner, and then Minister of
Territorial Administration Mahamat Ali Nassour to discuss
possible future coordination between the NRF and the GOC
following the Chad-Sudan rapproachment. As all parties
agreed that Sudan could not be trusted to adhere to the
recent agreement between the two countries, the members of
the meeting decided to establish a camp in Um-Jarasse for NRF
field commanders to discreetly continue their operations.
Ahmat also said that recruiting had already begun in the Dar
Sila region, and members of the Djadjo, who had been recent
victims of several vicious Janjaweed attacks, were rapidly
signing up for the Sudanese rebel cause.
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1591 SANCTIONS COMMITTEE EXPERTS VISIT CHAD
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9. (C) Technical experts from the U.N. 1591 Sanctions
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Committee paid a visit to Ambassador Wall to discuss their
recent investigation in Chad on possible Chadian support of
Sudanese rebels. Marc Lavergne, Coordinator of the
investigative team, told the Ambassador that based on their
investigation, there was enough information to link Chadian
military assets to Sudanese rebel movements. Through
eyewitness accounts from both sides of the border, the
investigative team were persuaded that some vehicles and arms
within the NRF arsenal originated in Chad. They also learned
of the presence of a number of members in the NRF ranks
wearing Chadian military uniforms (identified by a Chadian
flag on the shirt). Lavergne told the Ambassador that they
found vehicles that were allegedly purchased by Daoussa Deby.
All this evidence, according to the team, constituted enough
to indicate that assets flowing from Chad to the Sudanese
rebel movements.
10. (C) However, Lavergne noted that they did not know if
there was enough information to link Chadian authorities to
the support received by Sudanese rebels. GOC authorities
told team members that support was coming from rogue elements
in the Chadian military who could not be controlled and fully
monitored by Chadian officials. The fact that they could
establish no direct links would make any cases against
Daoussa Deby, Mahamat Ali Nassour, or even President Deby
himself, extremely difficult to make. Team members also
noted their difficulty in collecting specific pieces of
information, such as vehicle registration numbers for
vehicles apparently originating in Chad. The team asked the
Ambassador if the U.S. Embassy could provide any assistance
in obtaining information, such as tracing vehicles through
their registration numbers. The Ambassador suggested that
the team pursue this request with U.S. officials in USUN and
in Washington.
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COMMENT
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11. (C) Reports that the GOC is relocating Sudanese rebel
elements to the Chad-Sudan border to continue operations in
Darfur are not surprising, given the history of the
Chad-Sudan relationship. Our preference would be to leave
information-gathering efforts of the 1591 Sanctions Committee
in the hands of the U.N. or possibly the African Union. We
would appreciate any further guidance.
12. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL