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WikiLeaks
Press release About PlusD
 
Content
Show Headers
) and (D) 1. (C) SUMMARY: As part of the recent agreement between Chad and Sudan, Sudanese rebels loyal to the Justice and Equality Movement and the recently-formed National Redemption Front (NRF) have been asked by the GOC to leave Chad. According to representatives of the NRF, Sudanese rebels will continue to combat Sudanese armed forces and forces loyal to Minni Minnawi, as long as they continue to threaten NRF supporters and civilians in Darfur. NRF representatives asserted that Sudanese rebels will consider laying down their arms as long as there is an open dialogue about the shortcomings of the Darfur Peace Accords. At the same time, Minni's supporters in N'Djamena, who have no intention of leaving Chad, contend that the GOC is actually planning to relocate the NRF to the Chad-Sudan border, where it can continue to assist the organization in carrying out its activities against Khartoum. The UN 1591 Sanctions committee, close to the end of their investigation on possible Chadian support for Sudanese rebel movements, has obtained some information corroborating reports of such support, but seek additional evidence. END SUMMARY. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - JEM SAYS GOOD-BYE TO THE AMBASSADOR - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2. (C) On August 14, Justice and Equality Movement Representatives Ahmed Tougod and Tadjadine Niam paid a visit to Ambassador Wall to announce their plans to depart Chad in the comings days. Tougod told the Ambassador that following the agreement reached between the governments of Chad and Sudan, Chadian authorities asked members of all rebel groups in N'Djamena to leave the country. Tougod said that most representatives of JEM and other members of the National Redemption Front would either return to the field in Darfur to continue operations against Khartoum or go to Addis if requested by the African Union. Tougod himself planned to go to London to continue the JEM's political activities. 3. (C) Ambassador Wall asked what this meant for the JEM's relations with Chad, and any possible support to the JEM and NRF's activities from the Chadian government. Tougod said that for the time being, Chad would provide no political support (which he defined as the right of transit from Chad to Darfur and the right to reside within the country) to any Sudanese rebel movements. Tougod stated that the Chadian government had never provided arms or military equipment to the NRF's efforts in Darfur. When the Ambassador asked how the NRF was waging its battle against its opponents, Tougod and Niam asserted that the Sudanese rebels were well-supplied and well-armed with equipment they confiscated following battles against Sudanese Armed Forces and Sudanese Liberation Movement forces loyal to Minni Minnawi. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SUDAN AND MINNI WILL NOT DEFEAT US - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4. (C) Tougod said that while the NRF would no longer be in N'Djamena, it would continue its political and military activities. The NRF was a political movement, and was prepared at any time to cease their military operations if their opponents and the international community were ready to examine the shortcomings of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Tougod noted that he and other political representatives intended to contact the Department of State to request meetings with senior officials to convey the NRF's position on the DPA. The Ambassador told Tougod that, while he was welcome to contact authorities in Washington, the U.S. remains convinced that the DPA was the best solution for peace in Darfur, and asked him and his fellow NRF members to reconsider their position and assist in the implementation of the agreement. In response, Tougod reiterated the NRF's NDJAMENA 00001069 002.2 OF 003 concerns over compensation, political representation, as well as the lack of a definite timeframe for disarmament of the janjaweed, and argued that the DPA could not be implemented until these shortcomings were addressed. 5. (C) Tougod and Niam both noted that while the NRF was a political movement, it would have to resort to force if the GOS and Minni-loyalists continued to attack their supporters. The NRF believed the attacks would continue, based on the build-up of GOS forces in Darfur and the public intentions by the GOS to destroy DPA non-signatories Following his visit to the Embassy, Niam called Economic/Consular Officer on August 16 to inform him that the GOS had told the African Union Mission in Sudan that all Sudanese rebel groups should plan on leaving Sudan, as their safety could no longer be guaranteed. 6. (C) The JEM representatives claimed that the NRF was capable of defeating Sudanese forces. Tougod stated that NRF loyalists who were part of the Sudanese Armed Forces were feeding intelligence to NRF field commanders on SAF activities. He also said that Minni's forces were severely decimated from attacks they launched against NRF positions in June and July, and lacked the capability to challenge the NRF in Darfur. As for whether the NRF's goal was to dethrone the regime in Khartoum, Niam stated that the primary goal was to defend the rights of the Darfurian people. However, to ensure that Darfurians were not harmed in efforts to combat the GOS, the NRF was willing to take the battle to Khartoum. According to Niam, the July attack in Kordofan was a warning to the GOS that the NRF had the means to fight and defeat Sudanese forces on their own turf. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - JEM AND NRF ARE NOT LEAVING CHAD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7. (C) On August 15, Djabadien Hussein, representative for Sudanese Liberation Movement members loyal to Minni Minnawi in N'Djamena, told Economic/Consular Officer that no Chadian authorities had asked the group to leave N'Djamena, and their immediate plans were to stay in the Chadian capital. Furthermore, he noted that while members of the NRF may say they are leaving N'Djamena, Chadian authorities were planning to assist NRF representatives in N'Djamena to relocate to the Chadian village of Um-Jarasse, which is north of the border town of Tine and the home village of President Deby. He also stated that a JEM field commander named Nourene Bachim was in the Dar Sila region of Chad to recruit fighters from the Djadjo community, an ethnic group indigenous to the border region south of Adre. 8. (C) During a meeting with Economic/Consular officer on August 16, Adam Idriss Ahmat, a local leader in Dar Sila, confirmed and clarified Hussein's earlier account. According to him, on August 12, members of the NRF met with President Deby, advisor and half-brother to the President Daoussa Deby, Daoussa's special advisor Moussa Sner, and then Minister of Territorial Administration Mahamat Ali Nassour to discuss possible future coordination between the NRF and the GOC following the Chad-Sudan rapproachment. As all parties agreed that Sudan could not be trusted to adhere to the recent agreement between the two countries, the members of the meeting decided to establish a camp in Um-Jarasse for NRF field commanders to discreetly continue their operations. Ahmat also said that recruiting had already begun in the Dar Sila region, and members of the Djadjo, who had been recent victims of several vicious Janjaweed attacks, were rapidly signing up for the Sudanese rebel cause. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1591 SANCTIONS COMMITTEE EXPERTS VISIT CHAD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9. (C) Technical experts from the U.N. 1591 Sanctions NDJAMENA 00001069 003.2 OF 003 Committee paid a visit to Ambassador Wall to discuss their recent investigation in Chad on possible Chadian support of Sudanese rebels. Marc Lavergne, Coordinator of the investigative team, told the Ambassador that based on their investigation, there was enough information to link Chadian military assets to Sudanese rebel movements. Through eyewitness accounts from both sides of the border, the investigative team were persuaded that some vehicles and arms within the NRF arsenal originated in Chad. They also learned of the presence of a number of members in the NRF ranks wearing Chadian military uniforms (identified by a Chadian flag on the shirt). Lavergne told the Ambassador that they found vehicles that were allegedly purchased by Daoussa Deby. All this evidence, according to the team, constituted enough to indicate that assets flowing from Chad to the Sudanese rebel movements. 10. (C) However, Lavergne noted that they did not know if there was enough information to link Chadian authorities to the support received by Sudanese rebels. GOC authorities told team members that support was coming from rogue elements in the Chadian military who could not be controlled and fully monitored by Chadian officials. The fact that they could establish no direct links would make any cases against Daoussa Deby, Mahamat Ali Nassour, or even President Deby himself, extremely difficult to make. Team members also noted their difficulty in collecting specific pieces of information, such as vehicle registration numbers for vehicles apparently originating in Chad. The team asked the Ambassador if the U.S. Embassy could provide any assistance in obtaining information, such as tracing vehicles through their registration numbers. The Ambassador suggested that the team pursue this request with U.S. officials in USUN and in Washington. - - - - COMMENT - - - - 11. (C) Reports that the GOC is relocating Sudanese rebel elements to the Chad-Sudan border to continue operations in Darfur are not surprising, given the history of the Chad-Sudan relationship. Our preference would be to leave information-gathering efforts of the 1591 Sanctions Committee in the hands of the U.N. or possibly the African Union. We would appreciate any further guidance. 12. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. WALL

Raw content
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 001069 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, D, DRL, PRM; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2016 TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREF, ASEC, CD, SU SUBJECT: CHAD/SUDAN: THE SUDANESE REBELS' "LONG GOOD-BYE" FROM CHAD NDJAMENA 00001069 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: ECONOMIC/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B ) and (D) 1. (C) SUMMARY: As part of the recent agreement between Chad and Sudan, Sudanese rebels loyal to the Justice and Equality Movement and the recently-formed National Redemption Front (NRF) have been asked by the GOC to leave Chad. According to representatives of the NRF, Sudanese rebels will continue to combat Sudanese armed forces and forces loyal to Minni Minnawi, as long as they continue to threaten NRF supporters and civilians in Darfur. NRF representatives asserted that Sudanese rebels will consider laying down their arms as long as there is an open dialogue about the shortcomings of the Darfur Peace Accords. At the same time, Minni's supporters in N'Djamena, who have no intention of leaving Chad, contend that the GOC is actually planning to relocate the NRF to the Chad-Sudan border, where it can continue to assist the organization in carrying out its activities against Khartoum. The UN 1591 Sanctions committee, close to the end of their investigation on possible Chadian support for Sudanese rebel movements, has obtained some information corroborating reports of such support, but seek additional evidence. END SUMMARY. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - JEM SAYS GOOD-BYE TO THE AMBASSADOR - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2. (C) On August 14, Justice and Equality Movement Representatives Ahmed Tougod and Tadjadine Niam paid a visit to Ambassador Wall to announce their plans to depart Chad in the comings days. Tougod told the Ambassador that following the agreement reached between the governments of Chad and Sudan, Chadian authorities asked members of all rebel groups in N'Djamena to leave the country. Tougod said that most representatives of JEM and other members of the National Redemption Front would either return to the field in Darfur to continue operations against Khartoum or go to Addis if requested by the African Union. Tougod himself planned to go to London to continue the JEM's political activities. 3. (C) Ambassador Wall asked what this meant for the JEM's relations with Chad, and any possible support to the JEM and NRF's activities from the Chadian government. Tougod said that for the time being, Chad would provide no political support (which he defined as the right of transit from Chad to Darfur and the right to reside within the country) to any Sudanese rebel movements. Tougod stated that the Chadian government had never provided arms or military equipment to the NRF's efforts in Darfur. When the Ambassador asked how the NRF was waging its battle against its opponents, Tougod and Niam asserted that the Sudanese rebels were well-supplied and well-armed with equipment they confiscated following battles against Sudanese Armed Forces and Sudanese Liberation Movement forces loyal to Minni Minnawi. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SUDAN AND MINNI WILL NOT DEFEAT US - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4. (C) Tougod said that while the NRF would no longer be in N'Djamena, it would continue its political and military activities. The NRF was a political movement, and was prepared at any time to cease their military operations if their opponents and the international community were ready to examine the shortcomings of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Tougod noted that he and other political representatives intended to contact the Department of State to request meetings with senior officials to convey the NRF's position on the DPA. The Ambassador told Tougod that, while he was welcome to contact authorities in Washington, the U.S. remains convinced that the DPA was the best solution for peace in Darfur, and asked him and his fellow NRF members to reconsider their position and assist in the implementation of the agreement. In response, Tougod reiterated the NRF's NDJAMENA 00001069 002.2 OF 003 concerns over compensation, political representation, as well as the lack of a definite timeframe for disarmament of the janjaweed, and argued that the DPA could not be implemented until these shortcomings were addressed. 5. (C) Tougod and Niam both noted that while the NRF was a political movement, it would have to resort to force if the GOS and Minni-loyalists continued to attack their supporters. The NRF believed the attacks would continue, based on the build-up of GOS forces in Darfur and the public intentions by the GOS to destroy DPA non-signatories Following his visit to the Embassy, Niam called Economic/Consular Officer on August 16 to inform him that the GOS had told the African Union Mission in Sudan that all Sudanese rebel groups should plan on leaving Sudan, as their safety could no longer be guaranteed. 6. (C) The JEM representatives claimed that the NRF was capable of defeating Sudanese forces. Tougod stated that NRF loyalists who were part of the Sudanese Armed Forces were feeding intelligence to NRF field commanders on SAF activities. He also said that Minni's forces were severely decimated from attacks they launched against NRF positions in June and July, and lacked the capability to challenge the NRF in Darfur. As for whether the NRF's goal was to dethrone the regime in Khartoum, Niam stated that the primary goal was to defend the rights of the Darfurian people. However, to ensure that Darfurians were not harmed in efforts to combat the GOS, the NRF was willing to take the battle to Khartoum. According to Niam, the July attack in Kordofan was a warning to the GOS that the NRF had the means to fight and defeat Sudanese forces on their own turf. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - JEM AND NRF ARE NOT LEAVING CHAD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7. (C) On August 15, Djabadien Hussein, representative for Sudanese Liberation Movement members loyal to Minni Minnawi in N'Djamena, told Economic/Consular Officer that no Chadian authorities had asked the group to leave N'Djamena, and their immediate plans were to stay in the Chadian capital. Furthermore, he noted that while members of the NRF may say they are leaving N'Djamena, Chadian authorities were planning to assist NRF representatives in N'Djamena to relocate to the Chadian village of Um-Jarasse, which is north of the border town of Tine and the home village of President Deby. He also stated that a JEM field commander named Nourene Bachim was in the Dar Sila region of Chad to recruit fighters from the Djadjo community, an ethnic group indigenous to the border region south of Adre. 8. (C) During a meeting with Economic/Consular officer on August 16, Adam Idriss Ahmat, a local leader in Dar Sila, confirmed and clarified Hussein's earlier account. According to him, on August 12, members of the NRF met with President Deby, advisor and half-brother to the President Daoussa Deby, Daoussa's special advisor Moussa Sner, and then Minister of Territorial Administration Mahamat Ali Nassour to discuss possible future coordination between the NRF and the GOC following the Chad-Sudan rapproachment. As all parties agreed that Sudan could not be trusted to adhere to the recent agreement between the two countries, the members of the meeting decided to establish a camp in Um-Jarasse for NRF field commanders to discreetly continue their operations. Ahmat also said that recruiting had already begun in the Dar Sila region, and members of the Djadjo, who had been recent victims of several vicious Janjaweed attacks, were rapidly signing up for the Sudanese rebel cause. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1591 SANCTIONS COMMITTEE EXPERTS VISIT CHAD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9. (C) Technical experts from the U.N. 1591 Sanctions NDJAMENA 00001069 003.2 OF 003 Committee paid a visit to Ambassador Wall to discuss their recent investigation in Chad on possible Chadian support of Sudanese rebels. Marc Lavergne, Coordinator of the investigative team, told the Ambassador that based on their investigation, there was enough information to link Chadian military assets to Sudanese rebel movements. Through eyewitness accounts from both sides of the border, the investigative team were persuaded that some vehicles and arms within the NRF arsenal originated in Chad. They also learned of the presence of a number of members in the NRF ranks wearing Chadian military uniforms (identified by a Chadian flag on the shirt). Lavergne told the Ambassador that they found vehicles that were allegedly purchased by Daoussa Deby. All this evidence, according to the team, constituted enough to indicate that assets flowing from Chad to the Sudanese rebel movements. 10. (C) However, Lavergne noted that they did not know if there was enough information to link Chadian authorities to the support received by Sudanese rebels. GOC authorities told team members that support was coming from rogue elements in the Chadian military who could not be controlled and fully monitored by Chadian officials. The fact that they could establish no direct links would make any cases against Daoussa Deby, Mahamat Ali Nassour, or even President Deby himself, extremely difficult to make. Team members also noted their difficulty in collecting specific pieces of information, such as vehicle registration numbers for vehicles apparently originating in Chad. The team asked the Ambassador if the U.S. Embassy could provide any assistance in obtaining information, such as tracing vehicles through their registration numbers. The Ambassador suggested that the team pursue this request with U.S. officials in USUN and in Washington. - - - - COMMENT - - - - 11. (C) Reports that the GOC is relocating Sudanese rebel elements to the Chad-Sudan border to continue operations in Darfur are not surprising, given the history of the Chad-Sudan relationship. Our preference would be to leave information-gathering efforts of the 1591 Sanctions Committee in the hands of the U.N. or possibly the African Union. We would appreciate any further guidance. 12. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. WALL
Metadata
VZCZCXRO3456 RR RUEHROV DE RUEHNJ #1069/01 2291619 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 171619Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4250 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1255 RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0178 RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0739 RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0314 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1527 RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2797 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1940 RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0299 RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1329 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0876 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0816
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