C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001150
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2017
TAGS: ECON, ENRG, EPET, IZ
SUBJECT: DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ON HYDROCARBON LAWS
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.5 (B),(D)
1. (C) Summary: At an April 2 dinner with Deputy Prime
Minister for Economic Affairs Barham Salih, the Ambassador
noted President Bush,s frustration with the GOI,s failure
thus far to complete the hydrocarbon-related package of laws
to send to the Council of Representatives. The DPM responded
with a frank read-out of what he sees as the state of play
regarding the hydrocarbon-related laws' drafting process.
Salih began by noting that getting agreement on the framework
law had required spending a lot of political capital.
Finding agreement on the full package, including the
revenue-management, Ministry of Oil reorganization and Iraq
National Oil Company reformation laws, and other parts of the
package, will also require continuous "kicking of butts" to
keep the political players in Baghdad and Erbil moving. He
pledged to keep the pressure on. End Summary
2. (C) On April 2, DPM Barham Salih hosted a small welcome
dinner for the Ambassador, also present were the DCM,
Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, Acting Econmin
and emboff. On-going efforts to find a suitable venue for
the Neighbors Conference and International Compact with Iraq
signing meeting were discussed (and acted on via phone), but
the principal focus was on the need for immediate action on
the hydrocarbon-related laws and the draft revenue-management
law in particular. The Ambassador noted the President,s
frustration with the GOI,s failure as yet to complete the
hydrocarbon-related package of laws to send to the Council of
Representatives. In response, DPM Salih gave the Ambassador
a frank read-out of his view of the state of play regarding
the hydrocarbon-related laws, drafting process. Salih began
by observing that getting agreement on the framework law had
required spending a lot of political capital. Finding
agreement on the full package, including the
revenue-management, Ministry of Oil Reformation and Iraq
National Oil Company laws, will also require continuous
"kicking of butts" to keep the political players in Baghdad
and Erbil moving. The top GOI leaders, including the DPM,
need to keep the pressure on because "we need action now."
Oil is of critical importance to Iraq,s future. The
completion and implementation of the laws will also be
tangible evidence to Iraqis and the international community
of the GOI,s ability to do its job of governing.
3. (C) According to the DPM, the Kurdistan Regional
Government,s (KRG's) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani has
made a policy decision to reach agreement on the
revenue-sharing law now being negotiated, but his negotiators
have been "playing their own games" by delaying their visit
to Baghdad, now promised for April 4. Salih noted that the
Kurds are right to be concerned about the Ministry of
Finance,s (MOF) role in paying out the region,s share of
oil revenue under the new law because MOF has withheld $360
million owed the KRG under the present system. He emphasized
that the problem was with Ministry officials, not the Finance
Minister himself. The KRG PM,s visit is expected on the
heels of the arrival of the negotiating team and would enable
the revenue-sharing draft to get top-level KRG approval
without delay. The DPM, noting he is himself a Kurd, was
very forceful in saying that the Kurds need to act
responsibly and that all the parties need to act now.
4. (C) DPM Salih said that the fundamental problem in
drafting, passing and implementing the hydrocarbon-related
laws, as with other laws such as the DeBaathification law, is
that politics is everything. Iraq now has a powerful
oligarchy based on money. Few of the leadership "Shia,
Sunni or Kurd" are concerned about demonstrating that the
government is competent by delivering goods and services to
Iraqis, and promoting economic growth for the country.
Everyone is fighting for power pure and simple. A major
problem for the Prime Minister is that there is no reliable
Sunni partner available. The DPM concluded that he was
relieved to see that the "United States had finally woken up
to two realities: 1) That Iraqi leaders are undeserving of
additional undeserving love, and 2) That Iran is a major (and
unusually unhelpful) player which at times is more powerful
than the United States."
5. (C) The DPM argued that Iraq should be producing 6
million barrels of oil per day (mbpd), not 1.5 mbpd. In
spite of the clear failure of the centralized system,
Minister of Oil Shahristani has been a "disaster" running his
Ministry, and still takes a statist approach to its future.
He can be expected to try to use the new Ministry
reorganization law to that end. Further, he balks at
implementing instructions from the Prime Minister or Energy
Committee. The Prime Minister cannot, however, replace him
because of the Minister,s family connections to Grand
Ayatollah Sistani. (Minister of Finance Jabr is, in the
DPM,s view, reliable. He follows, even if at times
reluctantly, Prime Ministerial and Cabinet orders.)
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6. (C) Salih contended that a major problem is that the
Ministry of Oil has been decimated. Many competent officials
have been pushed out for sectarian political reasons. Others
have taken jobs abroad where they and their families can be
safe and where compensation is far higher than in Iraq.
7. (C) The DPM concluded by pledging to move the vital
hydrocarbon legislation forward. He noted that PM Maliki
would be going on an official trip to Japan April 7, but
added that, even so, he would be available for decisions on
legislative drafts if needed. Salih also said that he hoped
President Talibani would be able to go to the Mayo Clinic
"soon" for medical treatment.
CROCKER