C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001875
SIPDIS
STATE FOR INL/FO, INL/PC, INL/AAE, EUR/ERA, L/LEI;
JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS;
LA PAZ FOR DCM, NAS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016
TAGS: KCRM, PGOV, PREL, SNAR, EUN, BL
SUBJECT: INL ASSISTANT SECRETARY DISCUSSES THREATENED
EXPULSION OF DEA FROM BOLIVIA WITH COMMISSION DEPUTY
DIRECTOR-GENERAL AGUIAR
Classified By: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
AFFAIRS (INL) COUNSELOR JAMES P. MCANULTY FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) INL Assistant Secretary David Johnson briefed European
Commission Deputy Director-General (DDG) for Relations with
Asia and Latin America Joao Aguiar Machado and Commission
Bolivia Desk Officer Nicola Murray on the threat by Bolivian
President Evo Morales to expel Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) personnel. Commission interlocutors
expressed concern over the situation, but professed lack of
leverage to convince Bolivian leaders to rescind the order,
because of existing friction over regional trade
negotiations. END SUMMARY.
-------------------------------------------
REVIEW OF COUNTER-DRUG SITUATION IN BOLIVIA
-------------------------------------------
2. (C) After the November 14 U.S.-European Union (EU) Troika
meeting on Drug Issues (Septel), INL Assistant Secretary
(A/S) Johnson, accompanied by Mission INL Counselor, INL/PC
Deputy Director, and INL/PC Foreign Affairs Officer, briefed
DDG Aguiar and Desk Officer Murray regarding the latest drug
developments in Bolivia, particularly the threatened
expulsion of DEA personnel. A/S Johnson noted that the U.S.
counter-drug program in Bolivia has traditionally focused on
interdiction, alternative development, and eradication. The
current budget for the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) budget
there amounted to some 30 million dollars annually. In early
summer, the Bolivian coca growers' union had protested
against the activities of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (AID), forcing AID personnel to leave the Chapare
region. On November 1, President Evo Morales suddenly
declared a 90-day deadline for the departure of all DEA
personnel from the country. Absent a reversal of this
decision, DEA personnel would leave Bolivia by the end of
January 2009, after a presence of more than 30 years there.
---------------------------------
LOSS OF COUNTER-DRUG CAPABILITIES
---------------------------------
3. (C) A/S Johnson noted that, with the projected departure
of DEA personnel, the U.S. and Bolivia would lose a targeting
mechanism for effective counter-drug activities. He lamented
that such a decision, if carried out, would end what had
become the longest-running, and at one point the largest,
U.S. counter-drug program in the Western Hemisphere. Under
such a scenario, the U.S. would remove all U.S.-supplied
helicopters but would leave behind other capital equipment,
including vehicles and computer systems. The sustainability
of such equipment would remain doubtful, however, given the
poor GOB record on maintenance. INL would transfer remaining
funds to other programs, perhaps to those in neighboring
countries, such as Peru, Paraguay, or Brazil. If the INL
Bureau were asked to end its NAS program in Bolivia, the
process of restarting it would take years with the required
lead time for programming and budgeting processes. A/S
Johnson warned that, given the flow of Bolivian cocaine to
markets in Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and nations in
West Africa and Europe, the greatest impact of DEA's
departure would be on those countries, rather than the United
States. Cocaine flows to Europe would likely increase
"significantly," producing unfortunate consequences.
--------------------------------------
EU KEENLY CONCERNED ABOUT CONSEQUENCES
--------------------------------------
BRUSSELS 00001875 002 OF 003
4. (C) DDG Aguiar responded that the situation in Bolivia
worried him and other EU officials. He said they were "on
the same page" as U.S. colleagues regarding Bolivia. He
offered that the Commission would try to deal with Bolivia on
this issue, but currently found themselves in a "delicate
situation,", because of recent friction over negotiation of
an Andean free trade agreement. The Commission had tried to
negotiate multilaterally, but Bolivia blocked a regional
agreement. Negotiators are planning to negotiate bilaterally
-- a change in strategy that has angered President Morales.
Aguiar remarked that Morales, who was putting himself in the
role of "victim," has now begun to lash out at the EU.
Earlier, the EU had tried to help President Morales resolve
domestic issues involving the Constitution and the provinces.
---------------
REGIONAL IMPACT
---------------
5. (C) A/S Johnson acknowledged that Morales may no longer be
open to reversing his decision. Accordingly, the U.S. was
examining relationships in neighboring countries that would
be affected by the expulsion of DEA personnel. Overall, the
U.S. enjoys good relations with Brazil, and DEA maintains a
strong presence there. That said, in recent years, Brazil
had been slow in expending some of its INL assistance,
particularly related to rule of law reforms. The Brazilians
may have perceived such assistance as evoking a
"student-teacher relationship" and had allowed 15 million
dollars to go unexpended over four to five years. As a
result, INL had to move some of the funding to programs in
other countries. Yet, overall U.S.- Brazilian relations
remain positive, particularly on energy and trade. Aguiar
observed that Brazil appeared interested in starting a
dialogue on drug issues with the EU and had proposed a
meeting in December. Previously, Brazil had viewed this area
as too sensitive to address.
6. (C) DDG Aguiar iquired whether the worsening
U.S.-Bolivian relationship would continue to escalate,
especially in the wake of the expulsion of the U.S.
Ambassador and the U.S. announcement of planned suspension of
trade prefereces. A/S Johnson responded that the
Administation had announced its decision on trade
prefrences and awaited public comment. A key Congressional
leader had voiced opposition to the decision but, in the end,
implementation may be inevitable. Aguiar remarked that
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez had pledged to buy up all
Bolivian products that would have entered the U.S. under the
trade preferences. He expressed concern about "pushing"
Morales further into Chavez' corner. That said, he noted
that Chavez had a history of making commitments and then
breaking them.
-------------
EU ASSISTANCE
-------------
7. (C) Desk Officer Nicola Murray noted that current EU
assistance to Bolivia would not compensate for missing U.S.
assistance. EU assistance, focusing primarily on economic
development, amounted to some 234 million euros over a
seven-year period in three sectors. Of this amount, 45
million euros went to counter-drug assistance over a four-
year time frame. A/S Johnson reiterated U.S. concerns over
public statements by Bolivian leaders that the EU supported
Bolivian efforts to expand commercial uses for coca leaf.
DDG Aguiar responded that the EU had proceeded with the
initiative to fund the study on coca leaf with the
collaboration and knowledge of U.S. officials. He insisted
that the study was designed strictly to present a "snap shot"
of current legitimate uses of coca leaf. A/S Johnson urged
the EU to correct the record when Bolivian officials make
their outrageous claims, given that failure to do so would
BRUSSELS 00001875 003 OF 003
lead to an inaccurate public perception. DDG Aguiar insisted
that there should be no question over the true purpose of the
study. He promised to correct the record, if necessary, to
counter inaccurate public perceptions, but implied that the
EU would exercise caution in doing so to avoid risking the
loss of their ability to communicate with Bolivian leaders.
8. (C) Aguiar added that individual EU Member States had also
encountered difficulties in dealing with President Morales,
particularly Spain over Bolivia's nationalization of energy
companies. Although he claimed that the EU would not be
reluctant to express its concerns over the threatened
expulsion of DEA personnel, he said he was not optimistic
that Bolivia would listen. President Morales, he remarked,
continued to present himself as the "excluded" party and
"victim." Domestically, he appeared intent on promoting a
divisive campaign of "indigenous" Bolivians against "white"
Bolivians. Decrying historic injustices, President Morales
was understood to be saying that it was now the turn of the
indigenous population to rule the country. A/S Johnson
agreed generally with DDG Aguiar's analysis. President
Morales did not seem to have a coherent vision of the
country's future, but only appeared to want benefits that he
could announce under an "Evo Delivers" system. He excluded
the Peace Corps and AID programs because they did not fit
into this framework. Indeed, AID successes in promoting
farmers' cooperatives in the Chapare had given the indigenous
population there an alternative to supporting his coca
growers' unions.
----------------------
FOLLOW-UP CONVERSATION
----------------------
9. (C) In a follow up conversation with INL Counselor on
November 17, Desk Officer Murray lamented published
statements by President Morales that DEA agents would not
return to Bolivia while he remained in office. She
indicated, nonetheless, that Commission and Delegation
colleagues were busy exploring strategies and opportunities
for speaking with GOB counterparts about the expulsion. INL
Counselor impressed upon Murray the urgency of the situation.
-------
COMMENT
-------
10. (C) Given current EU-Bolivian tensions, Mission holds
little hope that Commission colleagues will succeed in
persuading Bolivian counterparts to intercede with President
Morales to reverse the expulsion decision. END COMMENT.
11. (U) The INL Bureau has cleared on this telegram.
MURRAY
.