S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000079
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR PHU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, KDEM, PTER, PHUM, TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: THAILAND'S POLITICAL TURBULENCE PUSHES
SOUTH TO BACK BURNER
REF: A. BANGKOK 1612 (HOW HOT IS IT?)
B. CHIANG MAI 60 (NEW NSC CHIEF SEEN AS THREAT) AND PREVIOUS
C. BANGKOK 1210 (RTG TALKS WITH INSURGENTS STALLED) AND PREVIOUS
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CLASSIFIED BY: Mike Morrow, CG, ConGen, Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
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Summary
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1. (S/NF) A late-May round of secret talks between the Thai
Government and southern insurgents yielded good progress on a
proposal to create pilot "peace zones" in specific conflict
areas, according to Mark Tamthai, RTG point-man for the talks.
However, making the proposal operational anytime soon is highly
unlikely since the RTG's preoccupation with ongoing national
political deadlock has pushed decisions on the south to the back
burner, he said. Nonetheless, Tamthai is encouraged that RTG
officials administering the southern border provinces are, in
his view, finally beginning to embrace a non-military solution
(in part because of recent setbacks there). He also believes
the RTG is nearly ready to take the next step - difficult but
needed - of making the secret talks public. The next round of
talks is tentatively scheduled for late June or early July,
though Tamthai cautions that real progress will hinge on
domestic political dynamics and a coming re-structuring of the
RTG's peace process team. End Summary.
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Progress Toward Pilot "Peace Zone" Proposal
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2. (S/NF) Consul General met May 29 in Chiang Mai with Dr. Mark
Tamthai, Director of Payap University's Institute of Religion,
Culture and Peace and point-man for the RTG's secret dialogue
with southern insurgents. Tamthai had recently returned from a
meeting with the insurgents in Bali the previous week. He
described the Bali round as a stripped-down working meeting (he
was the only RTG official present) that made "good progress" on
the two sides' shared goal of advancing beyond
confidence-building measures toward recommendations for
meaningful operational changes on the ground in southern
Thailand. Specifically, the sides are hammering out a proposal
to create pilot "peace zones" in specific conflict areas.
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National Political Deadlock Pushes South to Back Burner
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3. (S/NF) The next step is to get the RTG and the insurgent
commanders to agree to implement this pilot project. Tamthai
was not optimistic this would happen anytime soon. He cited
Bangkok's intense preoccupation with the ongoing domestic
political deadlock (Ref A) as something that has "pushed
decisions regarding the south to the back burner." Moreover,
the RTG's structural line-up for handling the peace process is
again in flux.
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RTG Re-adjusting Its Peace Process Team
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4. (S/NF) To illustrate, Tamthai provide a quick history lesson
of the RTG's structural approach to the peace process:
-- Initially, a cabinet-level steering committee (chaired by
the Prime Minister and including the Royal Thai Army
Commander-in-Chief) oversaw the process, with the actual work
being handled by a working group whose main participants were
the National Security Council (NSC) Secretary General, Tamthai,
and an NSC senior staffer.
-- About a year after Surayud Chulanont became interim Prime
Minister following the September 2006 military coup, he
streamlined the structure by choosing to never convene the
steering committee. As a result, Tamthai and the working group
reported directly to PM Surayud. Tamthai said this simplified
structure empowered his working group and increased its
effectiveness, and was in place for about the last four months
of the interim government's existence.
-- When the new, elected government headed by PM Samak
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Sundaravej took office in early 2008, Samak delegated leadership
of the peace process to RTA Commander-in-Chief Anupong
Paochinda. According to Tamthai, Anupong recently decided to
revert to the original structure: a cabinet-level steering
committee overseeing a working group. But this decision has yet
to be implemented, and the new players yet to be identified.
5. (S/NF) As a result, Tamthai currently has no senior body to
report to regarding the outcome of the Bali talks. This leaves
no near-term possibility of moving forward on the recommendation
for pilot peace zones - implementation of which would require
RTG decisions on issues such as troop deployments and funding
commitments. Other delaying factors include the aforementioned
focus on national domestic politics, and the fact that most of
the new RTG players (once identified) would need to be briefed
up on the peace process.
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Reasons to be Encouraged . . .
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6. (S/NF) Stepping back from these immediate concerns, Tamthai
mentioned two recent encouraging developments with regard to the
peace process:
-- The RTG officials at the Southern Border Province
Administration Center (SBPAC) are finally coming to the
realization that a strictly military solution is not possible.
In Tamthai's view, these are the professional bureaucrats who
are actually more important to the peace process than the
(oft-changing) high-level politicians. He cautioned, however,
that different people have different understandings of what
would constitute a "non-military" solution. For example, some
RTG officials believe judicial reform alone could bring peace, a
view that Tamthai sees as unrealistic.
-- General Anupong now believes the time has come to make
public the heretofore secret peace talks, Tamthai claimed.
Tamthai himself has been advocating going public for several
months now. In his view, operational steps toward peace will
require the public's understanding and support. Both sides thus
need to sell the peace process to the public, especially
residents in and around the conflict areas. Moreover, the RTG
needs to be able to tell the outside world that it is pursuing
dialogue and not relying on military action alone. Tamthai
cautioned, however, that making the transition from secret talks
to public dialogue is delicate and difficult, and Anupong has
not decided how or when it can be done.
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. . . and Discouraged
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7. (S/NF) Tamthai also pointed to two recent discouraging
developments impacting the peace process:
-- The RTG's aforementioned preoccupation with national
domestic politics; and
-- Recent RTG setbacks in the south that Tamthai cited but did
not elaborate on: first, a recent spate of casualties there
that has not been publicly disclosed; and second, new
intelligence indicating that the insurgents were more organized
than the RTG had previously thought. Tamthai ironically noted a
silver lining here, in that these negative developments have
helped push RTG and, more specifically, SBPAC officials toward
the realization that a solely military solution to the violence
is not possible.
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Cloak and Dagger
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8. (S/NF) Tamthai said the next round to talks would take place
in late June or early July (pending RTG approval), in a location
to be determined. He said the insurgents always choose the
location, and then inform the RTG participants at the last
minute. Even then, the insurgents provide only the name of the
city, at which point the government officials purchase air
tickets. They are then met upon arrival at the airport and
taken to the meeting site. Tamthai said the Bali meeting
surprised him in that he was driven to a meeting site some 90
minutes into the island's interior.
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Comment
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9. (S/NF) As in our previous meetings, Tamthai was very
measured in his comments, simultaneously pointing out progress
and obstacles. Clearly, his expectations for significant
near-term progress are low, given the current domestic political
dynamic in Bangkok. To Tamthai's credit, his approach is
patient and his view is long-term, and he will continue to seek
opportunities to engineer forward progress. We share, however,
his concern that the slow pace of the peace process sends
unhelpful signals to the advocates of more violence in the
restive south.
10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok.
MORROW