1. (U) This is an action cable, please see para 10.
2. (C) Summary. Funding to train and equip Pakistan's
Frontier Corps has been reduced to $25 million in the 2009
DOD Authorization bill. (It was $75 million in the FY08 DOD
Supplemental. There is no FMF available.) Since a better
trained, better equipped Frontier Corps is the backbone of
our counter-insurgency strategy in the tribal areas, this
reduction in funding is a serious blow. Moreover, it comes
at a time when the Frontier Corps is under new and far more
promising leadership, both the Army and the Frontier Corps
are engaged in serious combat with militants in both Swat and
Bajaur, and, after a long delay, it appears as if Special
Forces training for the Frontier Corps is back on track.
U.S. training of other Pakistani security forces and militia
has only reinforced our confidence in the basic premise of
the U.S. Security Development Plan; the Frontier Corps is the
only Pakistani military organization with the scope and
organization to help the Army clear and hold the tribal
areas. Please advise what other sources of funding might be
available for this national priority. End Summary.
3. (SBU) The 2009 DOD Authorization bill approved by the
Congress September 24 and awaits the President's signature
includes only $25 million for train and equip monies for
Pakistan's Frontier Corps (FC). Funding in 2008 and our
request for 2009 were for $75 million in train and equip
authority for the FC. The language of the bill appears to
prohibit use of Section 1206 funds for paramilitary forces
like the Frontier Corps, restricting the funds for use in
building capacity in "national military forces." This
follows on the Congress' decision not to include additional
FMF funding in the DOD 2009 supplemental, which could have
been used to fund FC support.
4. (C) This unexpected change in authorization could
significantly undercut our ability to support the GOP in its
recently invigorated efforts to defeat the insurgency. It
comes at a time when the Pakistani Army and FC are fighting
in both Swat, Northwest Frontier Province, and Bajaur,
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Bajaur straddles
a key link between Pakistan and Afghanistan, is a base for
insurgents, and has been the source of increased cross-border
attacks on U.S./ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Chief of Army
Staff General Kayani has just appointed one of his best major
generals, MG Tariq Khan, as the new Inspector General for the
FC; Khan already is reinvigorating the FC with plans to
increase salaries, improve morale, and introduce much needed
troop rotations, but his forces lack training and remain
woefully under-equipped. Khan predicted that the Bajaur
operation, one he characterized as critical for Pakistan's
ability to roll back a growing militant insurgency, would
take several more months to succeed. After Bajaur, the FC
and the Army, which just sent another brigade to Bajaur, plan
to move operations to neighboring Mohmand Agency.
5. (C) The U.S. is in the midst of helping the GOP provide
COIN-based relief and support for populations displaced by
Pakistani military action in Swat and Bajaur. This military
action is a welcome change that demonstrates a new degree of
political will to take on the militants; however, it is clear
the Pakistanis still lack adequate counter-insurgency
capabilities.
6. (C) Post is aware of the concern by some in Washington
about the reliability of the FC; the reality is that the
Punjab-based Pakistani Army has proven ineffective in
fighting alone in the Pashtun-dominated FATA. USG efforts to
train Pakistani SSG (Special Forces), the tribal Levies and
the NWFP police have enhanced security to some extent.
However, these forces do not have the scope, organizational
structure or size required to do the job.
7. (C) The Pashtun-based FC is the only local force with the
adequate level of organization and leadership required to
help the Army clear areas of militancy; it is also the best
placed force to hold areas that have been cleared. The way
to improve the effectiveness and reliability of the FC is to
provide this force with equipment and training, and we have
made this effort the cornerstone of our strategy in helping
the GOP defeat militant forces in FATA.
ISLAMABAD 00003177 002 OF 002
8. (C) Reductions in funding now would send a message to
Islamabad that we are not committed to enhanced U.S.-Pakistan
military-military cooperation in the FATA. The new civilian
government would not be slow to recognize that we are giving
them less support for the FC than we gave to President
Musharraf's government. Moreover, this would undermine a
whole range of proposed cooperation, from FC training due to
begin in October to a Joint military Operations Coordination
Center (JMOCC) planned for Tarbella intended to improve
U.S.-Pakistani intelligence coordination. Therefore, we now
face the challenge of cobbling together from a variety of
pots of money $56 million in funding to fill the shortfall
for this critical element of our counter-insurgency strategy.
(Total FY09 requirement is just over $81 million.)
10. (C) Post has been encouraged by the Deputies
Committee's interest in what is needed to support COIN
strategy in Pakistan. We welcome Washington suggestions on
how we can make up this shortfall.
PATTERSON
| A SETBACK TO OUR COIN STRATEGY | |
2008 October 3, 10:59 (Friday) |
08ISLAMABAD3177_a |
CONFIDENTIAL |
CONFIDENTIAL |
|
-- Not Assigned -- |
5714 |
-- Not Assigned -- |
TEXT ONLINE |
-- Not Assigned -- |
TE - Telegram (cable) |
|
-- N/A or Blank -- -- N/A or Blank -- |
-- Not Assigned -- |
-- Not Assigned -- |
|
Content
Raw content
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003177
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MARR, PK
SUBJECT: A SETBACK TO OUR COIN STRATEGY
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (U) This is an action cable, please see para 10.
2. (C) Summary. Funding to train and equip Pakistan's
Frontier Corps has been reduced to $25 million in the 2009
DOD Authorization bill. (It was $75 million in the FY08 DOD
Supplemental. There is no FMF available.) Since a better
trained, better equipped Frontier Corps is the backbone of
our counter-insurgency strategy in the tribal areas, this
reduction in funding is a serious blow. Moreover, it comes
at a time when the Frontier Corps is under new and far more
promising leadership, both the Army and the Frontier Corps
are engaged in serious combat with militants in both Swat and
Bajaur, and, after a long delay, it appears as if Special
Forces training for the Frontier Corps is back on track.
U.S. training of other Pakistani security forces and militia
has only reinforced our confidence in the basic premise of
the U.S. Security Development Plan; the Frontier Corps is the
only Pakistani military organization with the scope and
organization to help the Army clear and hold the tribal
areas. Please advise what other sources of funding might be
available for this national priority. End Summary.
3. (SBU) The 2009 DOD Authorization bill approved by the
Congress September 24 and awaits the President's signature
includes only $25 million for train and equip monies for
Pakistan's Frontier Corps (FC). Funding in 2008 and our
request for 2009 were for $75 million in train and equip
authority for the FC. The language of the bill appears to
prohibit use of Section 1206 funds for paramilitary forces
like the Frontier Corps, restricting the funds for use in
building capacity in "national military forces." This
follows on the Congress' decision not to include additional
FMF funding in the DOD 2009 supplemental, which could have
been used to fund FC support.
4. (C) This unexpected change in authorization could
significantly undercut our ability to support the GOP in its
recently invigorated efforts to defeat the insurgency. It
comes at a time when the Pakistani Army and FC are fighting
in both Swat, Northwest Frontier Province, and Bajaur,
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Bajaur straddles
a key link between Pakistan and Afghanistan, is a base for
insurgents, and has been the source of increased cross-border
attacks on U.S./ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Chief of Army
Staff General Kayani has just appointed one of his best major
generals, MG Tariq Khan, as the new Inspector General for the
FC; Khan already is reinvigorating the FC with plans to
increase salaries, improve morale, and introduce much needed
troop rotations, but his forces lack training and remain
woefully under-equipped. Khan predicted that the Bajaur
operation, one he characterized as critical for Pakistan's
ability to roll back a growing militant insurgency, would
take several more months to succeed. After Bajaur, the FC
and the Army, which just sent another brigade to Bajaur, plan
to move operations to neighboring Mohmand Agency.
5. (C) The U.S. is in the midst of helping the GOP provide
COIN-based relief and support for populations displaced by
Pakistani military action in Swat and Bajaur. This military
action is a welcome change that demonstrates a new degree of
political will to take on the militants; however, it is clear
the Pakistanis still lack adequate counter-insurgency
capabilities.
6. (C) Post is aware of the concern by some in Washington
about the reliability of the FC; the reality is that the
Punjab-based Pakistani Army has proven ineffective in
fighting alone in the Pashtun-dominated FATA. USG efforts to
train Pakistani SSG (Special Forces), the tribal Levies and
the NWFP police have enhanced security to some extent.
However, these forces do not have the scope, organizational
structure or size required to do the job.
7. (C) The Pashtun-based FC is the only local force with the
adequate level of organization and leadership required to
help the Army clear areas of militancy; it is also the best
placed force to hold areas that have been cleared. The way
to improve the effectiveness and reliability of the FC is to
provide this force with equipment and training, and we have
made this effort the cornerstone of our strategy in helping
the GOP defeat militant forces in FATA.
ISLAMABAD 00003177 002 OF 002
8. (C) Reductions in funding now would send a message to
Islamabad that we are not committed to enhanced U.S.-Pakistan
military-military cooperation in the FATA. The new civilian
government would not be slow to recognize that we are giving
them less support for the FC than we gave to President
Musharraf's government. Moreover, this would undermine a
whole range of proposed cooperation, from FC training due to
begin in October to a Joint military Operations Coordination
Center (JMOCC) planned for Tarbella intended to improve
U.S.-Pakistani intelligence coordination. Therefore, we now
face the challenge of cobbling together from a variety of
pots of money $56 million in funding to fill the shortfall
for this critical element of our counter-insurgency strategy.
(Total FY09 requirement is just over $81 million.)
10. (C) Post has been encouraged by the Deputies
Committee's interest in what is needed to support COIN
strategy in Pakistan. We welcome Washington suggestions on
how we can make up this shortfall.
PATTERSON
Metadata
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DE RUEHIL #3177/01 2771059
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9128
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9209
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 8803
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3848
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 0412
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 6154
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 4980
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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