C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000050
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/E
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2019
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PINR, SOCI, SO, ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - TFG-ARS WORKING GROUP SKETCHES PATH TO
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
REF: 1/8/9 SWAN - YATES E-MAIL
Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson. Reasons: 1.4 (b,
d).
1. (C) Summary: The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) -
Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) working group
suggested by the November 25 Djibouti communique began work
under UNPOS auspices in Nairobi the week of January 5, and
appears to have quickly reached a decision to create a unity
government and elect a new president by January 26. Although
the TFG - ARS working group deliberations have been
harmonious enough, not all parliamentarians accept the
ambitious timetable, or elements of the November 25 Djibouti
communique, particularly the expansion of Parliament. Nor is
it clear that all of the clans that would have to be
represented by new MPs in the expanded Parliament that would
be created under a unity government have been fully
consulted. Still, the TFG Prime Minister and the ARS
Chairman have endorsed the plan, and the UN's Special
Representative is traveling to Addis Ababa in an effort to
ensure GoE acceptance. End summary.
The Timetable
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2. (C) The TFG - ARS working group that the November 25
Djibouti communique suggested should negotiate the shape of a
unity government began formal meetings at UNPOS in Nairobi
the week of January 5. In a January 8 meeting, the ten
TFG/ARS representatives, all drawn from the High-Level
Committee, confirmed to us the ambitious timetable sketched
in ref e-mail:
1/10: High-level delegations begin work January 10 in
Djibouti. (The High-Level Committee will act as a
preparatory committee for the expansion of Parliament and
creation of a unity government.)
1/14-15: Djibouti High-Level Committee meeting.
1/16: TFG MPs convene in Djibouti to amend Transitional
Federal Charter.
1/20: Latest date by which ARS convenes its MP-nominees
in Djibouti. (Selection of ARS MPs will be on the basis of
justice and clan balance. The ARS Secretary General will give
final approval to the list. The 75 slots reserved in the
November 25 communique for the business community and civil
society will remain vacant.)
1/21: Expanded Parliament sworn in. Other amendments to
Charter adopted by expanded Parliament after swearing in.
1/22: Speaker elected.
1/24-25: Presidential candidates address Parliament.
1/26: President elected. (The election of a president
will occur even if Parliament not expanded.)
3. (C) The January 20 entry (above) agreed by the working
group appears to sidestep the 4.5 principle that has governed
much of the rest of the work on transitional structures. ARS
working group members have told us that they cannot use
"4.5," as it will alienate their supporters. It is unclear
if the "on the basis of justice and clan balance" formulation
will satisfy all clan participants.
Why Djibouti?
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4. (C) The working group members told us that they had
settled on Djibouti as venue because Baidoa, even if
reinforced with additional ENDF troops, remained too
dangerous. The MPs currently in Nairobi, Mogadishu, and
Puntland would not return for the votes, they feared. The
members also thought an international presence necessary to
ensure the transparency of the process. ARS working group
members told us separately that they could not be seen by
their supporters participating in an event secured by the
Ethiopians. (Note: the December 27 assassination of Deputy
Minister for Reconciliation and MP Ismail Hassan Tamir and
the January 1 assassination of National Reconciliation
Commission member Abdullahi Abdi Egal capped a long series of
hit-and-run attacks on MPs or their compounds in Baidoa and
have stiffened the MPs' resistance to returning for this
projected series of votes.)
5. (C) Although the working group members seemed convinced at
our January 8 meeting that their ambitious timetable could be
met, there will be obstacles along the way. A healthy
minority in the Parliament, currently meeting in Nairobi, is
unhappy at the prospect of awarding the ARS an equal number
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of seats. They have alleged to us that the ARS controls only
two regions in Somalia, which by their calculations would
entitle it to only thirty seats. They also argue that the
November 25 communique agreement in principle to double the
size of Parliament was negotiated without their consent and
that the subsequent endorsement of that communique by
Parliament in Baidoa had been rigged by Speaker Sheikh Aden
"Madobe" and his allies. It is difficult to know how many
MPs reject the working group's plan. Forty-one MPs possible
dissenters attended a January 7 lunch hosted by the Speaker,
who told Special Envoy John Yates on January 8 that he
believes the TFG alone should elect an interim president
while the working-group holds more thorough negotiations
toward the creation of a unity government.
6. (C) SRSG Ould-Abdallah confirmed to S/E Yates January 9
that the working group members were confident that they could
meet the deadlines. The SRSG assured S/E Yates that, even if
efforts to elect a unity president failed, he would ensure
that a TFG president was elected within the one month
deadline established by the Transitional Charter. (Note:
that assurance is in parentheses in the January 26 entry,
above, but we are told that it was verbally agreed, but not
included in the timetable signed by TFG Working Group
Chairman Abdallah Boss Ahmed and ARS Chairwoman Fawzia
Mohammed Sheikh Hassan.) The SRSG is flying to Addis Ababa
January 9 in order to gauge the reaction of the GoE to the
accelerated timetable.
Comment
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7. (C) It is impossible to tell at this juncture if the
working group's optimism about its timetable, and the Prime
Minister and ARS Chairman's willingness to endorse it, spell
success for this effort. The parties to this agreement
believe that it is important to capitalize on the positive
atmosphere created by the possible withdrawal of ENDF troops,
recent al-Shabaab setbacks, and the end of intra-TFG feuding
in creating a unity government. Acting quickly, they
believe, also prevents the warlords and other "spoilers,"
some of whom set their sights on the presidency, from
bolstering their own constituencies, and attempting to put a
stick in the spokes of the process. The agreement to elect a
president, even if just a TFG head-of-state, by January 26
appears to provide the effort with the safety net that it
needs if the Djibouti Process is to remain on track in the
event that the unity government negotiations do not bear
fruit.
RANNEBERGER