b and d.
1. (C) Summary: In a wide ranging discussion with
Assistant Secretary Gordon on August 14, Belarus'
Presidential Administration Chief (White House Chief of
Staff equivalent) Vladimir Makey conveyed Belarus'
interest in improving relations with the U.S. Makey did
not offer any concrete proposals, but welcomed A/S
Gordon's offer to discuss a roadmap of benchmarks to
address our concerns about human rights and democracy that
could lead to a phased rollback of sanctions against
Belarus' leadership. A/S Gordon's meeting with Foreign
Minister Martynov, recapped the discussion with Makey.
End summary.
Belarus Looking to Obama to Change Relations
--------------------------------------------
2. (C) In his opening statement, Makey stressed
Belarus' interest in improved bilateral relations. He
stated his view that both the U.S. and Belarus recognize
the need to move forward our relationship. For its part,
Belarus was ready for dialogue at all levels and was eager
to remove the barriers that exist in our relationship as
soon as possible. Makey noted that he had a
Russian version of President Obama's book "The Audacity of
Hope." He said the GOB and Belarus had hope in better
relations with a White House inhabited by a person who can
change America and the world.
3. (C) Makey continued that he understood change was a two
way street -- both Belarus and the U.S. need to take steps
to improve bilateral relations. He stated that Belarus
was ready to hold honest and open dialogue, but would take
concrete actions as well. However, he stressed that not
all processes and actions will proceed at the same speed.
Belarus' national identity and psychology was formed
during the Soviet Union; the Belarusian people could not
go to bed in the Soviet Union and wake up in the fully
democratic country "we wish it to be." Democratization is
a lengthy process and should not be forced to proceed at
an artificially faster pace. Makey urged dialogue in
order to convey such context about the situation in
Belarus.
4. (C) A/S Gordon explained the Obama Administration's
principled approach toward dialogue even with countries
with which we have disputes, and our interest in exploring
better relations with Belarus. In our view Belarus had
taken a number of limited, positive steps (on political
prisoners, distribution of independent newspapers,
non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and the
U.S. wants to build on these to continue moving forward.
The priority remains the human rights and democracy
situation in Belarus. However, the U.S. also wants to
explore mutually beneficial cooperation in other areas,
including the WTO, NATO, and nuclear security. A/S Gordon
stated that the U.S. would also like to see the U.S.
Embassy fully staffed up to facilitate new avenues of
cooperation. A/S Gordon also suggested developing a
roadmap of specific steps by both sides to improve
relations.
More Positive Steps to Come, Slowly
-----------------------------------
5. (C) Makey showed appreciation for our acknowledgment
of Belarus' positive steps and stressed there would be
more to come -- "the process of the development of
democracy is a permanent process." Dialogue with civil
society is necessary and will happen. More newspapers
will be registered and distributed through state
networks. Makey emphasized that the GOB's past and
forthcoming positive steps came from a "sincere desire" to
open up Belarusian society. He also urged a calm approach
to change, as Belarus has already taken "sweeping" steps
during the past year that were unimaginable a year and a
half ago. A/S Gordon urged the distribution of additional
independent newspapers and the registration of additional
NGOs, and noted the importance of ensuring that the next
presidential elections meet international standards. He
pointed to the case of youth activist Artyom Dubski
and noted that it would be unfortunate if the issue of
political prisoners were back on our agenda. Makey
indicated the Dubski case would be addressed and the MFA
would provide us the appropriate information.
6. (C) Makey also hinted at possible factions in the GOB
affecting internal discussions on reform. While noting
that there would be forward movement, Makey said there
could be different views and different proponents and
opponents on specific developments. Makey "did not want
to indicate that there are different views within (the
GOB), but there are views on how to develop society."
No Problems with NATO and Nuclear Security
------------------------------------------
7. (C) On NATO, Makey said he saw no specific problems
regarding NATO and was ready for further cooperation --
taking into account Belarus' national interests and
obligations to its allies, including Russia and the
Collective Security Treaty Organization.
8. (C) Makey also saw no problems in our cooperation on
nuclear security and said our joint work at the Sosny
nuclear facility was absolutely transparent and in line
with IAEA regulations. Regarding the transfer of spent
fuel to Russia, Makey said Belarus and Russia should soon
finalize the protocols for the transfer. On START
follow-on discussions, Makey raised the guarantees of
Belarus' independence and sovereignty in the 1994 Budapest
memorandum and said Belarus wanted to see these guarantees
in any new agreement. This was important for Belarus in
light of its pursuit of an independent foreign policy.
A/S Gordon stated that we remain committed to the Budapest
guarantees, which would remain in force regardless of the
outcome of START follow-on negotiations. A/S Gordon also
noted the possibility of VCI A/S Rose Gottemoeller
visiting Minsk to discuss nuclear security issues and
noted the President's Nuclear Security Summit in March
2009.
Embassy Staffing: On the Table, but No Progress
--------------------------------------------- --
9. (C) Makey reiterated the GOB's traditional linkage
between restrictions on Embassy Minsk staffing and our
financial sanctions on the Lukashenka-controlled company
Belneftekhim -- once sanctions are lifted, the GOB will
remove staffing restrictions. (Comment: Lukashenka has
personally and publicly given these marching orders on
restrictions on our Embassy staffing and Makey is just
following the party line.) A/S Gordon emphasized our
position that our sanctions are based on our human rights
and democracy concerns and only movement in these areas
will lead to any movement on sanctions. Ultimately, Makey
stated that everything was on the table in our dialogue
and Embassy staffing could be discussed within the context
of a roadmap to improve relations. He also noted
increased trade and economic ties with the U.S. could help
remove the staffing restrictions.
10. (C) A/S Gordon suggested short term measures to
increase
our bilateral engagement, including designating a
non-resident defense attach, legal attach, and Foreign
Commercial Service representative. Makey said he
understood such issues had been raised and, while
remaining non-committal, said he supported dialogue with
U.S. representatives at different levels.
Sanctions are Driving Away American Business
--------------------------------------------
11. (C) Makey commented that our sanctions are not against
Belarus' leadership and in fact hurt the Belarusian people
and American companies interested in doing business in
Belarus. He noted the GOB wanted American business in
Belarus to balance the influence of Russian business,
which want to get everything for nothing.
Roadmap
-------
12. (C) A/S Gordon outlined a roadmap approach to improved
U.S.-Belarus relations, with suggested benchmarks to
address our concerns about human rights and democracy that
could lead to a phased rollback of sanctions against
Belarus' leadership. Makey accepted the idea of a roadmap
and agreed to further discussion of expectations,
parameters, and a timeline. The key was concrete measures
taken in a timely fashion -- "not referring to the U.S.,"
Makey noted making past arrangements, only to have
Belarus' partners break them. Makey noted that he and
Foreign Policy Advisor Rybakov have daily access to
Lukashenka and this direct channel can help remove
obstacles as they appear.
The Russia Angle
----------------
13. (C) In response to A/S Gordon's query, Makey closed
the meeting with a candid portrayal of Belarus-Russia
relations. Makey noted that while Belarus had in the past
voiced its pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy, in
practice Belarus was almost completely dependent on
Russia, especially for trade. Only after "problems" with
Russia in 2007 (when Russia dictated higher energy prices
to Belarus), did Belarus' multi-vector approach become
reality. However, Russia continues to view Belarus as a
vassal to which it dictates policy, including the sale of
Belarusian state-owned enterprises to Russian oligarchs.
Belarus' engagement with the EU on the Eastern Partnership
Initiative was a particular problem with Russia.
14. (C) Makey believes Lukashenka's efforts to maintain
Belarus' sovereignty have irked Russian leadership and he
did not ruling out Russian involvement in Belarus' next
presidential elections in 2010/2011. However, he believes
this would be in vain as the Belarusian people will not be
bought off by external forces.
15. (C) As has been noted to us and EU interlocutors in
the past, Makey said Russia is putting economic pressure
on Belarus to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Martynov Meeting
----------------
16. (C) A/S Gordon also met with FM Martynov and briefly
recapped the same discussion he had with Makey.
17. (U) Assistant Secretary Gordon has cleared this cable.
CLINTON
| BELARUS: ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON'S MEETINGS WITH CHIEF OF STAFF MAKEY AND FOREIGN MINISTER MARTYNOV | |
2009 August 19, 21:13 (Wednesday) |
09STATE86606_a |
CONFIDENTIAL |
CONFIDENTIAL |
|
-- Not Assigned -- |
10275 |
-- Not Assigned -- |
TEXT ONLINE |
-- Not Assigned -- |
TE - Telegram (cable) |
|
-- N/A or Blank -- -- N/A or Blank -- |
-- Not Assigned -- |
-- Not Assigned -- |
|
Content
Raw content
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 086606
SIPDIS
EMBASSY VILNIUS AND EMBASSY KYIV: FOR EMBASSY MINSK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2019
TAGS: ECON, PHUM, PREL, PGOV, BO, RS, GG
SUBJECT: BELARUS: ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON'S MEETINGS
WITH CHIEF OF STAFF MAKEY AND FOREIGN MINISTER MARTYNOV
Classified By: Assistant Secretary Philip H. Gordon. Reasons 1.4,
b and d.
1. (C) Summary: In a wide ranging discussion with
Assistant Secretary Gordon on August 14, Belarus'
Presidential Administration Chief (White House Chief of
Staff equivalent) Vladimir Makey conveyed Belarus'
interest in improving relations with the U.S. Makey did
not offer any concrete proposals, but welcomed A/S
Gordon's offer to discuss a roadmap of benchmarks to
address our concerns about human rights and democracy that
could lead to a phased rollback of sanctions against
Belarus' leadership. A/S Gordon's meeting with Foreign
Minister Martynov, recapped the discussion with Makey.
End summary.
Belarus Looking to Obama to Change Relations
--------------------------------------------
2. (C) In his opening statement, Makey stressed
Belarus' interest in improved bilateral relations. He
stated his view that both the U.S. and Belarus recognize
the need to move forward our relationship. For its part,
Belarus was ready for dialogue at all levels and was eager
to remove the barriers that exist in our relationship as
soon as possible. Makey noted that he had a
Russian version of President Obama's book "The Audacity of
Hope." He said the GOB and Belarus had hope in better
relations with a White House inhabited by a person who can
change America and the world.
3. (C) Makey continued that he understood change was a two
way street -- both Belarus and the U.S. need to take steps
to improve bilateral relations. He stated that Belarus
was ready to hold honest and open dialogue, but would take
concrete actions as well. However, he stressed that not
all processes and actions will proceed at the same speed.
Belarus' national identity and psychology was formed
during the Soviet Union; the Belarusian people could not
go to bed in the Soviet Union and wake up in the fully
democratic country "we wish it to be." Democratization is
a lengthy process and should not be forced to proceed at
an artificially faster pace. Makey urged dialogue in
order to convey such context about the situation in
Belarus.
4. (C) A/S Gordon explained the Obama Administration's
principled approach toward dialogue even with countries
with which we have disputes, and our interest in exploring
better relations with Belarus. In our view Belarus had
taken a number of limited, positive steps (on political
prisoners, distribution of independent newspapers,
non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and the
U.S. wants to build on these to continue moving forward.
The priority remains the human rights and democracy
situation in Belarus. However, the U.S. also wants to
explore mutually beneficial cooperation in other areas,
including the WTO, NATO, and nuclear security. A/S Gordon
stated that the U.S. would also like to see the U.S.
Embassy fully staffed up to facilitate new avenues of
cooperation. A/S Gordon also suggested developing a
roadmap of specific steps by both sides to improve
relations.
More Positive Steps to Come, Slowly
-----------------------------------
5. (C) Makey showed appreciation for our acknowledgment
of Belarus' positive steps and stressed there would be
more to come -- "the process of the development of
democracy is a permanent process." Dialogue with civil
society is necessary and will happen. More newspapers
will be registered and distributed through state
networks. Makey emphasized that the GOB's past and
forthcoming positive steps came from a "sincere desire" to
open up Belarusian society. He also urged a calm approach
to change, as Belarus has already taken "sweeping" steps
during the past year that were unimaginable a year and a
half ago. A/S Gordon urged the distribution of additional
independent newspapers and the registration of additional
NGOs, and noted the importance of ensuring that the next
presidential elections meet international standards. He
pointed to the case of youth activist Artyom Dubski
and noted that it would be unfortunate if the issue of
political prisoners were back on our agenda. Makey
indicated the Dubski case would be addressed and the MFA
would provide us the appropriate information.
6. (C) Makey also hinted at possible factions in the GOB
affecting internal discussions on reform. While noting
that there would be forward movement, Makey said there
could be different views and different proponents and
opponents on specific developments. Makey "did not want
to indicate that there are different views within (the
GOB), but there are views on how to develop society."
No Problems with NATO and Nuclear Security
------------------------------------------
7. (C) On NATO, Makey said he saw no specific problems
regarding NATO and was ready for further cooperation --
taking into account Belarus' national interests and
obligations to its allies, including Russia and the
Collective Security Treaty Organization.
8. (C) Makey also saw no problems in our cooperation on
nuclear security and said our joint work at the Sosny
nuclear facility was absolutely transparent and in line
with IAEA regulations. Regarding the transfer of spent
fuel to Russia, Makey said Belarus and Russia should soon
finalize the protocols for the transfer. On START
follow-on discussions, Makey raised the guarantees of
Belarus' independence and sovereignty in the 1994 Budapest
memorandum and said Belarus wanted to see these guarantees
in any new agreement. This was important for Belarus in
light of its pursuit of an independent foreign policy.
A/S Gordon stated that we remain committed to the Budapest
guarantees, which would remain in force regardless of the
outcome of START follow-on negotiations. A/S Gordon also
noted the possibility of VCI A/S Rose Gottemoeller
visiting Minsk to discuss nuclear security issues and
noted the President's Nuclear Security Summit in March
2009.
Embassy Staffing: On the Table, but No Progress
--------------------------------------------- --
9. (C) Makey reiterated the GOB's traditional linkage
between restrictions on Embassy Minsk staffing and our
financial sanctions on the Lukashenka-controlled company
Belneftekhim -- once sanctions are lifted, the GOB will
remove staffing restrictions. (Comment: Lukashenka has
personally and publicly given these marching orders on
restrictions on our Embassy staffing and Makey is just
following the party line.) A/S Gordon emphasized our
position that our sanctions are based on our human rights
and democracy concerns and only movement in these areas
will lead to any movement on sanctions. Ultimately, Makey
stated that everything was on the table in our dialogue
and Embassy staffing could be discussed within the context
of a roadmap to improve relations. He also noted
increased trade and economic ties with the U.S. could help
remove the staffing restrictions.
10. (C) A/S Gordon suggested short term measures to
increase
our bilateral engagement, including designating a
non-resident defense attach, legal attach, and Foreign
Commercial Service representative. Makey said he
understood such issues had been raised and, while
remaining non-committal, said he supported dialogue with
U.S. representatives at different levels.
Sanctions are Driving Away American Business
--------------------------------------------
11. (C) Makey commented that our sanctions are not against
Belarus' leadership and in fact hurt the Belarusian people
and American companies interested in doing business in
Belarus. He noted the GOB wanted American business in
Belarus to balance the influence of Russian business,
which want to get everything for nothing.
Roadmap
-------
12. (C) A/S Gordon outlined a roadmap approach to improved
U.S.-Belarus relations, with suggested benchmarks to
address our concerns about human rights and democracy that
could lead to a phased rollback of sanctions against
Belarus' leadership. Makey accepted the idea of a roadmap
and agreed to further discussion of expectations,
parameters, and a timeline. The key was concrete measures
taken in a timely fashion -- "not referring to the U.S.,"
Makey noted making past arrangements, only to have
Belarus' partners break them. Makey noted that he and
Foreign Policy Advisor Rybakov have daily access to
Lukashenka and this direct channel can help remove
obstacles as they appear.
The Russia Angle
----------------
13. (C) In response to A/S Gordon's query, Makey closed
the meeting with a candid portrayal of Belarus-Russia
relations. Makey noted that while Belarus had in the past
voiced its pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy, in
practice Belarus was almost completely dependent on
Russia, especially for trade. Only after "problems" with
Russia in 2007 (when Russia dictated higher energy prices
to Belarus), did Belarus' multi-vector approach become
reality. However, Russia continues to view Belarus as a
vassal to which it dictates policy, including the sale of
Belarusian state-owned enterprises to Russian oligarchs.
Belarus' engagement with the EU on the Eastern Partnership
Initiative was a particular problem with Russia.
14. (C) Makey believes Lukashenka's efforts to maintain
Belarus' sovereignty have irked Russian leadership and he
did not ruling out Russian involvement in Belarus' next
presidential elections in 2010/2011. However, he believes
this would be in vain as the Belarusian people will not be
bought off by external forces.
15. (C) As has been noted to us and EU interlocutors in
the past, Makey said Russia is putting economic pressure
on Belarus to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Martynov Meeting
----------------
16. (C) A/S Gordon also met with FM Martynov and briefly
recapped the same discussion he had with Makey.
17. (U) Assistant Secretary Gordon has cleared this cable.
CLINTON
Metadata
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DE RUEHC #6606 2312131
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 192113Z AUG 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0000
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN PRIORITY 0000
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0000
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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