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ACTION EA-14
INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00
IO-13 AID-20 DPW-01 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 AGR-20 EB-11
ACDA-19 OMB-01 AF-10 SR-02 ORM-03 RSR-01 ( ADP ) W
--------------------- 078741
O R 281140Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2766
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RANGOON
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
USIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMCONSUL UDORN
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USMISSION USUN
AMCONSUL CAN THO
AMCONSUL BIEN HOA
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
CINCPAC
CINCPACFLT
CINCUSARPAC
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DIA WASHDC
CGFMFPAC
CGUSARSUPTHAI
CNO
COMNAVINTCOM
COMSEVENTHFLT
COMUSMACTHAI
7/13 AF
7TH PSYOPS
COMUSSAG
III MAF
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 PHNOM PENH 9021
JOINT EMBASSY/DAO
E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PINT, PINS, PFOR, MOPS, CB
SUBJ: KHMER REPORT - AUGUST 28, 1973
1. GENERAL. THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION THIS WEEK WAS ON THE MILITARY
SCENE AS KHMER INSURGNT FORCES RENEWED THEIR OFFENSIVE
ACTIVITIES WITH A SERIES OF ATTACKS AGAINST KEY LINES OF
COMMUNICATION INCLUDING ROUTES 1, 4 AND 5. ROUTES 4
AND 5 REMAIN CLOSED BUT FANK COUNTERATTACKS ALONG
RTE 1 SUCCEEDED IN REOPENING THE ROAD AND INFLICTING
HEAVY CASUALTIES ON THE ENEMY. THE ISOLATED PROVINCIAL
CAPAITAL OF KOMPONG CHAM MEANWHILE REMAINS UNDER PRESSURE.
RENEWED BARGAINING BETWEEN THE SOCIO-REPUBLICAN AND
REPUBLICAN PARTIES ON A CONTINGENCY REPLACEMENT CABINET
FOR THE IN TAM GOVERNMENT HAS SO FAR FAILED TO PRODUCE
ANY CLEAR-CUT POLITICAL RESULTS AND THE SITUATION
THUS REMAINS ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED. SIHANOUK TOLD
AN AFP REPORTED THAT PEKING THAT THE DRV HAS REFUSED TO
PROVIDE THE KHMER INSURGENTS WITH DIRECT ARMS AID BUT
ADDED THAT FIGHTING WOULD CONTINUE NEVERTHELESS. THE
GKR IS SEEKING ADDITIONAL RICE FROM THAILAND AND JAPAN
TO FILL THE GAP UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF U.S. PL 480
RICE AT THE END OF THE YEAR.
2. POLITICAL (INTERNAL). AT PRESIDENT LON NOL'S INSISTENCE,
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THE SOCIO-REPUBLICAN AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES THIS WEEK
RESUMED DISCUSSIONS IN AN EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE
COMPOSITION OF A POST-IN TAM CABINET. DEEP-SEATED
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS HAVE PREVENTED
SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD THIS GOAL, HOWEVER. IT
THUS APPEARS THAT THE IN TAM GOVERNMENT WILL REMAIN
IN PLACE FOR THE TIME BEING ALTHOUGH POLITICAL TENSIONS,
ESPECIALLY THOSE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMY,
LIMIT ITS ABILITY TO DEAL WITH PRESSING NATIONAL
PROBLEMS. THE DEMOCRATS MEANWHILE CONTINUE TO REFUSE
ANY COOPERATION WITH THE OTHER PARTIES AND THEIR BEST-
KNOWN ALLY, FORMER PRIME MINISTER SON SANN, FINDING
THE MOMENT UNPROPITIOUS FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITY, HAS
MADE PLANS TO RETURN TO PARIS ON AUGUST 29.
3. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON AUGUST 27, SISOWATH SIRIK
MATAK, MEMBER OF THE HIGH POLITICAL COUNCIL AND COUSIN
OF SIHANOUK, RELEASED AN OPEN LETTER TO THE PRINCE
CALLING ON HIM TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE RESISTANCE MOVE-
MENT WHICH HE SUPPOSEDLY LEADS IS REALLY A CAMOUFLAGE FOR
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AGAINST CAMBODIA AND THAT
HE IS ONLY BEING USED BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS FOR THEIR OWN
BENEFIT. THIS ADMISSION HAVING BEEN MADE, THE LETTER CONCLUDES,
SIHANOUK SHOULD RETIRE FROM THE SCENE AS A TRUE GESTURE OF
PATRIOTISM. OVER THE WEEKEND PRESIDENT LON NOL MADE A PAIR OF
RADION ADDRESSES ECHOING MANY OF SIRIK MATAK'S POINTS
CONCERNING THE WEAKNESSES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN SIHANOUK'S
POSITION. EARLIER IN THE WEEK, BOTH MINISTER OF INFORMATION SUM
CHHUM AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS LONG BORET PUBLICLY DENIED A
UPI REPORT THAT HIGH-RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICALS HAD ASKED THE
U.S. TO REMOVE MARSHAL LON NOL AND INVITE SIHAOUK TO RETURN TO
POWER. THEY DENIED ALSO THAT THERE IS ANY SIGNIFICANT SENTIMENT
IN FAVOR OF SIHANOUK AMONG THE CAMBODIAN POPULATION.
4. THE COUNCIL OF WAR TOOK ITS THIRD IMPORTANT ACTION WHEN IT
RETIRED GENDARMERIE NATIONAL MAJOR SUOS PANN FROM THE SERVICE
AND TRANSFERRED HIM TO THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR FURTHER
PUNISHMENT. SUOS PANN KILLED A BRITISH EMPLOYEE OF A FOREIGN
FIRM IN A SHOOTING EPISODE AT A PHNOM PENH BAR.
5. POLITICAL (EXTERNAL). LON NOL SPECIAL EMISSARY MG SAK
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SUTSAKHAN VISITED MANILA AND MET WITH PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT
MARCOS AND FOREIGN MINISTER ROMULO. SAK SUTSAKHAN ASKED THE
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE GKR, ESPECIALLY
IN THE UNGA; TO HELP BRING PRESSURE ON THE KHMER INSURGENTS TO
NEGOTIATE; AND TO ENCOURAGE ASEAN SUPPORT FOR THE GKR. THE
PHILIPPINE REACTION TO THESE OVERTURES WAS REPORTEDLY SYMPATHETIC.
6. THE GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND IN A DECLARATION OF POLICY ON CAMBODIA
HAS STATED THAT IT "WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE KHMER PEOPLE TO
DETERMINE THEIR FUTURE AND SOLVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS WITHOUT OUTSIDE
INTERFERENCE" AND THAT "ALL THE PROBLEMS BESETTING THE KHMER
REPUBLIC STEM FROM THREATS BY NORTH VIETNAM". THE DECLARATION
ADDED THAT NO THAI COMBAT TROOPS WILL BE SENT TO OPERATE IN
CAMBODIA.
7. GRUNK/FUNK. AFP GAVE USLO PEKING DETAILS NOT IN ITS PUBLISHED
AUGUST 17 INTERVIEW WITH SIGANOUK. THE PRINCE TOLD AFP THAT
HE ASKED DRV PREMIER PHAM VAN DONG TO PROVIDE THE INSURGENTS WITH
DIRECT ARMS SUPPLIES BUT DONG DEMURRED BECAUSE THE DRV WAS NO
LONGER AT WAR. THE DRV PREMIER DID AGREE, HOWEVER, THAT INSURGENTS
COULD CARRY BACK SUPPLIES FROM NVA-HELD AREAS IN SOUTH VIETNAM IF
THEY COULD REACH THEM. THE PRINCE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE LULL IN
CAMBODIAN FIGHTING IS MERELY DUE TO INSURGENT REGROUPING AND
FIGHTING WOULD CONTINUE IN THE RAINY SEASON (SIC) ACCORDING TO
THE AFP SOURCE.
8. A LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH INTERVIEW, HOWEVER, QUOTES THE PRINCE
AS BELIEVING PHNOM PENH WOULD FALL BEFORE THE END OF THE DRY
SEASON IN MAY 1974. HE ALSO NOTED C
E E E E E E E E
MRN: 1973PHNOM 009021 SEGMENT NUMBER: 000002 ERROR READING TEXT INDEX
FILE; TELEGRAM TEXT FOR THIS SEGMENT IS UNAVAILABLE