CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 01 OSLO 05256 01 OF 02 031137Z 11 ACTION EUR-08 INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 IO-03 SP-02 INR-05 EB-03 L-01 PM-03 COA-01 SAJ-01 OES-02 RSC-01 DODE-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 PRS-01 CIAE-00 /051 W --------------------- 061330 R 021538Z DEC 74 FM AMEMBASSY OSLO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9023 INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN USMISSION GENEVA AMEMBASSY HELSINKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM USMISSION NATO USMISSION UN C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 OSLO 5256 LIMDIS E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PARM, NO, UR SUBJECT: KEKKONEN PLAN AND NORWEGIAN SECURITY REF: OSLO 5199 SUMMARY. NORWEGIAN OFFICIALS ARE QUESTIONING WHAT MAY LIE BEHIND MOSCOW'S CURRENT ATTENTION TO THE KEKKONEN PLAN TO MAKE SCANDINAVIA A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE. THEY DO NO SEE EXACTLY HOW IT FITS INTO THE PATTERN OF CURRENT DELICATE SOVIET-NORWEGIAN NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING THE BARENTS SEA, BUT ARE CONCERNED BECAUSE THEY EXPECT THAT THE ISSUE OF SOVIET SECURITY IN THE NORTH WILL BE INTRODUCED IN SOME FASHION INTO THE NEXT PHASE OF NEGOTPIATIONS ON DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF. THEY ARE ALSO SENSITIVE TO ANY SOVIET MOVES WHICH MAY COMPLICATE THE CURRENT DEBATE WITHIN NORWAY OVER MODERNIZATION OF THE DEFENSE FORCES. OSLO ANTICIPATES THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 OSLO 05256 01 OF 02 031137Z SOVIETS WILL LOOK FOR CONCESSIONS IN THE AREA OF CONTROLLING OFF-SHORE SHORE OIL OPERATIONS AND POSSIBLE JOINT EXPOLITATION IN THE BARENTS SEA, BUT DOES NOT TOTALLY DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME PROBE IN THE ARMS LIMITATION FIELD. SEEN FROM OSLO MOSCOW'S POLICY OF DETENTE REMAINS THE MOST EFFECTIVE SOVIET WEAPON FOR OVERCOMING NORWEGIAN HESITANCY TO COOPERATE BILATERALLY WITH THE USSR IN THE NORTH, AND FOR WEAKENING OVER TIME NORWAYS'S TIES TO NATO AND ITS DEFENSE POSTURE. THE KEKKONEN PLAN, WHICH WOULD OSTENSIBLY REMOVE THE NEED FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA OVER NORWAY AND DENMARK, IS LOGICAL IF UNEXCITING ELEMENT IN THIS SOVIET DETENTE POLICY. END SUMMARY. 1. NORWEGIAN REACTION. NORWEGIAN OFFICIALS ARE PUZZLED (AS WE ARE) WHY THE USSR SHOULD WISH TO PLACE SUCH STRESS ON THE KEKKONEN PLAN AT THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT, AND HOW THIS MAY FIT INTO THE BRADER SCHEME OF SOVIET-NORWEGIAN RELATIONS. DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS VIBE HAS SPECULATED THAT MOSCOW MAY CONSIDER THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE FAVORABLE FOR ESTABLISHING A SPECIAL STATUS OF NORTHERN EUROPE-- WHICH WOULD PROVIDE USSR INTER ALIA WITH PRETEXT FOR INTERFERING IN NORWEGIAN DEFENSE PLANNING. BUT HE ALSO MADE VERY CLEAR (AS HAS HIM MINISTER PREVIOUSLY) THAT KEKKONEN PLAN HAS NO APPEAL IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES. REACTING PERHAPS TO FACT PODGORNYY SPRANG HIS ENDORSEMENT OF PLAN ON EVE OF NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER'S TRIP TO EASTERN EUROPE, BRATTELI WENT OUT OF HIS WAY IN BOTH POLAND AND HUNGARY TO MAKE CLEAR IT WAS A NON-STARTER. THOUGH INCLINED TO DISMISS PLAN AS OLD CHESTNUT, NORWEGIANS ALSO APPEAR IRRITATED BY ITS NEW PROMINENCE AND UNSURE WHETER THEY MAY NOT BE SEEING TIP OF SOVIET ICEBERG WITH UNPLESANT SECURITY IMPLICATIONS UNDER THE SURFACE. 2. SOVIET COMMENTARY. SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON KEKKONEN PLAN (NOV. 12 AND 22 FBIS) ARE NOT VERY HELPFUL IN ANSWERING A) WHY NOW? AND B) IS PROPOSAL ANY MORE PRECISELY TARGETED THAN THE USUAL PROPAGANDA INTENDED TO PORTRAY USSR AS A PEACE-SEEKING COUNTRY? SINCE, ACCORDING TO PRAVDA, FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE COULD LEAD TO CREATION OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN NORTHERN EUROPE, IT WOULD SEEM PREMATURE TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON PLAN WHILE CSCE HAS STILL MANY MONTHS TO GO. ACCEPTANCE OF KEKKONEN PLAN IS PICTURED BY PRAVDA AND IZVESTIYA IN ESSENTIALLY DETENTE FRAMEWORK AS "EXCLUDING CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 OSLO 05256 01 OF 02 031137Z THE TERRITORES OF NORTHER EUROPEAN STATES FROM SPHERE OF THE ARMS RACE," WITH IZVESTIYA ADDING THAT IT WOULD "FURTHER IMPROVE SITUATION THROUGHOUT EUROPE AS A WHOLE." IZVESTIYA ALSO LINKS THE PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, TO THE MORE SPECIFIC MILITARY GOAL OF DENUCLEARIZING SCANDINAVIA, NOTING THAT "CERTAIN NATO CIRCLES... WISH TO RESERVE AN "ATOMIC LOOPHOLE" FOR THEMSTEVES IN SCANDINAVIA," NOTWITHSTANDING THE ANNOUNCED POSITION OF THE NORWEGIAN, DANISH AND SWEDISH GOVERNMENTS ON THIS QUESTION. CONTRIBUTION TO DETENTE ATMOSPHERE? IT WOULD BE LOGICAL FOR THE USSR TO TRY TO EXPLOIT ANY FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF CSCE TO GIVE ADDED MOMENTUM TO POPULAR FEELINGS OF DETENTE. THE FACT THAT THE USSR DID NOT WAIT UNTIL THE CSCE WAS CLOSER TO COMPLETION TO PUSH KEKKONEN PLAN COULD BE EXPLAINED, HOWEVER, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE ANNUAL DEBATE AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO FOCUS DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF ATOM-FREE ZONES, AND THIS YEAR IS NO EXCEPTION. SOVIETS MAY HOPE THAT, IN THE PRESENT ATMOSPHERE OF ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY WHEN PEOPLES AND PARLIAMENTS MAY BE RELUCTANT TO APPROPRIATE LARGE SUMS FOR DEFENSE, EVEN THE FAMILIAR KEKKONEN PLAN MAY CONTRIBUTE TO THIS DETENTE GOAL. 4. AIMED AT SCANDINAVIAN DEFENSE? IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT TIMING OF KEKKONEN PLAN PROPAGANDA IS ALSO RELATED TO DEFENSE PLANNING IN SCANDINAVIA. VIBE SPECULATED THAT SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONCERNED BY RECENT DISCUSSION IN SWEDISH PRESS OF DESIRABILITY OF ACQUIRING MINI-NUKES. CONCEIVABLY SOVIETS ARE ALSO CONCERNED THAT DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY INDUSTRY IN SWEDEN (OPPOSITION REMAINS GREATER IN NORWAY) COULD OPEN DOOR TO DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SEEN FROM NORWAY, AT LEAST, SUCH CONCERN DOES NOT APPEAR VERY REASONABLE. BUT IT WOULD PROVIDE THE MOST LOGICAL EXPLANATION FOR RENEWED SOVIET STRESS ON THE KEKKONEN PLAN. 5. AT VERY LEAST, USSR REMAINS HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS AND PREVENTIVE- ORIENTED IN ITS GENERAL APPROACH TO SECURITY PROBLEMS, AS ILLUSTRATED BY SOVIET EFFORTS IN CONNECTION WITH BRATTELI'S CONFIDENTIAL NNN CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 01 OSLO 05256 02 OF 02 031014Z 16 ACTION EUR-08 INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 IO-03 SP-02 INR-05 EB-03 L-01 PM-03 COA-01 SAJ-01 RSC-01 OES-02 DODE-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 PRS-01 CIAE-00 /051 W --------------------- 060568 R 021538Z DEC 74 FM AMEMBASSY OSLO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9024 INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN USMISSION GENEVA AMEMBASSY HELSINKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM USMISSION NATO USMISSION UN C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 2 OSLO 5256 LIMDIS VISIT LAST MARCH TO EXTRACT NEW COMMITMENTS THAT NORWAY REMAINED OPPOSED TO FOREIGN BASES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON ITS SOIL. MOSCOW IS ALSO QUITE AWARE THAT: NORWAY, DENMARK AND PERHAPS SWEDEN HAVE ALL RETAINED THE OPTION TO HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IF THREATENED A SPECIAL NORWEGIAN DEFENSE COMMISSION IS PRESENTLY REEXAMINING THE BASIS FOR FUTURE DEFENSE POLICY IN ALL FIELDS; NORWEGIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY IS STUDYING SEPARATELY WHAT INCREASED NAVAL AND AIR FORCES IT NEEDS TO ENFORCE ITS SOVEREIGNTY ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF OFF NORTHERN AS WELL AS WESTERN EUROPE, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF INTENSE PRESS INTEREST IN THIS SUBJECT; DECISION MUST BE MADE EARLY NEXT YEAR WHAT FIGHTER THE FOUR CONSORTIUM COUNTRIES, INCLUDING DENMARK AND NORWAY, WILL PURCHASE TO REPLACE THE F-104; AND NORWEGIANS ALSO HOPE TO PURCHASE SOME FORM OF ALL-WEATHER-SHORT- RANGE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. GIVEN THIS EXTENSIVE ATTENTION TO MODERNIZATION OF MILITARY FORCES IN NORWAY AND ELSEWHERE IN CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 OSLO 05256 02 OF 02 031014Z SCANDINAVIA, AND THE TREND THAT AN INCREASING NUMBER OF PLANES AND MISSILES ARE NUCLEAR-CAPABLE, MOSCOW MAY FEEL THAT SOME EFFORT IS REQUIRED TO HAMPER A MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WHICH, WHILE COMPARATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT, WILL AFFECT THE CAPABILITY OF FORCES NEIGHBORING THE VITAL AND VULNERABLE KOLA PENISULA. 6. PRESS ARTICLES BY LEADING NORWEGIAN ANLYSTS AND OFFICIALS WILL HAVE ALERTED MOSCOW TO FACT THAT NORWAY IS VERY SENSITIVE TO SOVIET SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE NORTH. PREVIOUS UNILATERAL NORWEGIAN PLEDGES REGARDING FOREIGN BASES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD ALSO HAVE ENCOURAGED MOSCOW TO HOPE IT CAN EXTRACT SOME ADDITIONAL FORM OF UNILATERAL "REASSURANCE" FROM NORWAY. THE QUESTION, SURELY, IS NOT WHETHER BUT HOW MOSCOW WILL SEEK TO EXPLOIT THIS NORWEGIAN SENSITIVITY IN ORDER TO FURTHER SOVIET SECURITY AND OTHER INTERESTS DURING THE PRESENT PHASE OF SENSITIVE NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING THE BARENTS SEA. 7. NORWEGIANS HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY MIDDLE-LEVEL SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN OSLO TO EXPECT SOME EFFORT TO ESCALATE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS ON DELIMITING THE BARENTS SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF FROM TECHNICAL-LEGAL TO HIGHER POLITICAL FORUM IN WHICH SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS CAN BE TREATED MORE DIRECTLY. NORWEGIANS HAVE BEEN RESISTING ANY DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL "PACKAGE DEAL"INVOLVING THE BARENTS SEA, INSISTING THAT FISHERY AND SHELF DELIMITATION TALKS SHOULD BE KEPT SEPARATE, AND CERTAINLY APART FROM ANY DISCUSSION OF SECURITY. THEY APPEAR RECONCILED TO FACT, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO GET A BOUNDARY SETTLEMENT WITHOUT EVENTUALLY TREATING LARGER QUESTIONS OF SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INTEREST TO MOSCOW. 8. THUS FAR, SOVIET PROBES HAVE INVOLVED: A) ENTICING NOR- WEGIANS INTO A BILATERAL DETERMINATION WITH THE USSR OF WHAT ACTIVITY SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE SENSITIVE SVALBAR-BARENTS SEA AREA; B) EXCLUDING FOREIGN FIRMS FROM OFF-SHORE OIL OPERATIONS IN BARENTS SEA; C) POSSIBLE JOINT SOVIET-NORWEGIAN OIL EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION IN THE BARENTS SEA. WHILE NORWAY HAS RESISTED BEING DRAGGED INTO BILATERAL DIALOGUE WITH THE USSR ABOUT THE SENSITIVE NORTH, IT HAS INDICATED PUBLICLY THAT IT IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING, UNILATERALLY, BANNING OPERATIONS BY FOREIGN OIL COMPANIES IN THE WATERS OFF NORTH NORWAY (AN APPROACH WHICH POSTULATES NORWEGIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WHOLE CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 OSLO 05256 02 OF 02 031014Z SHELF AREA UP TO SVALBARD). BRATTELI RESISTED GIVING THE SOVIETS A PLEDGE TO THIS EFFECT DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW, IN PART BECAUSE NORWEGIAN POLICY ON THIS POINT HAS NOT YET BEEN FIRMLY FORMULATED, BUT ALSO BECAUSE HE DID NOT WISH TO APPEAR TO BE MAKING CONCESSIONS TO THE SOVIETS OR ENCOURAGING THEM TO BELIEVE THEY CAN CO-DETERMINE POLICY ON NORWAY'S CONTINENTAL SHELF. REALISTICALLY, HOWEVER, MOSCOW CAN HOPE FOR SOME UNILATERAL CONCESSION BY NORWAY IN THE AREA OF OIL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTH--BUT NOT IN DEFENSE POLICY. 9. THUS FAR, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT USSR INTENDS TO LINK BARENTS SEA SECURITY ISSUES IN A "PACKAGE DEAL" TO ANY REGIONAL ARMS LIMITATION SCHEME OR KEKKONEN PLAN. IN FACT, ALL THESE PRO- POSALS WOULD HAVE LITTLE IN COMMON EXCEPT BEING A MEANS OF TESTING NORWEGIAN DETERMINATION TO RESIST OVERTURES FROM THE USSR AND REMAIN ALIGNED WITH NATO. BEFORE ESTABLISHING ITS FIRM NEGOTIATING POSITION FOR THE NEXT "POLITICAL PHASE" OF NEGOTIATIONS ON DIVISION OF THE BARENTS SEA, MOSCOW WILL CERTAINLY BE TEMPTED TO SHAKE THE NEGOTIATING TREE TO SEE WHAT FRUIT MAY BE RIPE FOR PLUCKING. IT MUST KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT IF IT SHAKES TOO VIGOROUSLY, IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO TIGHTENING NORWAY'S LINKS WITH NATO AND MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT TO PUT THROUGH VERY EXPENSIVE PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE ITS ARMED FORCES. 10. TO OVERCOME NORWEGIAN HESITANCY ABOUT ENTERING INTO ANY SORT OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR IN THE NORTH, AND TO WEAKEN NORWAY'S TIES TO NATO AND GENERAL DEFENSE POSTURE- MOSCOW'S MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON REMAINS ITS POLICY OF DETENTE. SEEN FROM THIS STANDPOINT, THE OFFER OF A GREAT POWER GUARANTEE NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST SCANDINAVIA MUST SEEM A LOGICAL, ERROSIVE PROPAGANDA LINE--ONE SERVING SOVIET SHORT- TERM AS WELL AS LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES ON NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK. BYRNE CONFIDENTIAL NNN

--- Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994 Channel Indicators: n/a Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Concepts: POLICIES, NUCLEAR FREE ZONES, NEGOTIATIONS, MINISTERIAL VISITS Control Number: n/a Copy: SINGLE Draft Date: 02 DEC 1974 Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004 Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW Disposition Action: RELEASED Disposition Approved on Date: n/a Disposition Authority: kelleyw0 Disposition Case Number: n/a Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004 Disposition Event: n/a Disposition History: n/a Disposition Reason: n/a Disposition Remarks: n/a Document Number: 1974OSLO05256 Document Source: CORE Document Unique ID: '00' Drafter: n/a Enclosure: n/a Executive Order: GS Errors: N/A Film Number: D740350-0021 From: OSLO Handling Restrictions: n/a Image Path: n/a ISecure: '1' Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741268/aaaacfxm.tel Line Count: '284' Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM Office: ACTION EUR Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS Original Previous Classification: n/a Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a Page Count: '6' Previous Channel Indicators: n/a Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS Reference: OSLO 5199 Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED Review Authority: kelleyw0 Review Comment: n/a Review Content Flags: n/a Review Date: 07 MAY 2002 Review Event: n/a Review Exemptions: n/a Review History: RELEASED <07 MAY 2002 by garlanwa>; APPROVED <25-Sep-2002 by kelleyw0> Review Markings: ! 'n/a US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005 ' Review Media Identifier: n/a Review Referrals: n/a Review Release Date: n/a Review Release Event: n/a Review Transfer Date: n/a Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a Secure: OPEN Status: NATIVE Subject: KEKKONEN PLAN AND NORWEGIAN SECURITY TAGS: PARM, NO, UR To: STATE Type: TE Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005