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ACTION SS-20
INFO OCT-01 EA-11 ISO-00 EB-11 PM-07 NSC-07 SPC-03 RSC-01
CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PRS-01 IO-14 DPW-01 DODE-00
DRC-01 /088 W
--------------------- 115766
O R 050249Z MAR 74
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2280
S E C R E T SAIGON 2847
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, VS
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH: TALKING POINTS (VIETNAM)
1. FOLLOWING ARE TALKING POINTS FOR DPTY SECTY RUSH DURING HIS
CALLS ON FONMIN YUONG VAN BAC, PRIME MINISTER TRAN THIEN KHIEM,
AND PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU. A TALKING POINT ON THE ECONOMIC
SITUATION WILL BE TRANSMITTED SEPTEL.
2. IMPROVED GVN DIPLOMATIC POSTURE (DEPSEC MIGHT RAISE)
A. YOU MIGHT WISH TO EXPRESS OUR ADMIRATION FOR THE NEW
VIGOR IN THE RVN DIPLOMATIC POSTURE. WE ARE DELIGHTED AT THE
RECENT SUCCESS IN KEEPING THE "PRG" OUT OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
ON LAWS OF WAR. WE ARE HAPPY TO HEAR THAT A NUMBER OF VACANT
AMBASSADORIAL POSTS WILL SOON BE FILLED AND THAT THE NUMBER OF
GVN EMBASSIES IS EXPANDING.
B. WE ALSO WERE MOST PLEASED TO LEARN OF THE GVN'S INI-
TIATIVES FOR ELECTIONS, IN PARIS, AND HERE, FOR A LIMITED CEASE-
FIRE. THESE MOVES EMBARRASS THE COMMUNISTS AND ENHANCE THE GVN'S
IMAGE.
C. YOU MIGHT ALSO POINT TO THE NEED FOR THE GVN TO BE
ALERT TO COMMUNIST ATTEMPTS TO GAIN STATUS FOR THE "PRG" AT THE
FORTHCOMING SPECIAL UNGA SESSION, WHO MEETING, AND LAW OF SEA
CONFERENCE.
D. BACKGROUND: THE GVN IS GRADUALLY IMPROVING ITS ABILITY
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TO COUNTER THE COMMUNIST DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE. THE NEW FONMIN,
VUONG VAN BAC, HAS PROVED TO BE EXTREMELY ACTIVE IN TELLING THE GVN
STORY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, OFTEN DOING SO IN PERSON IN THE COURSE
OF EXTENDED TRIPS ABROAD, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS SHOWN ITSELF
MORE ACTIVE IN MAKING STRONG PITCHES FOR SUPPORT TO FOREIGN GOVTS.
THE GVN DELEGATION AT THE LAWS OF WAR CONFERENCE IN GENEVA WON HIGH
PRAISE FROM GEORGE ALDRICH FOR ITS PERFORMANCE ON THE ISSUE OF AN
INVITATION TO THE "PRG" THE GVN HAS RECENTLY ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND CHILE. IT IS HOPING ALSO TO OPEN
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH VENEZUELA.
THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HASALSO BEEN VERY ACTIVE IN EXPOSING
-- BY PUBLIC STATEMENT AND DIPLOMATIC NOTE -- THE CONTINUING COMMUNIST
VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE AND THE PARIS AGREEMENT.
3. PRISONER RELEASES (DEP SEC MIGHT RAISE)
A. THE PRISONER RELEASES PROVIDED FOR IN THE PARIS AGREEMENT
WERE RESUMED ON FEBRUARY 8 AND WILL BE COMPLETED ON MARCH 6. DURING
THIS FINAL PHASE OF RELEASES, THE GVN RELEASED TO THE COMMUNISTS
3,506 CIVILIAN DETAINEES AND 33 POW'S AND RECEIVED IN RETURN 634
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PRISONERS FROM THE COMMUNISTS. IN EARLIER
RELEASES LAST SPRING AND SUMMER, THE GVN RELINQUISHED NEARLY
27,000 POW'S AND 1,575 CIVILIAN DETAINEES AND RECEIVED BARELY 5,000
POW'S AND ONLY 411 CIVILIANS.
B. YOU MIGHT WISH TO COMPLIMENT THE GVN ON THIS ACCOMPLISHMENT,
RECOGNIZING THAT IT WAS NOT AN EASY DECISION TO RESUME THE NUMERICALLY
LOPSIDED RELEASES AFTER THE GVN'S EARLIER DEMONSTRATION OF INTEGRITY
AND GOOD FAITH IN RETURNING ALL ITS OWN POW'S HAD FAILED TO GET THE
COMMUNISTS TO RETURN MORE OF THE THOUSANDS OF CAPTIVES WHOM THEY
STILL DENY HOLDING. WE RECOGNIZE ALSO THAT ONCE THE DECISION WAS MADE,
THE BURDEN OF CARRYING OUT THE RELEASES FELL ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY UPON
THE GVN, WHILE THE OTHER SIDE DEVOTED ITS EFFORTS TO DILATORY
QUIBBLING AND DISTORTION. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THIS ACCOMPLISHMENT
WILL BENEFIT US BOTH BY MAKING IT LESS DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY BEFORE
AMERICAN PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL OPINION THE POLITICAL SUPPORT
AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE WHICH WE MUST PROVIDE FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
PEOPLE'S DEFENSE AGAINST THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRESSOR.
C. UNFORTUNATELY THERE STILL REMAINS THE PERNICIOUS PROPAGANDA
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CONCERNING "POLITICAL PRISONERS." WE HOPE THAT THE GVN WILL SEEK
TO FURTHER ENHANCE ITS IMAGE, AND TO FURTHER NEUTRALIZE ITS STILL
DANGEROUS CRITICS' MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON, BY EVEN MORE FORTHRIGHT AND
FACTUAL EFFORTS TO REVEAL THE "BIG LIE" PROPAGANDA ON POLITICAL
PRISONERS FOR WHAT IT IS -- A CONSCIOUS CAMPAIGN BY THE GVN'S
ENEMIES, STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY HANOI, TO DENY IT THE MILITARY
AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IT NEEDS.
4. ASSURANCE OF CONTINUED US SUPPORT (DEP SEC MIGHT RAISE)
A. WE MUST ASSURE THE GVN OF THE STRENGTH AND CONSTANCY OF OUR
COMMITMENT TO A FREE AND INDEPENDENT SOUTH VIETNAM. INFORMED GVN
LEADERS
ARE AWARE OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN CONDUCTED BY THE
COMMUNISTS, AND JOINED IN BY ANTI-VIETNAM MOVEMENTS AROUND THE WORLD,
TO ERODE SUPPORT FOR THE RVN. THEY ARE ALSO AWARE OF OUR PARTI-
CULAR PROBLEMS WITH A GROWING LACK OF US PUBLIC INTEREST IN
SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE RESULTANT PROBLEMS WE FACE IN CONGRESS IN
OBTAINING SUPPORT. WE MUST ASSURE THE GVN THAT WE WILL DO EVERYTHING
POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO
SUPPORT THE RVN'S NEEDS.
B. BACKGROUND: THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES ARE CONTINUING
THEIR YEAR-LONG MILITARY BUILD-UP WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM AND ALONG
ITS BORDERS. THE THREAT OF A LARGE-SCALE MILITARY OFFENSIVE BY NORTH
VIETNAM REMAINS VERY HIGH; HOWEVER IT SEEMS THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE
MILITARY PLANS MAY NOT INCLUDE A MAJOR OFFENSIVE WITHIN THE NEXT
FEW MONTHS. NORTH VIETNAM HOLDS TO ITS GOAL OF CONQUERING SOUTH
VIETNAM BY FORCE; IT HAS MERELY DEFERRED ITS PLANNED OFFENSIVE UNTIL
THE GVN GROWS WEAKER, EITHER DUE TO DOMESTIC CHAOS, WHETHER POLITICAL
ORECONOMIC, OR TO REDUCED SUPPORT FOR THE RVN IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ARENA, PARTICULARLY BY THE US.
C. DURING THE INITIAL STAGES OF THE ENEMY BUILD-UP, WHEN A MAJOR NVA
OFFENSIVE APPEARED MORE IMMINENT, MANY SOUTH VIETNAMESE LACKED
CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF THE RVNAF TO WITHSTAND THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE WITHOUT THE REINTRODUCTION OF US AIR SUPPORT. AS THE YEAR
WORE ON AND RVNAF BEGAN TO IMPROVE, SOUTH VIETNAMESE BEGAN TO GAIN
CONFIDENCE IN THEIR SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITY AND THE QUESTION OF US
AID SUPPORT NOW SELDOM ARISES. THE PUBLIC DEBATE IN THE US OVER
ASSISTANCE, BOTH ECONOMIC AND MILITARY, TO SOUTH VIETNAM DOES,
HOWEVER, RAISE SOME DOUBTS IN THE MINDS OF INFORMED GVN AND RVNAF
LEADERS.
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5. DISPUTE OVER THE PARACELS AND SPRATLYS (THE GVN MAY RAISE)
A. THE GVN UNDERSTANDS THAT WE TAKE NO POSITION ON THE CONFLICTING
CLAIMS TO THESE TWO GROUPS OF ISLANDS. FOLLOWING EXPULSION OF THEIR
FORCES FROM THE PARACELS BY THE CHINESE, THE GVN HAS BEEN SEEKING WAYS
TO FIND SATISFACTION THROUGH THE UN, SEATO, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OR THIRD PARTY ARBITRATION. WHILE THEY ARE AWARE THAT THEY HAVE LITTLE
HOPE OF WINNING ANY SUPPORT FROM EITHER THE UN OR SEATO, THEY ARE
ACTIVELY CONSIDERING TAKING THE MATTER TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OR SUBMITTING IT TO ARBITRATION. WE HAVE NOT DISCOURAGED THEM FROM
TAKING THIS COURSE BECAUSE, WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAVE ANY SUCCESS,
IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST TO BE SEEN PUBLICLY AS SEEKING PEACEFUL,
LEGAL RESOLUTION OF THEIR DISPUTE WITH PEKING. THE FONMIN MAY
MENTION THIS MATTER TO YOU AND ASK YOUR ADVICE.
B. BACKGROUND ON THE SITUATIONIN THE SPRATLYS: THE PARACELS AFFAIR
IMMEDIATELY RAISED GVN CONCERN THAT THE PRC MIGHT TAKE SIMILAR
ACTION IN THE SPRATLYS. THE GVN AT THE TIME HAD FORCES ON ONLY ONE
OF THE SPRATLY ISLANDS; SINCE THE END OF JANUARY IT HAS PUT FORCES
ON SEVERAL OTHER ISLANDS IN ORDER TO PREEMPT A POSSIBLE CHINESE MOVE.
THE PRC THREAT TO THE SPRATLYS IS OF COURSE FAR LESS SERIOUS THAN
IN THE CASE OF THE PARACELS. THE SPRATLYS ARE MUCH FURTHER FROM
THE CHINESE MAINLAND; AND THEY ARE CLAIMED BY THE PHILIPPINES
AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS WELL AS THE GVN -- MAKING THEM FAR
MORE OF A PROBLEM FROM PEKINGS'S POINT OF VIEW. PEKING'S RECENT
RELEASE OF ALL THE VIETNAMESE CAPTURED DURING THE PARACELS BATTLE
IS AN INDICATION THAT PEKING AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING IS TAKING
A RELAXED VIEW OF THE GVN'S "OCCUPATION" OF ISLANDS IN THE SPRATLYS.
IN THE CONTEXT OF GVN RELATIONS WITH NORTH VIETNAM, THE PARACELS
AND SPRATLYS HAVE IMPORTANT POLITICAL MEANING. THE SPECITACLE
OF THE GVN'S STOUTLY DEFENDING VIETNAMESE NATIONAL INTERESTS
AGAINST VIETNAM'S TRADITIONAL ENEMY, CHINE, IS PROFOUNDLY
DISCOMFITING TO HANOI. BY LOUDLY BROADCASTING ITS STRONG POSITION
ON THE PARACELS AND SPRATLYS THE GVN IN EFFECT IS TAUNTING HANOI
-- "WHO'S THE PUPPET NOW?" THE OVERALL EFFECT STRENGTHENS THE
GVN'S POLITICAL POSITION DOMESTICALLY AND GIVES THE GVN AN IMPORTANT
WEAPON IN ITS POLITICAL CONTEST WITH THE NORTH COMMUNISTS.
MARTIN
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