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ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00
ACDE-00 /026 W
--------------------- 053127
P 061230Z FEB 75
FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2403
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
S E C R E T SALT TWO GENEVA 0018
EXDIS/SALT
DEPT ALSO PASS DOD
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSONS STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 6, 1975
(SALT TWO-507)
THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR
JOHNSON AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF FEBRUARY 6, 1975.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
FEBRUARY 6, 1975
MR MINISTER:
I
AT OUR FIRST MEETING LAST WEEK I NOTED SOME OF THE TASKS
WHICH I BELIEVE WE MUST ACCOMPLISH IN PREPARING OUR NEW
AGREEMENT--TASKS WHICH ARE IN MANY RESPECTS DISTINGUISHED BY
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THIS AND THE EARLIER INTERIM AGREEMENT
LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.
AT OUR MOST RECENT MEETING I DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM OF
VERIFICATION AND LISTED SOME OF THE IMPORTANT MATTERS RELATING
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TO THIS ISSUE THATI BELIEVE WE MUST RESOLVE TOGETHER DURING
OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE. TODAY I WANT TO CONTINUE MY DISCUSSION
OF THE TASKS WHICH COME BEFORE US, IN THE BELIEF THAT A CLEAR
UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUES AND PROBLEMS BEFORE US IS A
NECESSARY FIRST STEP IN REACHING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS
TO THESE MATTERS.
AS WE BOTH NOTED AT OUR MEETING ON FEBRUARY 4, THE NEW
AGREEMENT ON WHICH WE ARE WORKING WILL DIFFER FROM THE INTERIM
AGREEMENT IN A NUMBER OF RESPECTS. ONE OF THESE DIFFERENCES
STEMS FROM THE BROADER SCOPE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WHICH WILL
PLACE LIMITS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS HAVING DIFFERENT
CHARACTERISTICS. THERFORE, THER IS A NEED FOR ADDITIONAL
AND MORE PRECISE DEFINITIONS OF THE SYSTEMS TO BE
LIMITED,ADN I PROPOSE TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT OF DEFINITIONS
WITH YOU AT A SUBSEQUENT MEETING.
HOWEVER, IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO HAVE CLEAR AND SPECIFIC
DEFINITIONS OF THE ARMS TO BE LIMITED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT.
WE ALSO NEED TO HAVE MUTUAL AGREEMENT AS TO WHEN IN THE COURSE
OF THEIR CONSTRUCTION, DEPLOYMENT, AND DEACTIVATION CYCLES
THESE ARMS ARE TO BE INCLUDED IN AND ELIMINATED FROM THE
AGGREGATE NUMBERS SET BY THE AGREEMENT. MOREOVER, MR MINISTER,
I BELIEVE THAT IT IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO HAVE MUTUALLY AGREED
CRITERIA AS TO HOW THE RELEVANT STAGES IN THESE CONSTRUCTION,
DEPLOYMENT,AND DEACTIVATION CYCLES SHALL BE DETERMINED.
II
WE BEGIN WITH THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF THE VLADIVOSTOK
ACCORD, THE VARIOUS SYSTMES WHICH ARE TO BE INCLUDED IN THOSE
AGGREGATE NUMBERS, AND THE FACT THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT IS TO
EXTEND UNTIL 1985. FROM THESE CONSIDERATIONS, I THINK IT IS
CLEAR THAT OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS THERE IS GOING TO BE A
CHANGING MAKE UP IN THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF EACH SIDE WHICH
ARE TO BE COVERED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT. NORE SPECIFICALLY,
OVER THE COURSE OF THE NEXT TEN YEARS, BOTH SIDES WILL,
AMONG OTHER THINGS, DEVELOP, TEST, CONSTRUCT, DEPLOY, TRAIN WITH,
MODIFY, CONVERT, MODERNIZE, REPLACE, PLACE IN RESERVE,
DISMANTLE, AND DESTROY VARIOUS STRATEGIC ARMS WHICH WILL BE
LIMITED BY THE NEW AGREEMENT. IT APPEARS, THEREFORE, MOST
IMPORTANT THAT FROM THE OUTSET THERE BE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
TWO SIDES AS TO THE STAGES AT WHICH VARIOUS WEAPONS SHOULD
BE INCLUDED, EXCLUDED, OR REMOVED FROM THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS.
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ACCORDINGLY, IN THE SAME VEIN IN WHICH I DISCUSSED THE
PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION WITH YOU EARLIER THIS WEEK, I WANT
TO SUGGEST SOME OF THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE IN THIS CONTEXT
AND WHICH, I HOPE, CAN BE ANSWERED THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF OUR
DELEGATIONS WORKING TOGETHER.
FOR EXAMPLE, AT WHAT POINT IN THE COURSE OF THEIR CONDTRUCTION,
CONVERSION, OR DEPLOYMENT SHOULD STRATEGIC ARMS BE INCLUDED
IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS? SHOULD THERE BE DIRRERENT CRITERIA
FOR, FOR EXAMPLE, ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS? OR FOR
MISSILE LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS? AND, IF SO, WHAT SHOULD
THESE CRITERIA BE?
AFTER WE FIND ANSWERS TO THE FIRST QUESTION-- THAT IS,
AT WHAT STAGE SHOULD A WEAPON BE INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE
NUMBERS-- OTHER QUESTIONS ARISE. WHAT IS IT S STATUS IF IT IS
MODIIFIED OR CONVERTED TO A PURPOSE OTHER THAN ITS ORIGINALLY
INTENDED USE? AND WHAT SHOULD BE THE CRITERIA FOR JUDGING ITS
ALTERED STATUS? WHAT SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOUD BE GIVEN TO ,
FOR INSTANCE, LAUNCHERS USED FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,
TESTING AND TRAINING, AND SPACE ACTIVITIES?
FINALLY, AS I SUGGESTED EARLIER, WEAPONS WILL BE LEAVING
INVENTORIES AS WELL AS ENTERING THEM. WHAT CRITERIA SHOULD
BE SET IN ORDER TO HAVE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT WEAPON
SHOULD NO LONGER BE INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS? SHOULD
THERE BE DIFFERENT STANDARDS FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF WEAPONS?
III
MR MINISTER, BY SETTING FORTH THESE QUESTIONS, IT IS NOT
MY INTENTION TO SUGGEST THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH IMPOSSIBLY
COMPLEX OR INSOLUBLE PROBLEMS. RATHER, I AM CONFIDENT THAT,
BY WORKING TOGETHER, OUR DELEGATIONS CAN DEFINE THE QUESTIONS
AND THEN FIND MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY ANSWERS. HERE, AGAIN, IT
APPEARS THAT THIS IS AN AREA IN WHICH AD HOC WORKING GROUPS
CAN, AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME, CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO OUR TASK.
WE ARE ALSO CONFIDENT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE SHARES OUR
DESIRE FOR A CLEARLY DRAWN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL
MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS ON THE PART OF
EITHER SIDE OR AMBIGUITIES AS TO THE OBLIGATIONS BEING ASSUMED.
WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR FURTHER THOUGHTS AND THOSE OF
YOUR DELEGATION ON THESE MATTERS AND TO WORKING WITH YOU TO
ARRIVE AT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. JOHNSON
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