THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AND GENERAL TRUSOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF
FEBRUARY 18, 1975.
QUOTE
SEMENOV STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 18, 1975
TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO OFFER CONSIDERA-
TIONS ON ARTICLE IX OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. THIS ARTICLE
PROVIDES THAT UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT EACH SIDE WOULD
ASSUME THE OBLIGATION NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY
CERTAIN NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.
THE USSR AND THE U.S. HAVE REACHED A COMMON UNDER-
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 02 SALT T 00036 01 OF 02 191317Z
STANDING REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY OF INCLUDING PROVISIONS
ON THIS SCORE IN THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS; THIS IS ALSO REFLECTED IN THE
SUMMIT UNDERSTANDING. THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10,
1974 EXPRESSLY STATES THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT COULD ALSO
PROVIDE FOR ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF
NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS DURING ITS TERM.
LIMITATIONS OF THIS KIND WOULD ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985. THEY
COULD ALSO HAVE A WIDER SIGNIFICANCE, INASMUCH AS THE SIDES
WOULD BY MUTUAL CONSENT ASSUME THE OBLIGATION NOT TO
DEVELOP OR DEPLOY CERTAIN NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS, WHICH DO NOT EXIST AT PRESENT.
PROCEEDING FROM THIS, AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE
FULL SCOPE OF THE FACTORS BEARING ON THIS PROBLEM,
ARTICLE IX DELINEATES THE ASSORTMENT OF SYSTEMS WHOSE
DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE BANNED. THEY
INCLUDE:
-CRUISE MISSLES OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE.
BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF
THESE MISSILES WILL PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SIDES'
ACQUIRING STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, WHICH IN
THEIR CAPABILITIES CAN BE COMPARABLE TO ICBMS.
-SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN
600 KILOMETERS.
ASSUMPTION BY THE SIDES OF THE OBLIGATION TO BAN SUCH
MISSILES WOULD PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING THIS
NEW TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, CAPABLE OF REACHING
THE TERITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE FROM THE VAST AREAS OF THE
SEAS AND OCEANS.
-BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600
KILOMETERS ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES OTHER THAN SUBMARINES.
BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF
THESE MISSILES WILL PREVENT THE APPEARANCE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, WHICH COULD BE DEPLOYED ON ANY
KIND OF SHIPS OR OTHER WATERBORNE VEHICLES. THIS WOULD
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 03 SALT T 00036 01 OF 02 191317Z
BLOCK A POSSIBLE CHANNEL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN EXCESS OF THE LIMITS
ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.
-FIXED AND MOBILE DEVICES FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC
MISSILES, WHICH COULD BE EMPLACED ON THE SEABED OR OCEAN
FLOOR OR IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL
SEA AND INLAND WATERS, OR WHICH COULD MOVE ONLY IN CONTACT
WITH THE BOTTOM.
AN OBLIGATION BY THE SIDES TO BAN THIS POSSIBLE TYPE
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD LEAD TO SAFEGUARDING
THE NEW AGREEMENT AGAINST CIRCUMVENTION THROUGH A BUILD-UP
IN THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS FOR SUCH MISSILES.
AN OBLICATION BY THE SIDES NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR
DEPLOY SUCH LAUNCHERS WOULD ALSO HAVE A POSITIVE SIGNIFICANCE
IN TERMS OF STRENGTHENING THE 1971 TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION
OF THE EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON THE SEABED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR AND
IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE
U.S. ARE PARTIES. SUCH AN OBLIGATION WOULD EXTEND TO BOTH
THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND INLAND WATERS.
-SYSTEMS FOR PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ANY OTHER
TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN EARTH ORBIT.
THE SIDES ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO ENSURING THAT
OUTER SPACE BE USED FOR THE PURPOSES SPECIFIED IN THE
TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES
IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE. PROCEEDING FROM
THIS, SYSTEMS FOR PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ANY OTHER
TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN EARTH ORBIT SHOULD
BE INCLUDED IN THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AMONG OTHER
NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SUBJECT TO PROHIBITION.
BY BANNING IN THE NEW AGREEMENT SYSTEMS INTENDED FOR
PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EARTH ORBIT, THE SIDES WILL, IN
PARTICULAR, ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGHTENING THE OBLIGATIONS
PROVIDED FOR IN THE AFOREMENTIONED TREATY.
-MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES
FOR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES.
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED, THE
SIDES UNDERTOOK TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF SLBM LAUNCHERS AND
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 04 SALT T 00036 01 OF 02 191317Z
LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, EQUIPPED WITH MIRVED MISSILES,
TO AN AGGREGATE NUMBER NOT TO EXCEED 1,320 UNITS. BANNING
MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES FOR
AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH THE UNDER-
STANDING REACHED AND WOULD PRECLUDE EXPANDING THE SPHERES
FOR USING SUCH REENTRY VEHICLES.
BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, DEALT WITH IN ARTICLE IX OF
THE DRAFT, WOULD PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A SITUATION
ARISING IN WHICH THE DECISION OF OUR TWO COUNTIRES TO LIMIT
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY,
WHICH IS THE HEART OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, COULD BE UNDERMINED
AS A RESLUT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AND BUILD-UP IN NEW
STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES. ASSUMPTION BY THE
SIDES OF THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE IX OF THE
DRAFT WOULD THUS PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE FROM THE STANDPOINT
OF ENSURING THE VIABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.
THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH
OUR STATES, WHICH ASSUMED THE JOINT OBLIGATION TO MAKE
SPECIAL EFFORTS IN THE AREA OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS,
FOR THE PURPOSE OF STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
THE SECURITY OF PEOPLES.
IN THE STATEMENT AT THE MEETING OF FEBRUARY 4, 1975,
THE USSR DELEGATION SET FORTH CONSIDERATIONS ON THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE SIDES MANIFESTING RESTRAINT IN THE AREA
OF STRATEGIC ARMS. THE OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLE IX
OF THE DRAFT, NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY THE NEW TYPES
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS NAMED THEREIN, WOULD BECOME A
CONVINCING EXAMPLE OF THE READINESS OF THE SIDES TO ACT IN
PRECISELY THIS MANNER; THIS WOULD BE OF SUBSTANTIAL
IMPORTANCE IN OVERALL POLITICAL TERMS AS WELL.
IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, DISCUSSIONS
HAVE ALREADY TAKEN PLACE, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH THE SOVIET
SIDE PRESENTED EXTENSIVE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF BANNING IN
THE NEW AGREEMENT THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOME
SPECIFIC TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THIS QUESTION
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 05 SALT T 00036 01 OF 02 191317Z
HAS BEEN IN THE FIELD OF VISION OF THE SIDES FOR A
CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME, AND YOU ARE ACQUAINTED WITH
THE RATIONALE OF THE SOVIET SIDE. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE
THAT A CERTAIN COINCIDENCE OR PROXIMITY OF POINTS OF VIEW
HAS DEVELOPED WITH RESPECT TO A NUMBER OF ASPECTS. THE
LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE IX WAS WORKED OUT WITH AN ACCOUNT FOR
THE DISCUSSIONS HELD AND THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING ADOPTED.
SOME NUANCES OF THE PROBLEM HAVE NOT BEEN DISCUSSED EARLIER,
BUT BY THEIR NATURE AND DIRECTION THEY HAVE THE SAME
MEANING.
PROCEEDING FROM THE ABOVE, WE ANTICIPATE THAT ARTICLE IX
OF THE DRAFT WILL MEET WITH UNDERSTANDING AND A POSITIVE
RESPONSE ON THE PART OF THE U.S. DELEGATION.
SECRET
NNN
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PAGE 01 SALT T 00036 02 OF 02 191319Z
41
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00 ACDE-00
CIAE-00 /026 W
--------------------- 094443
O P 191100Z FEB 75
FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2421
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0036
EXDIS/SALT
DEPT ALSO PASS DOD
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF
QUOTE:
TRUSOV STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 18, 1975
AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS THE QUESTION HAS BEEN RAISED AS TO
PRECISELY WHICH STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES MUST
BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREED AGGREGATE NUMBER OF SUCH VEHICLES,
NOT TO EXCEED 2,400 UNITS FOR EACH SIDE.
IN ITS STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 6, 1975, THE USSR DELEGATION
DREW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE ANSWER TO
THIS QUESTION IS CONTAINED IN THE DECISIONS REACHED DURING
THE SUMMIT MEETING.
ACCORDINGLY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CUSTOMARY PRACTICE
IN DRAWING UP TREATY DOCUMENTS, AND ABOVE ALL DOCUMENTS
CONCERNING STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS, ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH
2, OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT CONTAINS A CLEARLY WORDED
PROVISION REGARDING PRESICELY WHICH DELIVERY VEHICLES SHALL
BE COUNTED IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON
DELIVERY VEHICLES, ESTABLISHED BY THE UNDERSTANDING.
IN THE STATEMENT OF FEBRUSYR 10,1975, YOU,
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PAGE 02 SALT T 00036 02 OF 02 191319Z
MR AMBASSADOR, EXPRESSED CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING SOME
DEFINITIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT. YOU
RIGHTLY NOTED THAT THE PRECEDENTS INVOLVED IN THE AGREEMENTS
CONCLUDED EARLIER WILL ASSIST US IN RESOLVING SOME OF THE
PROBLEMS. AS FOR THE DEFINITIONS OF LUANCHERS FOR ICBMS
AND MODERN SLBMS, WE HAVE HAD CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN
USING THEM, WHICH HAS CONFIRMED THE VIABILITY OF THE
UNDERSTNADING REACHED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERIM
AGREEMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RELEVANT DEFINITIONS,
WHICH WERE ADOPTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT,
SHOULD BE RETAINED WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW DRAFT
AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT.
IN THE COURSE OF PREVIOUS NEGOTAITIONS, HEAVY BOMBERS
HAVE BEEN COMPREHENSIVELY DISCUSSED AND AN AGREED SOLUTION
BECAME APPARENT IN THEIR RESPECT. THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES
THAT HEAVY BOMBERS MUST INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING NUCLEAR
DELIVERY AIRCRAFT: FOR THE US--B-52 AND B-1, FOR THE USSR--
TUPOLEV-95 AND MYASISHCHEV, AS WELL AS NEW AIRCRAFT BEING
OR TO BE DEVELOPED, HAVING CHARACTERISTICS SIMILAR TO THE
B-1 BOMBER.
SUCH A DEFINITIONS COULD ALSO BE DRAWN UP IN THE FORM
OF AN APPROPRIATE AGREED STATEMENT.
WITH RESPECT TO AIR TO SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE
OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, ON FEBRUARY 12, 1975 THE USSR
DELEGATION SET FORTH ITS QUITE PRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF
THIS QUESTION. THE WORDING OF ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 2,
PROVIDING THAT WHEN BOBMERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH AIR TO SURFACE
MISSILES OF ANY TYPEWITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS,
EACH SUCH MISSILE WILL BE COUNTED AS ONE UNIT IN THE AGGREGATE
NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES,
IS STRICTY IN ACCORD WITH THE UNDERSTANDING RECORDED IN
THE AIDEMEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974.
IN THIS CONNECTION WE CANNOT UNDERSTNAD AN APPROACH
WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED.
THE US DELEGATIONS STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 10, 1975
RAISED THE QUESTION OF DEFINING A HEAVY ICBM. FRANKLY,
THE MOTIVES FOR RAISING THIS QUESTION ARE COMPLETELY
UNCLEAR.
THE QUESTION OF MISSILE VOLUME HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT
OF LENGTHY AND COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION AS FAR BACK AS
DURING THE WORKING OUT OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. AT THAT
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PAGE 03 SALT T 00036 02 OF 02 191319Z
TIME THE SIDES REACHED AN AGREED DECISION CONCERNING THE
PLACING OF APPRPPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON LAUNCHERS, AS
RECORDED IN ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. IT
PRECLUDES THE POSSIBILITY OF USING LAUCHERS FOR LIGHT
LAND BASED ICBMS AND LAUCHERS FOR LAND BASED ICBMS OF
OLDER TYPES, TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS FOR HEAVY
LAND BASED ICBMS. IT IS NOT ACCIDENTAL, THEREFORE, THAT
AN UNDERSTNADING WAS REACHED AT THE SUMMIT TO REATAIN IN
THE NEW AGREEMENT ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THE
WORKING OF ARTICLE IV OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT IS
FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED.
AS FOR CONSIDERATIONS ON THROWWEIGHT, THERE IS HARDLY
ANY NEED TO REPEAT THE RATIONALE CITED EARLIER REGARDING
ITS COMPLETE UNACCEPTABILITY AS A CRITERION FOR ANY KIND
OF LIMITATIONS OR DEFINITIONS.
THE QUESTION OF IGHT AND HEAVY MISSILES WAS QUITE
DEFINITELY RESOLVED AT THE SUMMIT, BY PLACING APPROPRIATE
LIMITATIONS ON THEIR LAUCHERS, AND THERE IS NO NEED TO
INTRODUCE ANY SORT OF NEW ELEMENTS THAT OBVIOUSLY COMPLICATE
THE MATTER.
THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF MAY 26, 1972, REGARDING
LIMITATIONS ON INCREASING THE DIMENSIONS OF LAND BASED
ICBM LAUCHERS IN THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION, COULD BE
RECORDED IN THE FORM OF AN APPROPRIATE AGREED STATEMENT
OF THE SIDES. UNQUOTE. JOHNSON
SECRET
NNN
| STATEMENTS BY DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV AND GENERAL TRUSOV ON FEBRUARY 18, 1975 (SALT TWO - 520) | |
1975 February 19, 11:00 (Wednesday) |
1975SALTT00036_b |
SECRET |
UNCLASSIFIED |
|
EXDIS - Exclusive Distribution Only |
12717 |
X1 |
TEXT ON MICROFILM,TEXT ONLINE |
-- N/A or Blank -- |
TE - Telegram (cable) |
|
-- N/A or Blank -- ACTION SS - Executive Secretariat, Department of State |
Electronic Telegrams |
Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006 |
|
Content
Raw content
SECRET
PAGE 01 SALT T 00036 01 OF 02 191317Z
42
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00
ACDE-00 /026 W
--------------------- 094446
O P 191100Z FEB 75
FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2420
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0036
EXDIS/SALT
DEPT ALSO PASS DOD
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF
E.O. 11652: XGDSI
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: STATEMENTS BY DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV AND GENERAL TRUSOV
ON FEBRUARY 18, 1975 (SALT TWO - 520)
THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AND GENERAL TRUSOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF
FEBRUARY 18, 1975.
QUOTE
SEMENOV STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 18, 1975
TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO OFFER CONSIDERA-
TIONS ON ARTICLE IX OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. THIS ARTICLE
PROVIDES THAT UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT EACH SIDE WOULD
ASSUME THE OBLIGATION NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY
CERTAIN NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.
THE USSR AND THE U.S. HAVE REACHED A COMMON UNDER-
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 02 SALT T 00036 01 OF 02 191317Z
STANDING REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY OF INCLUDING PROVISIONS
ON THIS SCORE IN THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS; THIS IS ALSO REFLECTED IN THE
SUMMIT UNDERSTANDING. THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10,
1974 EXPRESSLY STATES THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT COULD ALSO
PROVIDE FOR ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF
NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS DURING ITS TERM.
LIMITATIONS OF THIS KIND WOULD ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985. THEY
COULD ALSO HAVE A WIDER SIGNIFICANCE, INASMUCH AS THE SIDES
WOULD BY MUTUAL CONSENT ASSUME THE OBLIGATION NOT TO
DEVELOP OR DEPLOY CERTAIN NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS, WHICH DO NOT EXIST AT PRESENT.
PROCEEDING FROM THIS, AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE
FULL SCOPE OF THE FACTORS BEARING ON THIS PROBLEM,
ARTICLE IX DELINEATES THE ASSORTMENT OF SYSTEMS WHOSE
DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE BANNED. THEY
INCLUDE:
-CRUISE MISSLES OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE.
BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF
THESE MISSILES WILL PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SIDES'
ACQUIRING STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, WHICH IN
THEIR CAPABILITIES CAN BE COMPARABLE TO ICBMS.
-SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN
600 KILOMETERS.
ASSUMPTION BY THE SIDES OF THE OBLIGATION TO BAN SUCH
MISSILES WOULD PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING THIS
NEW TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, CAPABLE OF REACHING
THE TERITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE FROM THE VAST AREAS OF THE
SEAS AND OCEANS.
-BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600
KILOMETERS ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES OTHER THAN SUBMARINES.
BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF
THESE MISSILES WILL PREVENT THE APPEARANCE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, WHICH COULD BE DEPLOYED ON ANY
KIND OF SHIPS OR OTHER WATERBORNE VEHICLES. THIS WOULD
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 03 SALT T 00036 01 OF 02 191317Z
BLOCK A POSSIBLE CHANNEL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN EXCESS OF THE LIMITS
ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.
-FIXED AND MOBILE DEVICES FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC
MISSILES, WHICH COULD BE EMPLACED ON THE SEABED OR OCEAN
FLOOR OR IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL
SEA AND INLAND WATERS, OR WHICH COULD MOVE ONLY IN CONTACT
WITH THE BOTTOM.
AN OBLIGATION BY THE SIDES TO BAN THIS POSSIBLE TYPE
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD LEAD TO SAFEGUARDING
THE NEW AGREEMENT AGAINST CIRCUMVENTION THROUGH A BUILD-UP
IN THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS FOR SUCH MISSILES.
AN OBLICATION BY THE SIDES NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR
DEPLOY SUCH LAUNCHERS WOULD ALSO HAVE A POSITIVE SIGNIFICANCE
IN TERMS OF STRENGTHENING THE 1971 TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION
OF THE EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON THE SEABED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR AND
IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE
U.S. ARE PARTIES. SUCH AN OBLIGATION WOULD EXTEND TO BOTH
THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND INLAND WATERS.
-SYSTEMS FOR PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ANY OTHER
TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN EARTH ORBIT.
THE SIDES ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO ENSURING THAT
OUTER SPACE BE USED FOR THE PURPOSES SPECIFIED IN THE
TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES
IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE. PROCEEDING FROM
THIS, SYSTEMS FOR PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ANY OTHER
TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN EARTH ORBIT SHOULD
BE INCLUDED IN THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AMONG OTHER
NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SUBJECT TO PROHIBITION.
BY BANNING IN THE NEW AGREEMENT SYSTEMS INTENDED FOR
PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EARTH ORBIT, THE SIDES WILL, IN
PARTICULAR, ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGHTENING THE OBLIGATIONS
PROVIDED FOR IN THE AFOREMENTIONED TREATY.
-MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES
FOR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES.
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED, THE
SIDES UNDERTOOK TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF SLBM LAUNCHERS AND
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 04 SALT T 00036 01 OF 02 191317Z
LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, EQUIPPED WITH MIRVED MISSILES,
TO AN AGGREGATE NUMBER NOT TO EXCEED 1,320 UNITS. BANNING
MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES FOR
AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH THE UNDER-
STANDING REACHED AND WOULD PRECLUDE EXPANDING THE SPHERES
FOR USING SUCH REENTRY VEHICLES.
BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, DEALT WITH IN ARTICLE IX OF
THE DRAFT, WOULD PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A SITUATION
ARISING IN WHICH THE DECISION OF OUR TWO COUNTIRES TO LIMIT
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY,
WHICH IS THE HEART OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, COULD BE UNDERMINED
AS A RESLUT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AND BUILD-UP IN NEW
STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES. ASSUMPTION BY THE
SIDES OF THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE IX OF THE
DRAFT WOULD THUS PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE FROM THE STANDPOINT
OF ENSURING THE VIABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.
THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH
OUR STATES, WHICH ASSUMED THE JOINT OBLIGATION TO MAKE
SPECIAL EFFORTS IN THE AREA OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS,
FOR THE PURPOSE OF STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
THE SECURITY OF PEOPLES.
IN THE STATEMENT AT THE MEETING OF FEBRUARY 4, 1975,
THE USSR DELEGATION SET FORTH CONSIDERATIONS ON THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE SIDES MANIFESTING RESTRAINT IN THE AREA
OF STRATEGIC ARMS. THE OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLE IX
OF THE DRAFT, NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY THE NEW TYPES
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS NAMED THEREIN, WOULD BECOME A
CONVINCING EXAMPLE OF THE READINESS OF THE SIDES TO ACT IN
PRECISELY THIS MANNER; THIS WOULD BE OF SUBSTANTIAL
IMPORTANCE IN OVERALL POLITICAL TERMS AS WELL.
IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, DISCUSSIONS
HAVE ALREADY TAKEN PLACE, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH THE SOVIET
SIDE PRESENTED EXTENSIVE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF BANNING IN
THE NEW AGREEMENT THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOME
SPECIFIC TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THIS QUESTION
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 05 SALT T 00036 01 OF 02 191317Z
HAS BEEN IN THE FIELD OF VISION OF THE SIDES FOR A
CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME, AND YOU ARE ACQUAINTED WITH
THE RATIONALE OF THE SOVIET SIDE. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE
THAT A CERTAIN COINCIDENCE OR PROXIMITY OF POINTS OF VIEW
HAS DEVELOPED WITH RESPECT TO A NUMBER OF ASPECTS. THE
LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE IX WAS WORKED OUT WITH AN ACCOUNT FOR
THE DISCUSSIONS HELD AND THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING ADOPTED.
SOME NUANCES OF THE PROBLEM HAVE NOT BEEN DISCUSSED EARLIER,
BUT BY THEIR NATURE AND DIRECTION THEY HAVE THE SAME
MEANING.
PROCEEDING FROM THE ABOVE, WE ANTICIPATE THAT ARTICLE IX
OF THE DRAFT WILL MEET WITH UNDERSTANDING AND A POSITIVE
RESPONSE ON THE PART OF THE U.S. DELEGATION.
SECRET
NNN
SECRET
PAGE 01 SALT T 00036 02 OF 02 191319Z
41
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00 ACDE-00
CIAE-00 /026 W
--------------------- 094443
O P 191100Z FEB 75
FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2421
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0036
EXDIS/SALT
DEPT ALSO PASS DOD
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF
QUOTE:
TRUSOV STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 18, 1975
AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS THE QUESTION HAS BEEN RAISED AS TO
PRECISELY WHICH STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES MUST
BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREED AGGREGATE NUMBER OF SUCH VEHICLES,
NOT TO EXCEED 2,400 UNITS FOR EACH SIDE.
IN ITS STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 6, 1975, THE USSR DELEGATION
DREW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE ANSWER TO
THIS QUESTION IS CONTAINED IN THE DECISIONS REACHED DURING
THE SUMMIT MEETING.
ACCORDINGLY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CUSTOMARY PRACTICE
IN DRAWING UP TREATY DOCUMENTS, AND ABOVE ALL DOCUMENTS
CONCERNING STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS, ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH
2, OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT CONTAINS A CLEARLY WORDED
PROVISION REGARDING PRESICELY WHICH DELIVERY VEHICLES SHALL
BE COUNTED IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON
DELIVERY VEHICLES, ESTABLISHED BY THE UNDERSTANDING.
IN THE STATEMENT OF FEBRUSYR 10,1975, YOU,
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 02 SALT T 00036 02 OF 02 191319Z
MR AMBASSADOR, EXPRESSED CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING SOME
DEFINITIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT. YOU
RIGHTLY NOTED THAT THE PRECEDENTS INVOLVED IN THE AGREEMENTS
CONCLUDED EARLIER WILL ASSIST US IN RESOLVING SOME OF THE
PROBLEMS. AS FOR THE DEFINITIONS OF LUANCHERS FOR ICBMS
AND MODERN SLBMS, WE HAVE HAD CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN
USING THEM, WHICH HAS CONFIRMED THE VIABILITY OF THE
UNDERSTNADING REACHED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERIM
AGREEMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RELEVANT DEFINITIONS,
WHICH WERE ADOPTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT,
SHOULD BE RETAINED WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW DRAFT
AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT.
IN THE COURSE OF PREVIOUS NEGOTAITIONS, HEAVY BOMBERS
HAVE BEEN COMPREHENSIVELY DISCUSSED AND AN AGREED SOLUTION
BECAME APPARENT IN THEIR RESPECT. THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES
THAT HEAVY BOMBERS MUST INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING NUCLEAR
DELIVERY AIRCRAFT: FOR THE US--B-52 AND B-1, FOR THE USSR--
TUPOLEV-95 AND MYASISHCHEV, AS WELL AS NEW AIRCRAFT BEING
OR TO BE DEVELOPED, HAVING CHARACTERISTICS SIMILAR TO THE
B-1 BOMBER.
SUCH A DEFINITIONS COULD ALSO BE DRAWN UP IN THE FORM
OF AN APPROPRIATE AGREED STATEMENT.
WITH RESPECT TO AIR TO SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE
OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, ON FEBRUARY 12, 1975 THE USSR
DELEGATION SET FORTH ITS QUITE PRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF
THIS QUESTION. THE WORDING OF ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 2,
PROVIDING THAT WHEN BOBMERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH AIR TO SURFACE
MISSILES OF ANY TYPEWITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS,
EACH SUCH MISSILE WILL BE COUNTED AS ONE UNIT IN THE AGGREGATE
NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES,
IS STRICTY IN ACCORD WITH THE UNDERSTANDING RECORDED IN
THE AIDEMEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974.
IN THIS CONNECTION WE CANNOT UNDERSTNAD AN APPROACH
WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED.
THE US DELEGATIONS STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 10, 1975
RAISED THE QUESTION OF DEFINING A HEAVY ICBM. FRANKLY,
THE MOTIVES FOR RAISING THIS QUESTION ARE COMPLETELY
UNCLEAR.
THE QUESTION OF MISSILE VOLUME HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT
OF LENGTHY AND COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION AS FAR BACK AS
DURING THE WORKING OUT OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. AT THAT
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 03 SALT T 00036 02 OF 02 191319Z
TIME THE SIDES REACHED AN AGREED DECISION CONCERNING THE
PLACING OF APPRPPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON LAUNCHERS, AS
RECORDED IN ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. IT
PRECLUDES THE POSSIBILITY OF USING LAUCHERS FOR LIGHT
LAND BASED ICBMS AND LAUCHERS FOR LAND BASED ICBMS OF
OLDER TYPES, TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS FOR HEAVY
LAND BASED ICBMS. IT IS NOT ACCIDENTAL, THEREFORE, THAT
AN UNDERSTNADING WAS REACHED AT THE SUMMIT TO REATAIN IN
THE NEW AGREEMENT ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THE
WORKING OF ARTICLE IV OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT IS
FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED.
AS FOR CONSIDERATIONS ON THROWWEIGHT, THERE IS HARDLY
ANY NEED TO REPEAT THE RATIONALE CITED EARLIER REGARDING
ITS COMPLETE UNACCEPTABILITY AS A CRITERION FOR ANY KIND
OF LIMITATIONS OR DEFINITIONS.
THE QUESTION OF IGHT AND HEAVY MISSILES WAS QUITE
DEFINITELY RESOLVED AT THE SUMMIT, BY PLACING APPROPRIATE
LIMITATIONS ON THEIR LAUCHERS, AND THERE IS NO NEED TO
INTRODUCE ANY SORT OF NEW ELEMENTS THAT OBVIOUSLY COMPLICATE
THE MATTER.
THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF MAY 26, 1972, REGARDING
LIMITATIONS ON INCREASING THE DIMENSIONS OF LAND BASED
ICBM LAUCHERS IN THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION, COULD BE
RECORDED IN THE FORM OF AN APPROPRIATE AGREED STATEMENT
OF THE SIDES. UNQUOTE. JOHNSON
SECRET
NNN
Metadata
---
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), MEETING DELEGATIONS, RESOLUTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 FEB 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date: n/a
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event: n/a
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason: n/a
Disposition Remarks: n/a
Document Number: 1975SALTT00036
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: '00'
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750059-0061
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path: n/a
ISecure: '1'
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750231/aaaabbxt.tel
Line Count: '348'
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: '7'
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: n/a
Review Date: 21 APR 2003
Review Event: n/a
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <21 APR 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <22 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings: ! 'n/a
Margaret P. Grafeld
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006
'
Review Media Identifier: n/a
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date: n/a
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: STATEMENTS BY DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV AND GENERAL TRUSOV ON FEBRUARY 18,
1975 (SALT TWO - 520)
TAGS: PARM, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: ! 'Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic
Review 05 JUL 2006
Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006'
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