1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT STATEMENT PREPARED FOR FEB 24
NAC CONSULTATION ON SALT.
2. IN ORDER TO PERMIT USNATO TO PREPARE STATEMENT FOR DIS-
TRIBUTION IN NAC, WASHINGTONS COMMENTS ORE CONCURRENCE SHOULD BE
CABLED DIRECTLY TO US MISSION NATO TO BE RECEIVED THERE BY COB
FEB 21, WITH INFO COPY TO USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA.
QUOTE:
STATEMENT ON SALT TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
FEBRUARY 24, 1975
1. I AM VERY PLEASED TO BE HERE AGIN TODAY AND TO MEET WITH
YOU FOR ONE OF OUR REGULAR CONSULTATIONS ON SALT. I BELIEVE WE
ALL APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE AND TUILITY OF THESE CONSULTATIONS
AND I, FOR ONE, PARTICLUARLY VALUE THE OPPORTUNITY THEY AFFORD
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 02 SALT T 00037 01 OF 02 191801Z
ME TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH YOU ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.
2. I AM ALSO PLEASED TO NOTE THAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THIS
MORNINGS CONSULTATION ON SALT THERE WILL BE ANOTHER IN THE
SERIES OF EXPERTS MEETINGS. THE US WILL BE REPRESENTED AT THE
MEETING BY MR RALPH EARLE, A MEMBER OF THE US SALT DELEGATION,
WHO, I BELIEVE, IS WELL KNOWN TO MOST OF YOU.
3. AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, SINCE OUR LAST MEETING IN OCTOBER
THERE HAVE BEEN SOME MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS ON SALT, THE DETAILS OF
WHICH WERE REPORTED TO YOUR GOVERNMENTS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AT
LAST DECEMBERS MINISTERIAL MEETING. TO RECAPITULATE BRIEFLY,
AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSIONS AT THE VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT MEETING,
RECORDED SUBSEQUENTLY IN AN AIDE MEMOIRE EXCHANGED IN DECEMBER,
THE US AND SOVIET UNION AGREED THAT:
-- EACH SIDE WILL BE PREMITTED TO DEPLOY AN EQUAL NUMBER--
2400-- OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS, I. E. ICBM AND SLBM
LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS. IF AIR TO SURFACE
BALLISTIC MISSILES (ASBM) OF RANGES OVER 600 KMS ARE DEPLOYED
IN THE FUTURE, THESE WILL ALSO BE COUNTED AGAINST THE TOTAL.
WITHIN THE 2400 AGGREGATE OF HEAVY BOMBERS, ICBM AND SLBM
LAUNCHERS AND AIR TO SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF OVER 600
KMS RANGE THERE WILL BE NO RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM TO MIX,
EXCEPT THAT NO NEW FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS MAY BE CONSTRUCTED
OR ANY ADDITIONAL HEAVY ICBMS DEPLOYED;
-- EACH SIDE WILL ALSO BE PERMITTED TO DEPLOY AN EQUAL AGGREGATE
NUMBER--1320-- OF LAUNCHERS FOR MIRV MISSILES, AGAIN
WITH NO RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM TO MIX. I WOULD LIKE TO
POINT OUT HERE THAT IN BOTH INSTANCES-- THAT IS IN THE
AGGREGATE LEVEL AND THE MIRV LEVEL-- THE AGREED FIGURES ARE
BENEATH OUR BEST REASONABLE ESTIMATE OF FUTURE SOVIET
FORCE LEVELS IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT AND FAR BELOW OUR
ESTIMATE OF THEIR MAXIMUM CAPABILIITES.
-- THER IS TO BE NO COMPENSATION TO THE SOVIET SIDE FOR FBS OR
FOR THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR FORCES. IN SHORT, WHAT THE SOVIETS
CALL US FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS ARE IN NO WAY LIMITED BY THE
AGREEMENT; AND, LASTLY
-- THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IS TO CONTIUNE INTO FORCE UNTIL ITS
EXPIRATION IN OCTOBER, 1977. ITS RELEVANT PROVISIONS, AS
WELL AS ITS KEY INTERPRETATIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS, ARE
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 03 SALT T 00037 01 OF 02 191801Z
TO BE INCORPORATED INTO THE NEW AGREEMENT WHICH WILL COVER
THE PERIOD THROUGH 1985. ADDITIONALLY, THERE WILL BE A
PROVISION FOR NEGOTAITONS TO BEGIN NO LATER THAN 1980-81 ON
THE FURTHER LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. I
KNOW YOU ARE AWARE OF THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE US
VIEWS THE QUESTION OF FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS OF
THESE ARMS, AND FOR OUR PART, WE WILL URGE THAT SUCH
DISCUSSIONS BE HELD WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE 1980-81 DATE.
4. THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING OVERCAME THE MAJOR IMPASSE
IN SALT TWO-- THAT OF EQUAL AGGREGATES. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO
IMPLEMENT THE VALDIVOSTOK UNDERSTNADING, A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT
MATTERS REMAIN TO BE RESLOVED. THUS, WHEN WE RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS
IN GENEVA ON JANUARY 31, MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO DISCUSS MORE
FULLY WITH THE SOVIET SIDE CERTAIN REMAINING KEY ISSUES,
A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHICH THE US CONSIDERS VITAL TO THE
NEW AGREEMENT.
5. AT GENEVA, I HAVE INDICATED TO THE SOVIET SIDE THE NEED FOR
AGREEMENT ON PRECISE AND APPROPRIATE DEFINITIONS FOR THE WEAPONS TO
BE LIMITED, E.G. ON ICBMS, SLBMS, HEAVY ICBMS, HEAVY BOMBERS AND
BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH MIRVS. IN THE CASE OF THE FIRST TWO
SYSTEMS, WE HAVE, OR COURSE, A LONG AND USEFUL NEGOTIATING
HISTORY UPON WHICH TO DRAW. WE ALSO HAVE A PRIOR HISTORY IN THE
INTERIM AGREEMENT OF ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH AN INDIRECT
DEFINITION FOR HEAVY ICBMS THROUGH
LIMITS ON LAUNCHER CONVERSION. HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF THE LARGE
INCREASES IN THE CAPABILITIES OF THE NEW SOVIET MISSILE SYSTEMS,
THE US BELIEVES IT NECESSARY FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH A
MORE ADEQUATE DEFINITION DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE MIDDILE
ITSELF. THUS, I HAVE PROPOSED THAT A HEAVY ICBM SHOULD BE
DEFINED AS AN ICBM WHICH HAS A VOLUME OR THROW WEIGHT GREATER
THAN THAT OF THE LARGEST NON HEAVY ICBM DEPLOYED ON EITHER SIDE
ON THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT. IT IS THE INTENT OF
THIS DEFINITION TO ESTABLISH THE SS-19 MISSILE AS THE DIVIDING
LINE BETWEEN HEAVY AND NON HEAVY ICBMS AND THEREBY TO HALT THE
EROSION IN THIS DISTINCTION CAUSED BY THE INCREASE IN SIZE AND
THROW WEIGHT OF SOVIET NON HEAVY MISSILES.
6. AS YOU KNOW, THE NEW AGREEMENT WILL ALSO LIMIT HEAVY BOMBERS
FOR THE FIRST TIME BY INCLUDING THEM WITHIN THE 2400 AGGREGATE
NUMBER. WE WILL THUS NEED TO DETERMINE WHICH AIRCRAFT ARE TO BE
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 04 SALT T 00037 01 OF 02 191801Z
CONSIDERED AS HEAVY BOMBERS FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS AGREEMENT.
I HAVE PUT FORWARD TO THE SOVIET SIDE THE US VIEW THAT OF THE
CURRENT AIRCRAFT FIVE TYPES SHOULD BE SO LIMITED: THE US B-52
AND B-1, AND THE SOVIET BEAR (TUPOLEV 95), BISON (MYASISHCHEV)
AND BACKFIRE (TUPOLEV VARIABLE GEOMETRY WING BOMBER).
7. IN CONNECTION WITH THE LIMITATION ON LAUNCHERS FOR
MIRVED MISSILES, AND THE NEED TO DEFINE THE BALLISTIC MISSILES
WHICH ARE TO BE INCLUDED, I HAVE EMPAHSIZED TO THE SOVIET SIDE
THE NEED FOR A FULL EXCHANGE ON THE PROBLEMS WHICH COULD ARISE IN
VERIFYING THIS LIMITATION. I HAVE STRESSED THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT
WILL BE OF BROADER SCOPE THAN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND , SINCE
IT PROVIDES FOR NEW QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, SHOULD BE FORMULATED
SO AS TO ASSURE THAT ITS PROVISIONS CAN BE ADEQUATELY
VERIFIED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. IN PARTICULAR, I HAVE
IDENTIFIED CERTAIN QUESTIONS, RELATED TO THE ABILITY OF THE SIDES
TO VERIFY THE MIRV PROVISION OF THE AGREEMENT, WHICH ARE OF
CONCERN TO THE US AND I HAVE INVITED SOVIET COMMENTS OR
SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THESE QUESTIONS MIGHT BEST BE HANDLED.
THESE QUESTIONS INCLUDE:
SECRET
NNN
SECRET
PAGE 01 SALT T 00037 02 OF 02 191823Z
41
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00
ACDE-00 /026 W
--------------------- 098563
O 191700Z FEB 75
FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2423
INFO USMISSSION NATO IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0037
EXDIS/SALT
DEPT ALSO PASS DOD
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF
-- HOW CAN THE SIDES VERIFY WHICH VERSION OF A PARTICULAR
TYPE OF MISSILE IS DEPLOYED IF THAT MISSILE HAS BEEN
FLIGHT TESTED WITH BOTH A SINGLE REENTY VEHICLE ANS WITH
A MIRV;
-- HOW CAN THE SIDES VERIFY WHICH SLBM LAUCHERS CONTAIN
MIRVED MISSILES WHEN BOTH MIRVED AND NON MIRVED SLBMS
ARE COMPATIBLE WITH SUCH LAUNCHERS;
-- HOW CAN THE SIDES VERIFY WHETHER OR NOT ICBM OR SLBM
LAUNCHERS CONTAIN A MIRVED MISSILE AFTER SUCH LAUNCHERS
HAVE BEEN MODIFIED; AND
-- HOW CAN THE SIDES VERIFY THAT A LAUNCHER NO LONGER
CONTAINS A MIRVED MISSILE AFTER IT IS CONVERTED FROM A
LAUNCHER FOR MIRVED MISSILES TO A LAUNCHER FOR NON MIRVED
SYSTEMS?
8. I BELEIVE YOU CAN SEE FROM THE LIST OF QUESTIONS I HAVE
JUST CITED THAT THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING A MIRVED MISSILE FOR
INCUSION WITHIN THE MIRV LIMITATION AND THEN OF ASSURING THE
CAPABILITY OF THE SIDES TO VERIFY THAT LIMITATION BY NATIONAL
TECHNICAL MEANS IS AN EXCEPTIONALLY COMPLEX ONE. THUS FAR, THE
SOVIET SIDE HAS RESPONDED TO MY INVITATION FOR AN EXCHANGE ON
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 02 SALT T 00037 02 OF 02 191823Z
THIS ISSUE BY STATING THAT " THE QUESTION WAS UNDER STUDY."
9. THE DAY AFTER WE RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA THE
SOVIET SIDE TABLED A DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH THEY CLAIMED CARRIED
OUT THE INTENT OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING. THEIR DRAFT
DOES CALL FOR THE AGREED AGGREGATE AND MIRV LEVELS, CARRIES OVER
THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT (PRIMARILY
ARTICLES I AND II AND THE PERTINENT PROCEDUREAL ARTICLES ON
VERIFICATION, THE SCC, AMENDMENTS, WITHDRAWAL) AND PROVIDES FOR
FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, PERMITTED MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT,
ETC. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF POSITIONS AND PROVISIONS
INCLUDED IN THE SOVIET DRAFT WHICH ARE CLEARLY CONTRARY
TO , OR GO BEYOND, THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING.
10. SPECIFICALLY, THE SOVIET DRAFT CONSTRUES THE VLADIVOSTOK
UNDERSTNADING ON SYSTEMS TO BE COUNTED WITHIN THE 2400
AGGREGATE AS INCLUDING NOT JUST BALLISTIC ASMS WITH A RANGE OF
OVER 600 KMS, BUT ASMS " OF ANY TYPE" WITH THIS RANGE. AGAIN,
WHILE OSTENSIBLY AGREEING WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM TO MIX,
THEIR DRAFT CALLS FOR A LIMIT OF 240 FOR SLBM LAUNCHERS ON SUB-
MARINES OF WHAT THEY CALL " A NEW TYPE". THEY CLEARLY HAVE REF-
ERENCE TO OUR TRIDENT PROGRAM. ADDITIONALLY, THE SOVIET DRAFT
ATTEMPTS TO CONSTRAIN US AIR MOBILE OPTIONS BY BANNING THE
DEPLOYMENT OF AIR TO SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES ON AIRCRAFT
OTHER THAN BOMBERS. THE SOVIET DRAFT ALSO ATTEMPTS TO LINK ANY
FUTURE REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC ARMS TO REDUCTIONS IN FBS AND
TO THE EXISTENCE OV NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTIRES. AS
YOU MIGHT EXPECT, THE SOVIET DRAFT CONTAINS THEIR STANDARD
POSITION ON NON TRANSFER.
11. THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO PROPOSED TO BAN:
(A) CRUISE MISSILES OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE;
(B) SEA BASED CRUSIE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN
600 KILOMETERS;
(C) BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600
MILOMETERS ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES OTHER THAN SUBMARINES;
(D) FIXED OR MOBILE INSTALLATIONS FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC
MISSILES, WHICH COULD BE EMPLACED ON THE SEA BED OR
OCEAN FLOOR OR IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, INCLUDING THE
TERRITORIAL SEA AND INLAND WATERS, OR WHICH COULD MOVE ONLY
IN CONTACT WITH THE BOTTOM;
SECRET
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PAGE 03 SALT T 00037 02 OF 02 191823Z
(E) SYSTEMS FOR PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ANY OTHER KIND OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO EARTH ORBIT;
(F) MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES
FOR AIR TO SURFACE MISSILES.
-- THE FIRST FOUR OF THESE ARE BASICALLY CARRY OVERS OF
EARLIER SOVIET PROPOSALS; THE LAST TWO ITEMS ARE NEW ADDITIONS.
12. WE HAVE NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED OURSLEVES TO THE
SOVIET DRAFT, BUT HAVE THUS FAR BEEN SEEKING TO ARRIVE AT A
MEETING OF THE MINDS WITH THEM ON THE BASIC ISSUES WHICH WE FEEL
SHOULD BE RESOLVED BEFORE UNDERTAKING THE DRAFTING OF A TEXT.
13. THERE IS ONE FINAL TOPIC I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH
YOU AND THAT IS THE RECENT SESSION OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE
COMMISSION (SCC). AS YOU WILL RECALL, PRESIDENT FORD IN HIS
PRESS CONFERENCE OF DECEMBER 2 NOTED THE US WAS AWARE OF NO
VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE PART OF EITHER PARTY
TO THE AGREEMENT. HE DID, HOWEVER, SAY CERTAIN " AMBIGUITES"
HAD ARISEN AND , IN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE XIII(A) OF THE ABM
TREATY, THAT THE US WAS CALLING FOR AN SCC SESSION. THIS
SESSION WAS HELD FROM JANUARY 28 TO FEBRUARY 13 AND I BELIEVE
PROGRESS WAS MADE IN CLARIFYING QUESTIONS RELATED TO COMPLIANCE
RAISED BY BOTH THE SIDES. THERE WILL BE ANOTHER SESSION OF THE
SCC IN MARCH, AND I BELIEVE IT INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME TO COMMENT
FURTHER ON SCC MATTERS.
14. THIS CONCLUDES MY FORMAL PRESENTATION. I WILL BE GLAD
TO RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS. UNQUOTE. JOHNSON
SECRET
NNN
| DRAFT STATEMENT FOR NAC CONSULTATION, FEBRUARY 24, 1975 (SALT TWO-521) | |
1975 February 19, 17:00 (Wednesday) |
1975SALTT00037_b |
SECRET |
UNCLASSIFIED |
|
EXDIS - Exclusive Distribution Only |
12104 |
X1 |
TEXT ON MICROFILM,TEXT ONLINE |
-- N/A or Blank -- |
TE - Telegram (cable) |
|
-- N/A or Blank -- ACTION SS - Executive Secretariat, Department of State |
Electronic Telegrams |
Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006 |
|
Content
Raw content
SECRET
PAGE 01 SALT T 00037 01 OF 02 191801Z
42
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00
ACDE-00 /026 W
--------------------- 098271
O 191700Z FEB 75
FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2422
INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0037
EXDIS/SALT
DEPT ALSO PASS DOD
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: DRAFT STATEMENT FOR NAC CONSULTATION, FEBRUARY 24,
1975 (SALT TWO-521)
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT STATEMENT PREPARED FOR FEB 24
NAC CONSULTATION ON SALT.
2. IN ORDER TO PERMIT USNATO TO PREPARE STATEMENT FOR DIS-
TRIBUTION IN NAC, WASHINGTONS COMMENTS ORE CONCURRENCE SHOULD BE
CABLED DIRECTLY TO US MISSION NATO TO BE RECEIVED THERE BY COB
FEB 21, WITH INFO COPY TO USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA.
QUOTE:
STATEMENT ON SALT TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
FEBRUARY 24, 1975
1. I AM VERY PLEASED TO BE HERE AGIN TODAY AND TO MEET WITH
YOU FOR ONE OF OUR REGULAR CONSULTATIONS ON SALT. I BELIEVE WE
ALL APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE AND TUILITY OF THESE CONSULTATIONS
AND I, FOR ONE, PARTICLUARLY VALUE THE OPPORTUNITY THEY AFFORD
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 02 SALT T 00037 01 OF 02 191801Z
ME TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH YOU ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.
2. I AM ALSO PLEASED TO NOTE THAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THIS
MORNINGS CONSULTATION ON SALT THERE WILL BE ANOTHER IN THE
SERIES OF EXPERTS MEETINGS. THE US WILL BE REPRESENTED AT THE
MEETING BY MR RALPH EARLE, A MEMBER OF THE US SALT DELEGATION,
WHO, I BELIEVE, IS WELL KNOWN TO MOST OF YOU.
3. AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, SINCE OUR LAST MEETING IN OCTOBER
THERE HAVE BEEN SOME MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS ON SALT, THE DETAILS OF
WHICH WERE REPORTED TO YOUR GOVERNMENTS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AT
LAST DECEMBERS MINISTERIAL MEETING. TO RECAPITULATE BRIEFLY,
AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSIONS AT THE VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT MEETING,
RECORDED SUBSEQUENTLY IN AN AIDE MEMOIRE EXCHANGED IN DECEMBER,
THE US AND SOVIET UNION AGREED THAT:
-- EACH SIDE WILL BE PREMITTED TO DEPLOY AN EQUAL NUMBER--
2400-- OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS, I. E. ICBM AND SLBM
LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS. IF AIR TO SURFACE
BALLISTIC MISSILES (ASBM) OF RANGES OVER 600 KMS ARE DEPLOYED
IN THE FUTURE, THESE WILL ALSO BE COUNTED AGAINST THE TOTAL.
WITHIN THE 2400 AGGREGATE OF HEAVY BOMBERS, ICBM AND SLBM
LAUNCHERS AND AIR TO SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF OVER 600
KMS RANGE THERE WILL BE NO RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM TO MIX,
EXCEPT THAT NO NEW FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS MAY BE CONSTRUCTED
OR ANY ADDITIONAL HEAVY ICBMS DEPLOYED;
-- EACH SIDE WILL ALSO BE PERMITTED TO DEPLOY AN EQUAL AGGREGATE
NUMBER--1320-- OF LAUNCHERS FOR MIRV MISSILES, AGAIN
WITH NO RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM TO MIX. I WOULD LIKE TO
POINT OUT HERE THAT IN BOTH INSTANCES-- THAT IS IN THE
AGGREGATE LEVEL AND THE MIRV LEVEL-- THE AGREED FIGURES ARE
BENEATH OUR BEST REASONABLE ESTIMATE OF FUTURE SOVIET
FORCE LEVELS IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT AND FAR BELOW OUR
ESTIMATE OF THEIR MAXIMUM CAPABILIITES.
-- THER IS TO BE NO COMPENSATION TO THE SOVIET SIDE FOR FBS OR
FOR THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR FORCES. IN SHORT, WHAT THE SOVIETS
CALL US FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS ARE IN NO WAY LIMITED BY THE
AGREEMENT; AND, LASTLY
-- THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IS TO CONTIUNE INTO FORCE UNTIL ITS
EXPIRATION IN OCTOBER, 1977. ITS RELEVANT PROVISIONS, AS
WELL AS ITS KEY INTERPRETATIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS, ARE
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 03 SALT T 00037 01 OF 02 191801Z
TO BE INCORPORATED INTO THE NEW AGREEMENT WHICH WILL COVER
THE PERIOD THROUGH 1985. ADDITIONALLY, THERE WILL BE A
PROVISION FOR NEGOTAITONS TO BEGIN NO LATER THAN 1980-81 ON
THE FURTHER LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. I
KNOW YOU ARE AWARE OF THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE US
VIEWS THE QUESTION OF FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS OF
THESE ARMS, AND FOR OUR PART, WE WILL URGE THAT SUCH
DISCUSSIONS BE HELD WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE 1980-81 DATE.
4. THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING OVERCAME THE MAJOR IMPASSE
IN SALT TWO-- THAT OF EQUAL AGGREGATES. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO
IMPLEMENT THE VALDIVOSTOK UNDERSTNADING, A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT
MATTERS REMAIN TO BE RESLOVED. THUS, WHEN WE RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS
IN GENEVA ON JANUARY 31, MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO DISCUSS MORE
FULLY WITH THE SOVIET SIDE CERTAIN REMAINING KEY ISSUES,
A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHICH THE US CONSIDERS VITAL TO THE
NEW AGREEMENT.
5. AT GENEVA, I HAVE INDICATED TO THE SOVIET SIDE THE NEED FOR
AGREEMENT ON PRECISE AND APPROPRIATE DEFINITIONS FOR THE WEAPONS TO
BE LIMITED, E.G. ON ICBMS, SLBMS, HEAVY ICBMS, HEAVY BOMBERS AND
BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH MIRVS. IN THE CASE OF THE FIRST TWO
SYSTEMS, WE HAVE, OR COURSE, A LONG AND USEFUL NEGOTIATING
HISTORY UPON WHICH TO DRAW. WE ALSO HAVE A PRIOR HISTORY IN THE
INTERIM AGREEMENT OF ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH AN INDIRECT
DEFINITION FOR HEAVY ICBMS THROUGH
LIMITS ON LAUNCHER CONVERSION. HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF THE LARGE
INCREASES IN THE CAPABILITIES OF THE NEW SOVIET MISSILE SYSTEMS,
THE US BELIEVES IT NECESSARY FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH A
MORE ADEQUATE DEFINITION DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE MIDDILE
ITSELF. THUS, I HAVE PROPOSED THAT A HEAVY ICBM SHOULD BE
DEFINED AS AN ICBM WHICH HAS A VOLUME OR THROW WEIGHT GREATER
THAN THAT OF THE LARGEST NON HEAVY ICBM DEPLOYED ON EITHER SIDE
ON THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT. IT IS THE INTENT OF
THIS DEFINITION TO ESTABLISH THE SS-19 MISSILE AS THE DIVIDING
LINE BETWEEN HEAVY AND NON HEAVY ICBMS AND THEREBY TO HALT THE
EROSION IN THIS DISTINCTION CAUSED BY THE INCREASE IN SIZE AND
THROW WEIGHT OF SOVIET NON HEAVY MISSILES.
6. AS YOU KNOW, THE NEW AGREEMENT WILL ALSO LIMIT HEAVY BOMBERS
FOR THE FIRST TIME BY INCLUDING THEM WITHIN THE 2400 AGGREGATE
NUMBER. WE WILL THUS NEED TO DETERMINE WHICH AIRCRAFT ARE TO BE
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 04 SALT T 00037 01 OF 02 191801Z
CONSIDERED AS HEAVY BOMBERS FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS AGREEMENT.
I HAVE PUT FORWARD TO THE SOVIET SIDE THE US VIEW THAT OF THE
CURRENT AIRCRAFT FIVE TYPES SHOULD BE SO LIMITED: THE US B-52
AND B-1, AND THE SOVIET BEAR (TUPOLEV 95), BISON (MYASISHCHEV)
AND BACKFIRE (TUPOLEV VARIABLE GEOMETRY WING BOMBER).
7. IN CONNECTION WITH THE LIMITATION ON LAUNCHERS FOR
MIRVED MISSILES, AND THE NEED TO DEFINE THE BALLISTIC MISSILES
WHICH ARE TO BE INCLUDED, I HAVE EMPAHSIZED TO THE SOVIET SIDE
THE NEED FOR A FULL EXCHANGE ON THE PROBLEMS WHICH COULD ARISE IN
VERIFYING THIS LIMITATION. I HAVE STRESSED THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT
WILL BE OF BROADER SCOPE THAN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND , SINCE
IT PROVIDES FOR NEW QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, SHOULD BE FORMULATED
SO AS TO ASSURE THAT ITS PROVISIONS CAN BE ADEQUATELY
VERIFIED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. IN PARTICULAR, I HAVE
IDENTIFIED CERTAIN QUESTIONS, RELATED TO THE ABILITY OF THE SIDES
TO VERIFY THE MIRV PROVISION OF THE AGREEMENT, WHICH ARE OF
CONCERN TO THE US AND I HAVE INVITED SOVIET COMMENTS OR
SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THESE QUESTIONS MIGHT BEST BE HANDLED.
THESE QUESTIONS INCLUDE:
SECRET
NNN
SECRET
PAGE 01 SALT T 00037 02 OF 02 191823Z
41
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00
ACDE-00 /026 W
--------------------- 098563
O 191700Z FEB 75
FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2423
INFO USMISSSION NATO IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0037
EXDIS/SALT
DEPT ALSO PASS DOD
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF
-- HOW CAN THE SIDES VERIFY WHICH VERSION OF A PARTICULAR
TYPE OF MISSILE IS DEPLOYED IF THAT MISSILE HAS BEEN
FLIGHT TESTED WITH BOTH A SINGLE REENTY VEHICLE ANS WITH
A MIRV;
-- HOW CAN THE SIDES VERIFY WHICH SLBM LAUCHERS CONTAIN
MIRVED MISSILES WHEN BOTH MIRVED AND NON MIRVED SLBMS
ARE COMPATIBLE WITH SUCH LAUNCHERS;
-- HOW CAN THE SIDES VERIFY WHETHER OR NOT ICBM OR SLBM
LAUNCHERS CONTAIN A MIRVED MISSILE AFTER SUCH LAUNCHERS
HAVE BEEN MODIFIED; AND
-- HOW CAN THE SIDES VERIFY THAT A LAUNCHER NO LONGER
CONTAINS A MIRVED MISSILE AFTER IT IS CONVERTED FROM A
LAUNCHER FOR MIRVED MISSILES TO A LAUNCHER FOR NON MIRVED
SYSTEMS?
8. I BELEIVE YOU CAN SEE FROM THE LIST OF QUESTIONS I HAVE
JUST CITED THAT THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING A MIRVED MISSILE FOR
INCUSION WITHIN THE MIRV LIMITATION AND THEN OF ASSURING THE
CAPABILITY OF THE SIDES TO VERIFY THAT LIMITATION BY NATIONAL
TECHNICAL MEANS IS AN EXCEPTIONALLY COMPLEX ONE. THUS FAR, THE
SOVIET SIDE HAS RESPONDED TO MY INVITATION FOR AN EXCHANGE ON
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 02 SALT T 00037 02 OF 02 191823Z
THIS ISSUE BY STATING THAT " THE QUESTION WAS UNDER STUDY."
9. THE DAY AFTER WE RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA THE
SOVIET SIDE TABLED A DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH THEY CLAIMED CARRIED
OUT THE INTENT OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING. THEIR DRAFT
DOES CALL FOR THE AGREED AGGREGATE AND MIRV LEVELS, CARRIES OVER
THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT (PRIMARILY
ARTICLES I AND II AND THE PERTINENT PROCEDUREAL ARTICLES ON
VERIFICATION, THE SCC, AMENDMENTS, WITHDRAWAL) AND PROVIDES FOR
FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, PERMITTED MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT,
ETC. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF POSITIONS AND PROVISIONS
INCLUDED IN THE SOVIET DRAFT WHICH ARE CLEARLY CONTRARY
TO , OR GO BEYOND, THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING.
10. SPECIFICALLY, THE SOVIET DRAFT CONSTRUES THE VLADIVOSTOK
UNDERSTNADING ON SYSTEMS TO BE COUNTED WITHIN THE 2400
AGGREGATE AS INCLUDING NOT JUST BALLISTIC ASMS WITH A RANGE OF
OVER 600 KMS, BUT ASMS " OF ANY TYPE" WITH THIS RANGE. AGAIN,
WHILE OSTENSIBLY AGREEING WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM TO MIX,
THEIR DRAFT CALLS FOR A LIMIT OF 240 FOR SLBM LAUNCHERS ON SUB-
MARINES OF WHAT THEY CALL " A NEW TYPE". THEY CLEARLY HAVE REF-
ERENCE TO OUR TRIDENT PROGRAM. ADDITIONALLY, THE SOVIET DRAFT
ATTEMPTS TO CONSTRAIN US AIR MOBILE OPTIONS BY BANNING THE
DEPLOYMENT OF AIR TO SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES ON AIRCRAFT
OTHER THAN BOMBERS. THE SOVIET DRAFT ALSO ATTEMPTS TO LINK ANY
FUTURE REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC ARMS TO REDUCTIONS IN FBS AND
TO THE EXISTENCE OV NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTIRES. AS
YOU MIGHT EXPECT, THE SOVIET DRAFT CONTAINS THEIR STANDARD
POSITION ON NON TRANSFER.
11. THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO PROPOSED TO BAN:
(A) CRUISE MISSILES OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE;
(B) SEA BASED CRUSIE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN
600 KILOMETERS;
(C) BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600
MILOMETERS ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES OTHER THAN SUBMARINES;
(D) FIXED OR MOBILE INSTALLATIONS FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC
MISSILES, WHICH COULD BE EMPLACED ON THE SEA BED OR
OCEAN FLOOR OR IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, INCLUDING THE
TERRITORIAL SEA AND INLAND WATERS, OR WHICH COULD MOVE ONLY
IN CONTACT WITH THE BOTTOM;
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 03 SALT T 00037 02 OF 02 191823Z
(E) SYSTEMS FOR PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ANY OTHER KIND OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO EARTH ORBIT;
(F) MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES
FOR AIR TO SURFACE MISSILES.
-- THE FIRST FOUR OF THESE ARE BASICALLY CARRY OVERS OF
EARLIER SOVIET PROPOSALS; THE LAST TWO ITEMS ARE NEW ADDITIONS.
12. WE HAVE NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED OURSLEVES TO THE
SOVIET DRAFT, BUT HAVE THUS FAR BEEN SEEKING TO ARRIVE AT A
MEETING OF THE MINDS WITH THEM ON THE BASIC ISSUES WHICH WE FEEL
SHOULD BE RESOLVED BEFORE UNDERTAKING THE DRAFTING OF A TEXT.
13. THERE IS ONE FINAL TOPIC I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH
YOU AND THAT IS THE RECENT SESSION OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE
COMMISSION (SCC). AS YOU WILL RECALL, PRESIDENT FORD IN HIS
PRESS CONFERENCE OF DECEMBER 2 NOTED THE US WAS AWARE OF NO
VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE PART OF EITHER PARTY
TO THE AGREEMENT. HE DID, HOWEVER, SAY CERTAIN " AMBIGUITES"
HAD ARISEN AND , IN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE XIII(A) OF THE ABM
TREATY, THAT THE US WAS CALLING FOR AN SCC SESSION. THIS
SESSION WAS HELD FROM JANUARY 28 TO FEBRUARY 13 AND I BELIEVE
PROGRESS WAS MADE IN CLARIFYING QUESTIONS RELATED TO COMPLIANCE
RAISED BY BOTH THE SIDES. THERE WILL BE ANOTHER SESSION OF THE
SCC IN MARCH, AND I BELIEVE IT INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME TO COMMENT
FURTHER ON SCC MATTERS.
14. THIS CONCLUDES MY FORMAL PRESENTATION. I WILL BE GLAD
TO RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS. UNQUOTE. JOHNSON
SECRET
NNN
Metadata
---
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), MEETING DELEGATIONS, RESOLUTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 FEB 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date: n/a
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event: n/a
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason: n/a
Disposition Remarks: n/a
Document Number: 1975SALTT00037
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: '00'
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750059-0482
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path: n/a
ISecure: '1'
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750231/aaaabbxs.tel
Line Count: '309'
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: '6'
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: n/a
Review Date: 21 APR 2003
Review Event: n/a
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <21 APR 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <22 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings: ! 'n/a
Margaret P. Grafeld
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006
'
Review Media Identifier: n/a
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date: n/a
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DRAFT STATEMENT FOR NAC CONSULTATION, FEBRUARY 24, 1975 (SALT TWO-521)
TAGS: PARM, US, NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: ! 'Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic
Review 05 JUL 2006
Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006'
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