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ACTION PM-03
INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 EB-07 COME-00 MC-01 CIAE-00 H-01
INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02
SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 OMB-01 CIEP-01 /067 W
--------------------- 067251
R 171036Z JAN 75
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5019
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY OSLO
USMISSION NATO
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
AMEMBASSY PARIS
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 0239
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, NL
SUBJECT: F-104 REPLACEMENT: COMMENTS OF MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE SECRETARY GENERAL RE SELECTION
OF THE YF-16
1. SUMMARY: DURING LUNCHEON CONVERSATION JANUARY 16
WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE SECRETARY GENERAL PEIJNENBURG,
DCM ADVERTED TO MEETING TAKING PLACE IN BRUSSELS BETWEEN
USAF ASST. SEC. LA BERGE AND ASST. SEC. SHRONTZ AND
CONSORTIUM MEMBERS AND ASKED FRANKLY HOW EMBASSY COULD
IMPROVE CHANCES OF GON ULTIMATELY SELECTING THE YF-16.
PEIJNENBURG, WHO IS BOTH PRO-AMERICAN AND PRO-EUROPEAN
AND COMES ACROSS AS TRYING HARD TO BE OBJECTIVE, TOUCHED
ON FOUR KEY AREAS; (A) LEADING GON PERSONALITIES;
(B) TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY; (C) OFFSET; AND (D) TIMING.
PEIJNENBURG'S BASIC MESSAGE WAS THAT THERE WAS A GOOD
CHANCE THE GON WOULD BUY THE YF-16 ALTHOUGH IT WAS FAR
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FROM SURE AND THERE WERE MANY PITFALLS. END SUMMARY.
2. PEIJNENBURG SAID CATEGORICALLY THAT MOD VREDELING HAD
NOT RPT NOT YET REACHED DECISION AS TO WHICH PLANE HE
WOULD RECOMMEND FOR PURCHASE BY THE GON. (PEIJNENBURG
PARENTHETICALLY DISCOUNTED THE CHANCES OF THE VIGGEN).
"VREDELING'S HEART GOES TOWARD THE MIRAGE," SAID PEIJNENBURG,
"BUT HE HAS NOT YET MADE UP HIS MIND." VAN DER STOEL
ON THE OTHER HAND WAS FOR THE AMERICAN PLANE IN "HEART
AND MIND." THE OTHER KEY FIGURES, ACCORDING TO PEIJNENBURG,
WERE PRIME MINISTER DEN ULY AND FINANCE MINISTER DUISENBURG;
NEITHER HAD A STRONG PREFERENCE AS YET. PEIJNENBURG ADDED
THAT DUISENBURG WOULD BE VERY INFLUENTIAL IN THE GON'S
ULTIMATE DECISION BECAUSE OF HIS STATURE WITHIN THE
GOVERNMENT AND BECAUSE OF THE IMPACT OF THE F-104
REPLACEMENT ON THE DUTCH BUDGET. PEIJNENBURG DREW A
PARALLEL TO THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT WHOSE PRIME MINISTER,
FOREIGN MINISTER AND DEFENSE MINISTER HAD APPROXIMATELY
THE SAME ATTITUDES AT THIS TIME TOWARD THE SELECTION OF THE
FY-16 AS THEIR DUTCH COUNTERPARTS.
3. PEIJNENBURG EMPHASIZED THE SAME POINT AS HAD GENERAL
VAN ELSEN, CHAIRMAN OF THE SECOND CHAMBER'S DEFENSE
COMMITTEE IN A CONVERSATION WITH THE DCM LAST WEEK, THAT
DUTCH INDUSTRY MUST BENEFIT AS A SUB-CONTRACTOR IN
THE YF-16 PROJECT NOT JUST IN QUANTITATIVE TERMS
BUT EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY IN TERMS OF THE TRANSFER OF THE
LATEST TECHNOLOGY. HE NOTED THAT THE DASSAULT PEOPLE
WERE PUSHING VERY HARD ON THE ARGUMENT THAT THE DUTCH
WOULD BE FULL PARTNERS WITH THE FRENCH IF THE GON CHOSE
THE MIRAGE.
4. PEIJNENBURG SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE USING THE STICK
AS WELL AS A CARROT ON THE OFFSET FRONT BY LETTING IT BE
KNOWN THAT THEY WERE IN A POSITION TO START BUILDING A
MEDIUM-RANGE PASSENGER PLANE COMPARABLE TO FOKKER'S F-28
FELLOWSHIP (WHICH ACCORDING TO PIEJNENBURG IS SELLING
POORLY). IF ON THE OTHER HAND THE GON OPTED FOR THE
MIRAGE, THE FRENCH WOULD NOT PRODUCE A COMPETITOR FOR THE
F-28. PEIJNENBURG IMPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE US
INTEREST TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF HELPING FOKKER
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SELL ITS F-28S IN THE US AND ELSEWHERE.
5. TIMING: PEIJNENBURG THOUGHT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT
THE GON WOULD REACH A DECISION ON THE REPLACEMENT FIGHTER
UNTIL AFTER THE LABOR PARTY CONGRESS IN EARLY APRIL. HE
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE CHANCES OF THE GON SELECTING THE
FY-16 WOULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED, ALTHOUGH NOT
NECESSARILY JEOPARDIZED, BY SUCH A LENGTHY DELAY. HE
WAS CATEGORIC THAT IF THE GON DID NOT MAKE A DECISION BY
MARCH 1 THEN THERE WOULD BE NO DECISION UNTIL AFTER THE
LABOR PARTY CONGRESS. IRRESPECTIVE OF TIMING, HE THOUGHT
THAT VREDELING WOULD RUN INTO LESS OPPOSITION IN THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS IF HE RECOMMENDED THE YF-16 THAN IF HE
RECOMMENDED THE MIRAGE OR THE VIGGEN. THE
SITUATION IN THE PARLIAMENT MIGHT BE JUST THE OPPOSITE.
6. AS A FINAL WORD OF ADVICE PEIJNENBURG SAID WE SHOULD
NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE POLITICAL WEIGHT OF THOSE WHO ARE
ARGUING THAT THE NETHERLANDS COULD BET ALONG WITH AND
SHOULD THEREFORE BUY A LESS SOPHISTICATED AND LESS
EXPENSIVE PLANE SUCH AS THE ALPHA-JET OR THE F-5E.
AS A MILITARY EXPERT, PEIJNENBURG SAID HE WOULD BE MOST
UNHAPPY IF HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT CHOSE EITHER THE YF-16
OR THE MIRAGE SUPER F-1. HOWEVER, HE INDICATED THAT IT
WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR THE EMBASSY TO STIFFEN THE BACKBONE
OF THOSE IN THE GOVERNMENT WHO WERE SUSCEPTIBLE TO
PRESSURES TO BUY A CHEAPER PLANE EVEN IF ADMITTEDLY IT
COULD NOT FULFILL THE NETHERLANDS AIR FORCE'S NATO ROLE.
7. DCM THANKED PEIJNENBURG FOR HIS FRANK COMMENTS AND
ADVICE AND LEFT WITH HIM THE TEXT OF SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S
JAN 14 PRESS CONFERENCE, COMMENDING TO HIS PARTICULAR
ATTENTION THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC REASONS WHICH LED
THE USAF TO SELECT THE YF-16.
GOULD
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