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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06TASHKENT902	2006-05-05 12:12	2011-01-13 01:01	SECRET	Embassy Tashkent

VZCZCXRO9116
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNT #0902/01 1251259
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZUI RUEHSD 0065W 1252226 H/W ZDS
P 051259Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5716
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 7884
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 1962
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 2491
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 2392
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1455
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6648
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJC/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 000902 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AND DRL 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2016 
TAGS: KCRM PGOV ECON PREL PINR UZ
SUBJECT: (S) MAFIA BOSS FIXES GOU TENDERS AND JOBS 

REF: TASHKENT 465 

TASHKENT 00000902 001.2 OF 002 

Classified By: AMB. JON R. PURNELL, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D) 

¶1. (S) Summary: A well connected Embassy contact described a mafia chieftain's role in helping businessmen to secure GOU tenders and job applicants to "buy" government jobs. Crime boss Salim Abduvaliyev puts bidders for tenders in touch with an Iranian businessman holding British citizenship, who submits the paperwork to First Daughter Gulnora Karimova for approval. Salim works with the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs responsible for personnel issues to arrange government jobs, agreeing on a price and then adding his own fee before selling the position. Salim has reportedly sold a wide range of Government positions, including regional Hokim, police chief, and Ministry of Internal Affairs jobs. A Presidential Adviser and a former Minister of the Interior also reportedly worked closely with Salim on job placement transactions. End summary. 

¶2. (S) An Embassy contact with close connections to the families of senior GOU officials, XXXXXXXXXXXX, told Poloff that Salim often serves as a middleman in fixing GOU tenders and helping applicants obtain government jobs. Foreign investors can "win" GOU tenders by arranging them through Salim, who charges a percentage of revenues as a fee. Many job applicants have approached the contact, XXXXXXXXXXXX, asking for introductions to Salim in order to "purchase" a GOU job. (Note: Both public and private sector jobs are routinely "bought" in Uzbekistan. End note.)

CONTRACT AND TENDER GRAFT 
------------------------- 

¶3. (S) According to the contact, Salim locates foreign and other investors interested in GOU tenders, putting them in touch with an Iranian businessman holding British citizenship. The Iranian prepares the paperwork, submitting the tender to First Daughter Gulnora Karimova for approval. (Note: According to the contact, former Deputy PM Dilbar Gulomova's son works for this Iranian. End note.) Tenders arranged through this process reportedly include the Dutch Gemka (ph) firm's railway investment in Bukhara, which required paying Salim a $700,000 fee, a Swiss/Israeli company's water project in the Tashkent region, and a Korean company's large-scale contract to provide computers to schools.

GOU JOBS FOR SALE! 
------------------ 

¶4. (S) A man named "Abror hoja" brings job applicants to Salim, who discusses the price of the purchase and facilitates the transaction. The contact said that Salim has sold a wide range of government positions, including regional Hokim, regional police chief, and high and mid-ranking jobs at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Salim works closely with Tursinkhan Hudaibergenov, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs for personnel issues, to facilitate GOU job placements. Salim agrees on a price with Hudaibergenov, before adding his own fee, and selling the position at the higher price. (Note: The contact said that Salim closely cooperated in the past on such job purchase transactions with State Adviser to the President Ismail Jurabekov, and former Minister of Interior Zokir Almatov. End note.)

¶5. (S) In one example of Salim's sway over GOU personnel decisions, a regional mayor appealed to him for help retaining his job after he came under pressure to resign. The wife of Maksim Teshebaev, the mayor of Tashkent's region's Orta Chirchik district, approached Salim's wife asking for Salim's support. For the right price, Salim promised that Teshebaev would be able to retain his job. According to the contact, Salim instructed Teshebaev to make a payment to his brother, Azamjon Abduvaliyev, in order to retain the job. But after the payment was made, Salim reportedly mocked the amount of money Teshebaev offered, TASHKENT 00000902 002.2 OF 002 saying he "couldn't eat a meal" for that amount.

¶6. (S) Comment: Salim's role in securing GOU tenders and jobs sheds further light on the close connections between organized crime and the GOU (reftel). Corruption is rampant in the GOU. Tenders and government positions can be fairly easily secured by paying the right amount of money to the appropriate individual, leading to a situation in which unqualified individuals have every incentive to engage in further corrupt activity to pay off the large debts they usually incur making down payments on the jobs. PURNELL