Currently released so far... 1862 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/21 2010/12/20 2010/12/19 2010/12/18 2010/12/17 2010/12/16 2010/12/15 2010/12/14 2010/12/13 2010/12/12 2010/12/11 2010/12/10 2010/12/09 2010/12/08 2010/12/07 2010/12/06 2010/12/05 2010/12/04 2010/12/03 2010/12/02 2010/12/01 2010/11/30 2010/11/29 2010/11/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Cairo Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Paris Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
Browse by tag
CH CU CO CBW CLINTON CASC CE CJAN CVIS CMGT CI CIA CG CF CN CS CIS CA CM CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CD COUNTERTERRORISM COUNTER CDG CACM CDB CV
EUN EFIN ECON EAID ENRG EPET ER EIND EAGR ETRD ETTC EU ECIN EAIR ELAB EG EINV ECPS EFIS EI EINT EZ EMIN ET EC ENVR ES EWWT ELTN EN ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN EXTERNAL ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
IR IS IZ IPR IT INRB IAEA IRAJ IN INRA INRO ID ITPHUM IV IQ IO IRAQI ITALY ITALIAN IMO INTERPOL ICTY ICAO
KTFN KOLY KDEM KCRM KWBG KPAL KISL KPAO KUNR KCOR KJUS KGHG KIPR KDRG KMDR KAWK KSCA KS KN KIRF KIRC KU KBIO KE KNNP KZ KHLS KG KACT KGIC KRAD KCOM KMCA KV KHDP KDEV KWMN KSPR KTIA KHIV KPRP KAWC KCIP KCFE KPKO KMRS KFRD KTIP KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KNPP KR KPWR KSUM KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KFIN KGCC KPIN KNUC KPLS
MOPS MASS MAPP MCAP MNUC MARR MU MO MY MTCRE MA MG MASC MX MCC MZ ML MK MTRE MP MIL MDC MPOS MAR MD MEPP MR MOPPS MTCR
PREL PGOV PINR PHUM PTER PARM PK PL PREF PE PBTS PKFK PO PINS PHSA PGOF PROP PA PM PMIL POL PF POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PSOE PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON PAK POGOV PINL
Browse by classification
Community resources
Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07HAVANA258, CUBA: HOW BELIEVABLE IS A FIDEL CASTRO COMEBACK?
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07HAVANA258.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 07HAVANA258 | 2007-03-16 18:06 | 2010-12-17 22:10 | CONFIDENTIAL | US Interests Section Havana |
VZCZCXRO8161
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHUB #0258/01 0751828
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161828Z MAR 07
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1454
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0062
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0050
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUESDM/JTLO MIAMI FL
RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
MISC:
DESTINATION: VZCZCXRO8161
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHUB #0258/01 0751828
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161828Z MAR 07
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1454
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0062
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0050
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUESDM/JTLO MIAMI FL
RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000258
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR CU
SUBJECT: CUBA: HOW BELIEVABLE IS A FIDEL CASTRO COMEBACK?
HAVANA 00000258 001.3 OF 002
Classified By: COM Michael E. Parmly; Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
¶1. (C) Summary: XXXXXXXXXXXX
passed us a document March 14 that describes Fidel Castro's
declining health, as analyzed by a respected, XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX. The document concludes by saying that Castro has a
terminal condition, and will suffer an inevitable
deterioration of his faculties until he dies. But he is not
about to die "immediately." This contrasts with a flurry of
news and public statements by key regime figures about Castro
making a comeback, including his having spoken to Hugo Chavez
on the phone while the latter was in Haiti. We believe that
a full comeback is unlikely, but that Fidel Castro is more of
a presence behind the scenes -- and even "on stage" as a
presence -- than he was a few months ago. End Summary.
¶2. (U) Media have reported increased activity on the part of
Fidel Castro this past week: Speaking on the phone to Hugo
Chavez during the Venezuelan's visit to Haiti; and receiving
Colombian author and long-time sympathizer Gabriel Garcia
Marquez. Both Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque (in
Europe) and Parliamentary Speaker Ricardo Alarcon stated
publicly that Fidel Castro was making a comeback and would
return to the GOC's helm. Alarcon's statement included
Castro's "winning reelection for president" in 2008. Interim
dictator Raul Castro has kept a low profile during the past
few weeks.
¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX passed COM and
Pol-Econ Counselor a document based on XXXXXXXXXXXX interview with
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX with an excellent reputation. The
document traces Fidel Castro's critical condition from its
onset last July, through the various ups and downs with his
local medical staff and with the visiting Spanish doctor,
Garcia Sabrido. Most of this repeats what has previously
been reported, with one new development: Castro has fired
his long-time personal physician, Dr. Selman. Informal
translation of this document follows in Para 4.
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX Statement:
"The illness began in the plane from Holguin to Havana (Note:
after a full day of July 26, 2006 activities. End note). As
this was a short flight there was no doctor aboard and they
had to land urgently once they knew of his bleeding. He was
diagnosed with diverticulitis of the colon.
This illness is characterized by diverticulae in the large
intestine, generally. A diverticula is a protuberant sack in
a segment of the intestine, not in itself necessarily
dangerous. Waste gets trapped in them, for example.
Nevertheless, they can cause hemorrhaging, inflammation and
infection, resulting in diverticulitis. (Health Unit
Comment: Simple diverticulitis, without perforation,
hemorrhaging or infection, is treatable. End Comment.)
The condition requires surgery when the diverticulae are
gigantic, because they are more likely to become infected and
burst.
He had a perforation in the large intestine and needed to
have a colostomy done; which he opposed, saying that they
should splice out the infected part and reattach the
intestine to his colon. Dr. Selman, who was chief of the
medical team, was in agreement, but the rest of the team
opposed. But Fidel Castro, capriciously, did not permit the
colostomy.
With the passage of time, as the colon was infected, the
operation collapsed and the reattached part separated. They
had to operate again, but found a fistula. It wasn't known
at that time what he had, but normally a fistula in the
abdomen has the effect of blocking the digestion of
food--resulting in the loss of 40 pounds. They began to feed
him by IV serum, and they used a Korean-made device to treat
the fistula, which didn't have much success. That was when
they called in the Spanish doctor, the one who said that they
Cuban team had done what they could, but the correct
treatment should have been a colostomy.
At that point they removed Selman from the team, who is now
working as a low-level doctor someplace else.
XXXXXXXXXXXX explains that at his (Castro's) age
HAVANA 00000258 002.3 OF 002
this illness is not curable, and will notXXXXXXXXXXXX
allow him to return to leading Cuba. He won't die
immediately, but he will progressively lose his faculties and
become ever more debilitated until he dies."
¶5. (C) This report is consistent with our reporting that
Fidel Castro probably came close to death in July, 2006, and
then again around October. Since then, as we have seen in
video and audio broadcasts, Castro has been able to engage
with Hugo Chavez and others for limited periods of
conversation and other forms of carefully controlled
activity. He has not appeared live on TV or in any other
public context during the entire period of his critical
illness, which caused him to miss the September, 2006
Non-Aligned summit and a large-scale celebration of his
birthday and armed forces day in December, 2006.
¶6. (C) Cubans react to news about Fidel Castro with
resignation and wild speculation. XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX that he thought last month's taped call-in
by Castro to Hugo Chavez's radio show was fake and that he
would die by May. XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX described the Castro illness as having a similar
effect on the public as the Pope's 1998 visit: Greatly
raised expectation for change, followed by disappointment and
reversion to the totalitarian norm.
¶7. (C) Comment: We are missing too many variables to be able
to predict accurately how many more months Fidel Castro will
live. Frankly, we don't believe anyone, including Castro
himself, can state that with certainty. However, while he is
still alive, even in a reduced capacity, his presence has a
chilling and retardant effect on Cuban society. The high
expectations for change are still out there, but are mostly
associated with the idea that the dictator has to die first
before anything substantial will happen.
PARMLY