Cable Viewer

The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08BAKU625.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08BAKU625	2008-07-02 06:06	2010-12-15 21:09	SECRET	Embassy Baku

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKB #0625/01 1840627
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 020627Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5615
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2888
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0796
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1007

Wednesday, 02 July 2008, 06:27
S E C R E T BAKU 000625 
SIPDIS 
EO 12958 DECL: 07/02/2018 
TAGS ENRG, EPET, PTER, MARR, MASS, PBTS, IR, AJ 
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN FACES CHALLENGE OF PROTECTING CRITICAL 
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse per 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (S) Summary: On June 9-13 an interagency team representing the Global Critical Energy Infrastructure Program (GCEIP) and consisting of representatives from the Department of State, Department of Energy, the Coast Guard, and EUCOM met with a number of government and private industry officials responsible for Azerbaijan’s critical energy infrastructure security. The team broached the subject with the GOAJ of the USG providing technical advice on the security of such infrastructure through an agreement by which the GOAJ pays for such assistance. XXXXXXXXXXXX End summary.
DEFINING AZERBAIJAN’S CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶2. (SBU) On June 9-13 an inter-agency team consisting of representatives from the Department of State, Department of Energy, the Coast Guard, and EUCOM met with a number of government and private industry officials from organizations responsible for critical energy infrastructure security in Azerbaijan to include British Petroleum (BP), the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Ministry of National Security (MNS), the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), and the State Special Protection Service (SSPS). XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX

ONSHORE FACILITIES
------------------- 
¶9. (C) The primary responsibility of the SSPS is to provide security for the President and other high-ranking government officials, but approximately five years ago it was charged with ensuring the security of all onshore critical energy infrastructure. Under the mandate of its Oil and Gas Export Pipelines Security Department with its approximately 1000 employees, the SSPS guards the BTC and gas export pipelines and is responsible for the external security around the Sangachal Terminal, which it coordinates with BP.
¶10. (C) According to BP’s Head of Regional Security in Azerbaijan, “pipeline security is in as good a shape as any pipeline in the world.” XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶11. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX. 
¶13. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶14. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶15. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
OFFSHORE FACILITIES
--------------------- 
¶16. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶17. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶18. (S) According to BP security personnel, the problems with offshore security stem from three main issues - lack of clarity between the Coast Guard and the Navy as to respective areas of responsibility, lack of coordination between the Coast Guard and theNavy, and inadequate equipment and training in both services. Both Admiral Sultanov, who leads Azerbaijan’s Navy, and the Deputy Head of the SBS Farhad Tagizade stress that there are efforts underway to improve coordination. A Maritime Security Strategy, which Admiral Sultanov claimed would more clearly delineate responsibility for energy infrastructure, is currently in development, and the two services are working together with the United States to improve their coordination efforts through tabletop exercises. XXXXXXXXXXXX Despite these efforts, Deputy Head of the SBS Tagizade admits that it will take more time for the two services to develop what he called a “mature relationship.”
¶19. (S) BP security officials also cited equipment problems that plague the Navy and Coast Guard. According to BP’s head of regional security, the off-the-shelf, commercial anti-collision radar that BP installed on the platforms and provides the Navy is the best one that the Navy currently has. BP officials also claimed that there was a general shortage of boats in both services, making it difficult for them to patrol the areas around the platforms. The boats the services do have tend to be old Soviet-era vessels, built in the 1960s and 70s.XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX

DERSE