Viewing cable 08PANAMA704, PANAMANIAN SECURITY COOPERATION: IRREPLACEABLE?

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHZP #0704/01 2391750
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 261750Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2447
INFO RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA WASHDC
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T PANAMA 000704 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PM
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN SECURITY COOPERATION: IRREPLACEABLE? 
 
REF: A. REF A:PANAMA 00223 
 ¶B. REF B:PANAMA 00467 
 ¶C. REF C:PANAMA07 00940 
 ¶D. REF D:PANAMA 00623 
 ¶E. REF E:PANAMA 00669 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Barbara Stephenson for Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Panama is one of the USG's most important law 
enforcement and security partners in the Western Hemisphere. 
Its importance is based on a combination of its strategic 
location astride one of the world's most important lines of 
communication, an enormous Panamanian flagged shipping fleet, 
and the willingness of the Government of Panama (GOP) to 
cooperate with various USG agencies. The fact that this 
cooperation is dispersed among many different agencies makes 
it difficult to understand the critical nature of our 
partnership with Panama. Panamanian cooperation allows the 
USG to: search Panamanian flagged ships in international 
waters, listen to the phone calls of drug dealers and FARC 
Fronts, make direct drug seizures, fly counter drug missions 
over Panama's strategic waters, and conduct the annual 
Panamax military exercise, SouthCom's largest and most 
important security cooperation event in the region. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) Panama's help is much more critical to us than it 
is to Panama. Because the scope of this cooperation is not 
fully visible, it risks being inadequately appreciated by 
even the most seasoned experts in Panama and the U.S. The 
counter-drug missions the GOP helps us with are not seen as a 
priority among Panamanians, who see them as an American 
affair, diverting resources from their own problems. The US 
must remain engaged in Panama's law enforcement and security 
efforts to maintain our critical cooperation across the 
board, and to obtain the even better results which are within 
reach. This cable seeks to inform Washington Panama watchers 
and other stakeholders regarding the importance and value of 
our extensive cooperation in law enforcement and security 
matters. The nature of our programs essentially extends our 
homeland security out from the U.S. border to Panama's. End 
Summary. 
 
------------------- 
Direct Seizure Rate 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Panama has seized over 30 tons of cocaine in the 
first eight months of 2008, following seizure of almost 60 
tons last year. This represents the highest seizure rate in 
the world by far. Panama is an important transshipment point 
for cocaine heading to the US and Europe by sea, and land. 
(Note: Due to Colombian Government efforts, there is very 
little drug trafficking through Panama by air at this time. 
End Note) Drug traffickers use go-fast boats to make short 
hauls along the coast, working their way up through Central 
America to Mexico, or take advantage of the Pan-American 
Highway to ship drugs north. Almost all seizures have been 
the result of information obtained through the Matador 
intercept program (see below para 7), or U.S. intelligence 
passed to the Panamanians. Almost all seizures are carried 
out by a small number of specialized units, including the 
Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU) and the Panamanian 
National Police's (PNP) Reverine Patrol and Action Unit 
(UMOF). 
 
------------- 
Special Units 
------------- 
 
¶4. (S/NF) Panama's Sensitive Investigations Unit is 
composed of 40 officers from the Panamanian Anti-Drug 
Prosecutor's Office and the PNP. Their main task is to 
further major, multi-lateral narcotics investigations in 
coordination with international law enforcement partners. 
They are vetted through background checks and polygraphs, and 
receive extensive USG training and resources, provided 
primarily by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the 
Embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), including salary 
bonuses. They use a "task force" approach, sharing leads and 
intelligence on a regular basis and in an effective fashion. 
DHS' Immigration and Custom's Enforcement (ICE) recently 
established its own vetted unit (staffed by ICE-vetted PNP 
officials), and that has already produced its own successes. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) The UMOF was established to patrol the rivers of 
Panama's almost impenetrable Darien Province, where rivers 
serve as roads. The unit has proven to be highly competent 
and aggressive, and has made excellent use of NAS-provided 
equipment, including two Donzi go-fast boats, to seize large 
amounts of cocaine, including out at sea. The unit is a sign 
of how effective resources given to the GOP can be in leading 
directly to important drug seizures. 
 
--------------- 
Problems at Sea 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (S/NF) The UMOF's success only highlights one of the 
major problem areas Post has encountered in Panama, the 
ineffectiveness of the Panamanian National Maritime Service 
(SMN). U.S. aircraft have identified the maritime drug 
trafficking routes along Panama's coasts, but the SMN has 
been ineffective at intercepting the go-fast boasts that 
carry out this activity, despite over $12 million in U.S. 
assistance, including two Donzi go-fast boats and four 
Nortech interceptor boats. The SMN continues to suffer from 
poor leadership and is likely plagued by internal corruption. 
 While it plays a major role in certain activities of 
importance to the U.S. (prisoner transfers, High Value 
Transits of the Canal, Panamax), the SMN has failed 
demonstrably in recent years to effectively act upon maritime 
counter-narcotics leads provided by the USG. While 
frustrating for the agencies involved, it also demonstrates 
that Panama could be seizing even more cocaine and disrupting 
drug smuggling routes if a way can be found to engage with 
the GOP as it attempts to reform the SMN as part of its 
planned creation of a National Aero-Naval Service SENAN) 
(Panamanian Coast Guard) as part of its planned security 
reforms. 
 
------- 
Matador 
------- 
 
¶7. (S/NF) Post's NAS and DEA offices have developed an 
extraordinarily successful Judicialized Telephone Intercept 
Program ("Matador") in cooperation with the Panamanian 
Anti-Drug Prosecutor's office, the Council of Public Security 
and National Defense (CSPDN), and the Panamanian Supreme 
Court. This extremely sensitive program, similar to U.S. 
Title III programs, continues to develop real-time leads in 
the fight against organized drug trafficking, and in 
particular the illicit activities of the FARC. The 
intercepts are also being used by the FBI to investigate the 
involvement of the FARC in the kidnapping of AmCit Celio Juan 
Padron in April 2008. The intercepts have allowed DEA to 
develop an intricate understanding of the FARC presence and 
activities in Panama, and to prepare a criminal case against 
them. Major indictments against the FARC in these two cases 
are expected in the coming months based on evidence obtained 
through Matador. At present, close to 200 dirty cellular 
lines are "intervened", each one following approval by the 
Criminal Chamber of the Panamanian Supreme Court of a request 
from the Panamanian Anti-Drug Prosecutor's Office. U.S. and 
Panamanian law enforcement agencies expect a regular stream 
of arrests and subsequent indictments from these efforts, as 
information obtained via Matador is valid in U.S. federal 
courts, as well as in local Panamanian courts. The success 
of the program stems from excellent cooperation among the 
Panamanian Supreme Court, the CSPDN, the Prosecutor's office, 
and vetted elements of the Panamanian National Police (PNP). 
Matador has benefited from DEA expertise and training, and 
has counted on financial backing from NAS (over $1 million), 
DEA, and the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) at Post. 
----------------- 
FARC, or No FARC? 
----------------- 
 
¶8. (S/NF) While the GOP readily admits to Embassy contacts 
that there is a small regular FARC presence in the thickly 
forested and largely ungoverned Darien Province, GOP 
officials shy away from talking about any FARC presence in 
Panama publicly. Rather than use the terms "FARC" or 
"terrorist," the GOP prefers "criminal elements" or "criminal 
organizations," in keeping with their view that, as the FARC 
comes under increasing pressure, a breakdown in central 
command is manifesting itself in a rise in undisciplined 
criminal actions. The GOP's historical position has been 
that of "live and let live", whereby FARC units keep a low 
profile, do not disturb Panamanians, and do not engage in 
serious crime against Panamanians (kidnapping, murder), and 
in turn they will not be disturbed by Panamanian forces. The 
FARC presence in the Darien is not very large, but it now 
appears likely that there is also a significant logistical 
operation based in Panama City. The Panamanian authorities do 
not have the capability to uproot the FARC presence from the 
Darien or other parts of Panama at this time, and this has 
been one of the reasons they have given in private for the 
need to create a new stand alone Frontier Force (SENAFRONT) 
(see Ref E). The FARC is not a major concern of the 
Panamanian people, however, who see the Darien as very 
remote, and are more focused on the day-to-day crime in their 
neighborhoods. There is little political gain in taking on 
the FARC publicly, and much to be lost. GOP may fear an 
aggressive campaign against the FARC could lead to a showdown 
in the Darien to which the GOP would, with current forces, 
lose. 
 
---------------------- 
Salas-Becker Agreement 
---------------------- 
 
¶9. (S/NF) In February 2002, the U.S. and Panama signed the 
Salas-Becker Agreement (SBA). This agreement remains one of 
our most important drug fighting tools in the region. SBA has 
three main components. Among other things, it allows the U.S. 
Coast Guard (USCG) to patrol Panamanian waters with 
Panamanian SMN officers aboard, to stop Panamanian registered 
ships on the high seas (after a diplomatic protocol), and to 
carry out drug interdiction flights over Panamanian waters 
and land in Panamanian airports. It is an invaluable tool to 
U.S. counter-narcotics efforts, and for that reason has faced 
opposition by some in Panama. Panamanian National Assembly 
President Pedro Miguel Gonzalez (presently under U.S. federal 
indictment in connection with the 1992 murder of a U.S. 
soldier) has threatened to challenge SBA in court, and some 
Panamanians see it as aviolation of Panamanian sovereignty. 
Nonetheless, the GOP has stood by the agreement, and, on 
August 17, 4.2 tons of cocaine were seized on the Panamanian 
flagged M/V Aganmenon 100 nautical miles south of Puerto 
Rico, under the terms of the SBA. 
 
------------------ 
Ship-Rider Program 
------------------ 
 
¶10. (S/NF) One of the key aspects of SBA is the Ship-Rider 
Program. This program allows Panamanian law enforcement 
officers to serve as liaison officers aboard USCG cutters 
that patrol in or near Panamanian territorial waters. These 
officers are able to give orders to Panamanian vessels, and 
request assistance from the crew of the USCG cutter. This 
effectively turns the cutters into Panamanian vessels that 
patrol Panamanian waters. The program has not been working as 
effectively as previously because the SMN officers have not 
been delegated the essential authority to take decisions on 
their own, and must get clearance from their superiors. 
Without these officers on board, however, it is not likely 
that the GOP would be able to justify letting U.S. ships 
patrol their waters. The GOP is also reluctant to allow 
ship-riders on U.S. Navy vessels which are assigned to law 
enforcement duties, preferring to put them on "civilian 
vessels." The program can be improved, but given the amount 
of narcotics trafficking going on in the territorial waters 
of Panama, this is still an important tool for the USG. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Boarding of Panama Flagged Vessels 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (S/NF) SBA also establishes a procedure by which the 
USG can request from the GOP the right to board 
Panamanian-flagged ships (one-third of all the ships in the 
world are flagged in Panama) in international waters. If 
drugs are found on-board, the GOP can cede jurisdiction of 
the ship, drugs and crew to the USG, with the critical 
exception of Panamanian citizens. To date all such requests 
have been approved. While it is unclear whether Panama has 
the legal right to cede jurisdiction over its citizens on the 
open sea, the 2006 case of the M/V Perseus V, where eight 
Panamanians were taken to the U.S. and tried and convicted 
under SBA, has made it a political impossibility right now 
(see Ref d). Also per Ref d, we have requested guidance from 
the Department on how to respond to the GOP's Dip Note on the 
status of the Panamanian sailors. The importance of the 
Panamanian fleet makes SBA invaluable in attempts to 
interdict drugs on the high seas, and Post is concerned this 
case may make it more difficult for the GOP to fully 
implement it. 
 
¶12. (S/NF) Panama has also participated in the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a potentially 
important tool in the bid to prevent WMD proliferation. To 
date no request to board a Panamanian flagged ship has been 
made under the PSI. 
 
------------------------ 
JIATF Tocumen Operations 
------------------------ 
 
¶13. (S/NF) The Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) - 
South operates P-3 aircraft out of Tocumen Airport in Panama 
City under SBA. The planes are non-military, either USCG or 
CBP, and must carry Panamanian law enforcement officials on 
board, per SBA. SBA allows the planes to track traffic over 
Panama and its waters, and to relay the orders of Panamanian 
officials to suspect aircraft or seacraft. The planes may 
operate out of Tocumen airport while conducting short joint 
operations, normally lasting a week. The program has allowed 
JIATF-South to map out the routes used by drug traffickers, 
and to identify targets. This program also benefits the GOP, 
whose National Air Service has only two functional 
helicopters at this time. As noted above, the information 
gathered has played a major role in seizures by the PNP and 
the UMOF, along with seizures made in other countries. The 
SMN has not been effective in using this information. 
 
----- 
CNIES 
----- 
 
¶14. (S/NF) JIATF-South currently benefits from Panama,s 
participation in the Cooperating Nations Information Exchange 
System (CNIES) program. CNIES uses Re-locatable Over the 
Horizon RADAR (ROTHR) feeds to detect air tracks as aircraft 
transit into or through Panamanian airspace. The Panamanian 
National Air Service (SAN) is very proficient and aggressive 
in sorting such air tracks to determine if they are 
legitimate or illicit airborne activities. The ROTHR feeds 
are real-time and are viewed at both the SAN Operations 
Center and JIATF-South Operations Center. In addition to 
providing a common operating picture, CNIES provides on-line 
chat (w /simultaneous translation) capability between JIATF-S 
and all participating countries. This chat capability allows 
for coordination and information sharing in real time. 
Without the SAN's ability to weed out legitimate flights from 
the raw radar information, JIATF-South would not be able to 
act on the information. While airborne trafficking is not a 
major issue right now due to aggressive actions by the 
Colombian government, the capability to detect air traffic 
through Central America is a very valuable asset, which may 
become even more important in the future, as traffickers 
change tactics to try to stay one step ahead of law 
enforcement agencies. 
 
------- 
Panamax 
------- 
 
¶15. (S/NF) Panama continues to co-host SouthCom's premier 
event, "Fueras Aliadas PANAMAX." This Canal defense oriented 
exercise has grown from three countries (Chile, Panama, and 
the U.S.) in 2003, to over 20 countries this year. This 
exercise has allowed the countries in the region who are 
willing to join forces in the defense of the Canal to 
practice their inter-operablity in real world naval exercises 
where officers and vessels from all the participants work 
together at every level to create a truly impressive model of 
defense cooperation. Panama has now begun to integrate its 
non-naval domestic security forces into the exercises by 
practicing its response to lower level emergencies which 
might precede a full scale international response. These 
exercises known as Panamax Alpha, show Panama's resolve to 
become a regional partner in the defense of the Canal, and 
not just a passive observer. 
 
------------ 
Third Border 
------------ 
 
¶15. (S/NF) Panama is a choke point in the Americas, and 
many travelers from South America must pass through Panama on 
their way north. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is working to 
build up Panama as a "third border", where people and goods 
coming to the U.S. can be screened and, if necessary, stopped 
before they reach the U.S. There are several programs that 
fall into this category. NAS financed the construction of the 
Guabala checkpoint about one mile from the Panama-Costa Rica 
border crossing at a cost of almost $500,000. The post is 
designed to stop illegal migrants, smugglers, and other 
contraband before reaching to border, and so prevent passage 
through Central America, and possibly to the U.S. DHS has 
deployed Border Patrol agents on several occasions to provide 
operational assistance to the Panamanian authorities, funded 
by NAS. CBP is also working with the CSPDN and civil aviation 
authorities to implement a the Advanced Passenger Information 
System (APIS) in Panama, that would allow CBP to know who was 
entering Panama, and prevent potential criminals or 
terrorists from continuing on to the US. This project would 
be funded under the Merida Initiative. 
 
--- 
CSI 
--- 
 
¶16. (S/NF) Panama is home to three of the most important 
container ports in the Western Hemisphere, and the world's 
second largest Free Trade Zone, in Colon. Many containers are 
transferred in these ports for eventual shipment to U.S. 
ports, making Panama a critical location for screening cargo 
bound for the U.S. Panama has cooperated closely with ICE in 
initiating a Container Security Initiative (CSI) in the three 
major ports here. The CSI became operational in Panama in 
September 2007, with a primary mission of deterring the entry 
of WMD into the U.S. through containerized shipping. DHS has 
installed two container scanners in Panamanian ports, and the 
GOP is looking to purchase several more. ICE currently has 
four CBP officers and one ICE agent stationed working with 
the Panamanians on this. 
 
--------------------- 
Turning Over Bad Guys 
--------------------- 
 
¶17. (S/NF) Panama is one of the most obliging countries in 
the region in terms of extraditing non Panamanian foreign 
nationals. They not only have an Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty (MLAT) with the U.S., which allows for a formal 
extradition process, but have been willing to engage in other 
more creative techniques. These have included: the direct 
expulsion to the U.S. of people of interest to U.S. law 
enforcement, under the pretext that they have lied on their 
request for entry documents; and the use of Conditional 
Release, under which the GOP releases to the U.S. a suspect 
already under arrest in Panama on other charges. Under this 
procedure, the suspect is "lent" to the U.S. for prosecution 
on the condition that they will be returned for prosecution 
in Panama at the end of their sentence. This procedure is 
much faster than a formal extradition, and has proven so 
successful, that DEA sometimes designs operations to bring 
suspects to Panama so they can be arrested in Panama and 
turned over to U.S. authorities quickly. 
 
-------------- 
Panama Express 
-------------- 
 
¶18. (S/NF) Panama Express refers to an agreement between 
Panama and the U.S. whereby drug suspects caught by U.S. 
ships in international waters can be brought to shore in 
Panama for transshipment to the U.S. A similar agreement 
exists with Guatemala. This agreement is critical to the work 
of USG counter-narcotic operations which focus on stopping 
drug shipments at sea. Suspects are allowed to "unofficially" 
enter Panama, after which they are taken directly to a SAN 
base, and then picked up by USG assets. Without this 
agreement, USCG ships would need to go off station for long 
periods of time, and burn large amounts of fuel in order to 
bring the suspects to the U.S. The knowledge that these 
suspects are going straight to the U.S. also increases their 
disposition to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement 
authorities. 
 
------------------ 
Police Cooperation 
------------------ 
 
¶20. (S) The day-to-day cooperation of the PNP and other 
local law enforcement with the FBI and other law enforcement 
agencies in non-drug cases, such as the Padron kidnapping, 
has been excellent. The only problem has been a failure to 
adequately safeguard information from release in the press. 
 
-------------- 
Other problems 
-------------- 
 
¶21. (S/NF) The Panamanian security services are hobbled by 
poor pay, poor organization, and poor coordination among 
different agencies. Panamanian police are very poorly paid, 
which invites corruption to take hold. NAS funds extra salary 
payments for members of the Sensitive Investigative Unit in 
an attempt to overcome this problem, and reinforce the 
dedication of the officers. The plan referred to above to 
create a separate Frontier Force is meant in part to overcome 
the negative results of transferring police between urban 
areas and the frontier, which has led to low morale and poor 
service to citizens by police more accustomed to frontier 
duty. There have also been major problem with the maintenance 
of some equipment, including USG-donated boats. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Challenge of a new Judicial System 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶22. (S/NF) One other major potential problem on the horizon 
is the adoption by Panama of a new accusatorial criminal 
justice system (to be phased in over the next five years), 
that will require major procedural reforms and require 
extensive training for judges, prosecutors, and defense 
lawyers. Panamanian Anti-Drug Prosecutor Jose Abel Almengor 
told PolOff August 19 that nowhere near enough money was 
being invested in this change, and that the result would be 
catastrophic for drug prosecutions, as it would not be 
possible to get judicial permission for searches fast enough, 
and unprepared and underpaid judges would be subject to great 
pressure to release suspects on bail, which they have not had 
the power to do up to now. NAS isworking with the U.S. 
Department of Justice to develop a training program for 
Panamanian judges and prosecutors. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶23. (S/NF) Very few of the programs listed above are 
generally known to Panamanians. They are the result of 
programs and relationships built up at a time when the USG 
had great resources to spend in Panama. Now that Panama is 
seen as a middle income country, they are being cut out of 
the foreign assistance loop. The assumption is that they 
should be able to pay for their own programs. What this cable 
aims to show is that most of these programs serve our 
interests more than Panamanian interests. Facing their own 
worsening crime problems, the GOP will be under increasing 
pressure to divert all law enforcement resources to fighting 
street crime, which is creating social alarm. While the 
street crime may be related to drug trafficking, it is not 
particularly effected by drug busts of shipments headed to 
the U.S. or abroad. In addition, with around 40% poverty and 
the second most unequal income distribution in Latin American 
(according to the U.N.) there is great pressure on the GOP to 
spend money on social programs, thus reducing the amount 
available for law enforcement. The small, effective anti-drug 
units in the PNP are essentially working a USG agenda, and 
need USG support. More such units, especially like the UMOF, 
might be able to further build on the wealth of intelligence 
that programs like JIATF-South's P-3 flights give us. The GOP 
should invest more money in its own defense, and we encourage 
them to do so. But given that our programs generally extend 
homeland security out from the U.S. border to Panama's, we 
should be realistic about the need to provide continued 
funding if we hope to retain the robust cooperation we 
currently enjoy. 
 
¶24. (S/NF) This cable has avoided referring to any active 
criminal investigations or to Compartmentalized Information. 
STEPHENSON