Viewing cable 09CHISINAU694, MONGOLIA’S CONSULTATIONS WITH DPRK VICE FOREIGN

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RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHCH #0694/01 2511527
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 081527Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8349
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

Thursday, 13 August 2009, 08:54
S E C R E T ULAANBAATAR 000234 
STATE FOR EAP/CM AND EAP/K; NSC FOR JEFF BADER 
EO 12958 DECL: 08/13/2034 
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, KNNP, MG 
SUBJECT: MONGOLIA’S CONSULTATIONS WITH DPRK VICE FOREIGN 
MINISTER KIM
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew K. Covington, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary: On August 12, Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) Deputy Director for Asian Affairs J. Sukhee briefed poloff on the annual Mongolia-DPRK consultations that concluded on August 11. MFAT State Secretary Tsogtbaatar led the Mongolian side, and the North Koreans met with President Elbegdorj on the sidelines of the consultation. Sukhee noted DPRK delegation head Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yong Il spent much time on the nuclear issue and little on the bilateral relationship with Mongolia. Key themes on the part of the DPRK were the lack of criticism of the United States, indications that the DPRK is seeking bilateral talks with the USG on normalization of relations, that the recent travel of former President Clinton to Pyongyang has greatly improved the prospects for such talks, that Mongolia would be an appropriate venue for these talks, and that the Six Party Talks are no longer an option. End Summary.
¶2. (S) Poloff met with MFAT Deputy Director for Asian Affairs J. Sukhee on August 12 to discuss Mongolia’s annual bilateral consultations with the DPRK. Sukhee was present at the consultations and has been involved with Korean affairs as a diplomat since 1985. Sukhee was candid in his meetings with poloff, referring repeatedly and openly to his handwritten notes from the DPRK consultations.
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DPRK DELEGATION OFFERS NO CRITICISM OF U.S.
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¶3. (S) Sukhee indicated that VFM Kim met with MFAT State Secretary Tsogtbaatar for the consultations and also held a separate meeting with President Elbegdorj on the margins Monday. The Mongolian Deputy Foreign Minister was to lead this latter meeting but was unable due to an obligation. Sukhee said the meetings were notable for several reasons: the DPRK delegation did not read from a prepared script, they were not aggressive and made no criticism of the United States, and they criticized China and Russia “three or four times” for supporting recent UN Resolutions aimed at the DPRK. What follows in paras 4 through 12 is Sukhee’s description to poloff of the DPRK’s statements during the course of the consultations:
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DPRK VFM ON DENUCLEARIZATION
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¶4. (S) VFM Kim said the DPRK is spending too much on weapons rather than on its children, but that the current reality dictates that they cannot get away from weapons for now. Kim said the DPRK is not a threat and was only interested in self-protection. The Mongolian side expressed concern that a nuclear DPRK could lead to a nuclear ROK, Japan, Syria, and Iran, and urged that the Mongolian nuclear-free model could serve as an example. Kim stated the United States would not allow Japan or the ROK to go nuclear and that the DPRK is committed to peace and denuclearization.
¶5. (S) The Mongolians offered the example of the Soviet Union and the United States during the Reagan-Gorbachev era, when the two allowed for nuclear inspections, leading to improved trust and a reduction in the number of warheads. The Mongolians stated that if they were in the DPRK’s place now, they would allow inspections, which would lead to mutual confidence and improved relations. The DPRK side offered no reaction to the suggestion.
¶6. (S) The DPRK side said what is most important is for the United States and the DPRK to come up with a “common language,” a “non-aggression agreement,” and establishment of diplomatic relations. Kim stated if the sides can take such measures, then denuclearization will be possible and easy, and that relations with Japan and the ROK will normalize thereafter.
¶7. (S) The Mongolian side counseled that recent “provocations” (this is Sukhee’s word to poloff; another word may have been used in the consultations) such as the missile test meant that the present situation was very fragile, and that the DPRK should be careful not to present the wrong signal. Kim agreed that the DPRK must be careful and must build confidence. The Mongolians stated that even if one has peaceful intentions, one can be seen as provocative.
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ON BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE U.S.
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¶8. (S) Regarding former President Clinton’s recent travel to the DPRK to secure of the release of the two journalists, Kim said this action had been prepared for a long time, meaning the groundwork for such a visit was already in place because of the progress the United States and the DPRK made during the Clinton presidency. Kim said forward motion stopped during the Bush Administration but was now able to proceed because of President Clinton’s recent involvement in a personal capacity, because President Obama is of the same party, and because former First Lady Clinton is now the Secretary of State. The North Koreans were expecting a dialogue with the United States to start soon as an extension of President Clinton’s visit.
¶9. (S) Kim asked the Mongolians to support a U.S.-DPRK dialogue (Sukhee described Kim as “enthusiastic” at this point), and he stated “there are no eternal enemies in this world.”
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ON THE SIX PARTY TALKS
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¶10. (S) Kim took a “very hard line” on the Six Party Talks according to Sukhee, stating that the DPRK will never return to the talks, that the talks were dead, but that the door has not closed on an opportunity for negotiations. During discussion of the Six Party Talks, Kim criticized Russia and China for their support of recent UN resolutions aimed at the DPRK. Kim said Japan and the ROK were natural allies of the United States during the talks, and that Russia and China ended up supporting the other three, so that the DPRK felt it was five against one. Kim stated the real intention of the Six Party Talks was to destroy the DPRK regime, and that at present the DPRK wants to talk only to the United States.
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VFM KIM’S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ELBEGDORJ
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¶11. (S) Sukhee also provided insight into Kim’s meeting with Elbegdorj on August 10: Kim refrained from criticizing the United States and stated the DPRK would be happy if the GOM could support a U.S.-DPRK dialogue “in the international arena.” Kim said to Elbegdorj, “We are telling you all this because Mongolia understand us.” Kim reiterated the notion that there is a “good personal understanding” between former President Clinton and DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il.
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HOW ABOUT U.S.-DPRK TALKS IN MONGOLIA?
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¶12. (S) Sukhee further noted that a counselor named Choi from the DPRK Embassy in Ulaanbaatar told Sukhee on the way to the airport on August 11 that he had suggested to VFM Kim that it would be good to host U.S.-DPRK talks in Mongolia, but that Kim offered no reaction. Choi also told Sukhee that the timing was right to establish a regional security mechanism whose organization the Mongols should spearhead.
MINTON