Viewing cable 07OTTAWA266, PSI: CANADIAN FOLLOW-UP ON ATTEMPT TO SHIP

VZCZCXRO3693
OO RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #0266 0401952
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 091952Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4974
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0069
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0230
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE 0025

UNCLAS OTTAWA 000266 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM/ISN - MFELIPE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM KNNP MNUC ETTC PREL SY CA
SUBJECT: PSI: CANADIAN FOLLOW-UP ON ATTEMPT TO SHIP 
U.S.-ORIGIN TEST EQUIPMENT TO SYRIA VIA THE UAE 
 
REF: A. STATE 13872 
 
 ¶B. ABU DHABI 168 
 ¶C. OTTAWA 220 
 
¶1. Action request: See para 3. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Responding to refs A and C, on February 9 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) 
Export Controls Division Deputy Director Steven Goodinson 
conveyed to us the points below regarding the attempted 
shipment of U.S.-origin test equipment to Syria by Polytech 
for International Supplies and Consultation (PISC): 
 
-- We have determined that neither the exporter, Polytech for 
International Supplies and Consultation (PISC), nor the 
agent, Integral Transportation Networks Inc., have individual 
export permits for the goods in question. The firms applied 
jointly in the past for the export of US-origin goods (a 
commercial vehicle) to Syria but withdrew the application 
once they were informed that US re-export authorization was 
necessary for such a transaction. 
 
-- Based on the information available to us, we have assessed 
the control status of the products exported by PISC to UAB. 
One of the product types exported, the vibration system 
(model BRVD-24) may be controlled by Canada's Export Control 
List under Items 6-15.B (MTCR) and 4-1.B (NSG) if the units 
are equipped with the 109 option, which is available for this 
model, and the unit is therefore capable of imparting forces 
greater than 50 kN measured bare table. However, the 
information available to us does not allow us to determine if 
this type of product was shipped. 
 
-- If not otherwise controlled, this product would be 
controlled by Canada's Export Control List under Item 5400 as 
a good of US origin. For an export of Item 5400 goods (not 
otherwise included in the Export Control List), the exporter 
could declare General Export Permit #12 to ship this product 
to the UAE but not to Syria. Export of this product to Syria 
would require an individual export permit. 
 
-- The other product type, the environmental humidity chamber 
(model TR20RC-3), is controlled under Item 5400 of the Export 
Control List. The exporter could declare General Export 
Permit #12 to ship this product to the UAE but not to Syria. 
Export of this product to Syria would require an individual 
export permit. 
 
-- We have reviewed the documents provided to us and have 
concluded that there is some evidence that the goods were 
exported to the UAE from Canada with the intent to divert to 
Syria, in violation of the Export and Import Permits Act. We 
have therefore referred this matter to the Investigations 
Branch of the Canada Border Services Agency for further 
action. 
 
-- We have also been informed that US officials have 
solicited the assistance of UAE authorities to interdict the 
shipment in question and return it to the United States. We 
have instructed the Embassy of Canada to the UAE to contact 
appropriate UAE customs authorities to confirm our support 
for such action, and to offer any other assistance which may 
be appropriate. 
 
-- We would be grateful if you would keep us fully informed 
as this matter proceeds in order to support our own 
investigation into the Canadian parties to this transaction. 
 
¶3. (SBU) After delivering the points, Goodinson asked that 
we advise his office soonest whether the items in the second 
bullet point were shipped with the "109 option." 
 
¶4. (SBU) Goodinson said Hamsho International (HI) was one of 
over 80 companies that shared the same address as PISC, and 
Qover 80 companies that shared the same address as PISC, and 
added that the Syrian Embassy in Ottawa's website identified 
HI Managing Director Ahmad Hamsho as a member of the Syrian 
Parliament and an "associate" of the Syrian Embassy. 
Goodlinson then noted that the Canadian Embassy to the UAE 
would soon receive an instruction to intensify its 
non-proliferation and related law enforcement outreach to UAE 
authorities, and to deepen cooperation with allies and other 
like-minded nations these area. 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
WILKINS