Currently released so far... 12477 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC AF AFIN AM AJ AG AS AEMR AMGT AORC APER AU ACBAQ AFGHANISTAN AR AE ADANA ADPM APECO AMED AX AL ADCO AA AECL AADP AMEX ACAO ANET AODE ASCH AY APEC AID AORG ASEAN ABUD AGAO AFSI AFSN AINF AGR AROC AO AFFAIRS ASIG ABLD ASUP AND ARM AQ ATFN AC ATRN ACOA AMBASSADOR AUC ASEX ARF AER AVERY AGRICULTURE AMG AFU AN AORL ALOW APCS AZ AMCHAMS ADM ACABQ AGMT ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AIT ACS
BR BK BA BRUSSELS BEXP BM BD BL BO BILAT BU BN BT BX BTIO BIDEN BG BE BP BY BBSR BC BTIU BWC BB BF BH BMGT
CO CASC CS CA CONDOLEEZZA CE CVIS CU CPAS CMGT COUNTER CH COUNTRY CJAN CG CIDA CJUS CI CY CD CDG CBSA CEUDA CR CM CLMT CAC CBW CODEL COPUOS CIC CW CBE CHR CFED CT CONS CWC CTM CDC CVR CF CIA CLINTON COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE COE CN CACS CAN CB CSW CITT CARSON CACM CDB COM CV CAPC CKGR CBC CTR CNARC CROS CARICOM CL CICTE CIS
EINV ETRD ECON EPET ENRG EAGR EC EFIN EAID ELTN EIND ELAB EAIR ECIN EUN EG EU ETTC ET EI EWWT EFIS EMIN ER EPA ENVI ENGR ETRC EXTERNAL ECPS EN ELN EINT ETRDEINVTINTCS ES EZ ETRO ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EDU ETRN EFTA EAIG EK EUREM ECONCS ECONOMICS ENVR ELECTIONS EAP ENIV ECONOMY ESA EINN ECONOMIC EIAR EXBS ECA ECUN EINDETRD EUR EREL EUC ESENV ECONEFIN ECIP ENERG EFIM EAIDS ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH EINVETC ENGY EINVECONSENVCSJA EUMEM ETRA EINVEFIN ETC ERD ENNP EFINECONCS ECINECONCS ERNG EXIM EURN EEPET
IR IAEA IS IZ IN IT IO IAHRC ID IC IRAQI IWC ISLAMISTS IV ICAO INDO ITPHUM ITPGOV ITALIAN IPR ICRC INTERPOL IQ IBET IMO INR INTERNAL ICJ ICTY IRS ILO ISRAELI IEA INRB ITALY IL ITU ITRA IBRD IIP ILC IZPREL IMF IRAJ IA ITF IF INMARSAT ISRAEL ICTR IDP IGAD IEFIN IACI INRA INRO INTELSAT IRC IDA
KS KN KTFN KTDB KTIP KIRF KPAO KDEM KCOR KE KMPI KSCA KZ KG KNUP KNNP KPAL KCRM KIPR KPKO KFLO KSEP KOMC KISL KNNPMNUC KWBG KFRD KUNR KWMN KSTC KFLU KOLY KMDR KJUS KSTH KAWC KU KWAC KNPP KERG KSEO KACT KHLS KGHG KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KDRG KTIA KVPR KV KIDE KICC KPRP KBIO KSUM KGIT KCFE KBTS KCIP KGIC KPAI KTLA KTEX KFSC KPLS KHIV KCSY KSAC KTRD KID KMRS KOM KSAF KRVC KR KMOC KNAR KHDP KSPR KBTR KOCI KJUST KNEI KAWK KGCC KMCA KBCT KREL KMFO KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KFTFN KVRP KIRC KCOM KO KLIG KAID KNSD KHUM KSEC KRAD KCMR KPWR KCHG KICA KPIN KESS KDEV KCGC KWWMN KPRV KPAK KWNM KWMNCS KRFD KVIR KSCI KDDG KIFR KHSA KCRS KRGY KCRCM KFIN KPOA KCFC KTER KREC KMIG KTBT KRCM KRIM KWMM KOMS KX KPAONZ KNUC KDEMAF
MP MY MOPS MCAP MARR MNUC MUCN MTCRE MASS MAPP MIL MX MEDIA MO MPOS MU ML MA MERCOSUR MG MD MW MK MAS MT MI MOPPS MASC MR MTS MLS MILI MAR MTRE MEPN MTCR MEPI MQADHAFI MAPS MARAD MEETINGS MEPP MILITARY MZ MDC MC MCC MASSMNUC MRCRE MV MIK
NU NZ NATO NPT NL NI NAFTA NDP NIPP NP NG NRR NO NEW NE NH NR NA NS NSF NZUS NATIONAL NSG NC NT NAR NK NV NORAD NSSP NASA NATOPREL NPA NW NPG NSFO NGO NSC
OVIP OPIC OEXC OTRA OPDC OREP OAS OPRC OIIP OSCE OFFICIALS OMIG ODIP OFDP OECD OBSP OPCW OTR OSAC OSCI ON OCII OES OPAD OIC OFDA OHUM OVP OIE OCS
PGOV PINR PREL PHSA PTER PE PREF PHUM PK PARM PINS PM PL PO PA PBTS PBIO POL PARMS PROG PAK POLITICS PORG PTBS PNAT PUNE POLICY PDOV PCI PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PP PS PG PY PTERE PGOF PALESTINIAN PKFK PSOE PEPR PPA PINT PMAR PRELP PSEPC PREFA PGOVE PINF PNG PMIL PGOC PFOR PCUL PLN PROP POLINT PGGV PHALANAGE PARTY PGOVLO PHUS PDEM PECON PROV PAS PHUMPREL PGIV PRAM PHUH PAO PSA PHUMPGOV PF PRL PHUMBA PEL PREO PAHO POGOV POV PNR PSI PINL PU PRGOV PAIGH POLITICAL PARTIES POSTS
RS RCMP RICE RU REACTION REPORT REGION RIGHTS RO RW RF RM RFE RSP RP RIGHTSPOLMIL ROBERT RELATIONS ROOD RUPREL RSO
SOCI SN SY SNAR SENV SP SZ SCUL SA SO SW SMIG SU SENVKGHG SR SYRIA SF SI SC SWE SARS STEINBERG SG SIPRS ST SL SNARIZ SSA SK SPCVIS SOFA SEVN SIPDIS SAN SYR SHUM SANC SEN SPCE SNARCS SNARN SHI SH SAARC SCRS
TU TPHY TI TX TSPL TRGY TBIO TF TERRORISM TH TIP TC TSPA TW TZ TNGD TT TL TV TS TRSY TINT TN TURKEY TBID TD TP TAGS TK TR TFIN TO THPY
UK UNSC USTR UG UNGA UZ USEU US UN UNC USUN UP UY UNESCO USPS UNHRC UNO UNHCR UNCHR USAID UNVIE UAE UNMIK USOAS UNFICYP UV UNEP UNODC UNCHS UNIDROIT UNDESCO UNCHC UNDP UNAUS UNCND UNCSD UNICEF UNPUOS UNDC USNC UE
Browse by classification
Community resources
Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09OTTAWA879, CANADA IN AFGHANISTAN: SOME PROGRESS, WITH STEPS BACKWARD
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09OTTAWA879.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 09OTTAWA879 | 2009-12-11 22:21 | 2011-04-28 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Ottawa |
VZCZCXRO4231
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHOT #0879/01 3452221
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 112221Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0150
INFO AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 OTTAWA 000879
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/A, S/SRAP, AND WHA/CAN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MOPS EAID AF CA
SUBJECT: CANADA IN AFGHANISTAN: SOME PROGRESS, WITH STEPS BACKWARD
REF: OTTAWA 00429; OTTAWA 00725; OTTAWA 944; OTTAWA 940
¶1. (SBU) Summary. In its sixth quarterly report to Parliament on
Canada's engagement in Afghanistan, the government cited slight
progress - mostly on school construction, micro-finance, and polio
eradication -- in its efforts in Kandahar Province. Training and
mentoring of Afghan Security Forces - both army and police -
continues, with mixed results. Signature development projects move
forward, and border security dialogue between Afghanistan and
Pakistan is expanding, with Canadian facilitation. The media and
Parliament, however, remain more obsessed with allegations that the
government ignored credible reports of abuse of Afghan detainees
transferred by the Canadian Forces in 2006 to Afghan authorities
(ref c), and largely ignored the mostly discouraging news in this
latest report. End summary.
¶2. (U) Minister of International Trade and Chair of the Cabinet
Committee on Afghanistan Stockwell Day on December 10 released
the sixth quarterly report to Parliament - mandated under a March
2008 bipartisan motion that also extended the mandate of the
Canadian Forces in Afghanistan until the end of 2011 -- on Canada's
engagement in Afghanistan. Covering the period from July 1 to
September 30, the report painted an often discouraging picture for
the work of Canadian military and civilian units operating in and
around Kandahar. The report recognized that the widespread fraud
that characterized the Presidential election had raised questions
of credibility regarding the Karzai government, but praised the
willingness of the Afghan people to vote in the face of
intimidation as well as the efforts of Afghan security forces to
provide security. The report noted that Canada had achieved
progress toward "many" of its priority objectives in the province.
¶3. (U) The report, however, also highlighted that the quarter had
witnessed the "heaviest loss of life among the greatly expanded
coalition forces for any three-month period since 2001," including
eleven members of the Canadian Forces. The report admitted that
"the insurgents have seized the initiative, both in armed conflict
and by creating a crisis of confidence among the populace through
the equally important 'silent war' of fear, intimidation and
persuasion." It noted that August was also the "deadliest month
so far this year for Afghan civilian casualties." The report
welcomed that the August recommendations from General Stanley
McChrystal, Commander of the International Security Assistance
Force (COMISAF), had in many ways reflected the approach already
underway by Canadian Forces, notably, the "Village Approach"
exemplified by Operation Kantolo, which aims to protect the
population and create a secure environment in which governance and
development can take root.
Key Findings of the Report
Priority One: Training and Mentoring ANSF
¶4. (U) The Canadian objective for 2011 is for the Afghan National
Army (ANA) to demonstrate an "increased capacity" to conduct
operations and sustain a more secure environment in key districts
of Kandahar Province, and for four kandaks (battalions) to be fully
capable of planning, executing, and sustaining near-autonomous
operations.. As of this quarter, however, only one of six kandaks
is "fully capable" -- unchanged from previous quarter, although
there is also a new kandak that has not undergone assessment. Only
one of the six kandaks or the ANA headquarters has an effective
strength of 70% or higher -- down from three kandaks at that level
last quarter. The report contended that the ANA nonetheless had
succeeded in shouldering greater responsibility for security in
Kandahar City and by independently executing 80% of security
operations on its own, as well as by leading more than 70%. This
exceeded the 65% goal for 2011, and is up from 45% for the June
2008 baseline period. (This was a benchmark that the government
had added only in the previous report.) However, in contrast to
the previous quarter when the ANA had an approval rating of 85% or
more in five out of six key districts, this was true in only one
key district during this quarter. Similarly, in this quarter,
OTTAWA 00000879 002 OF 004
there were no key districts in which the majority of Kandaharis
perceived security as improving, whereas there had been one in the
previous quarter.
¶5. (U) The Afghan National Police (ANP) performed well during the
elections, according to the report, providing security at polling
stations and assisting the Independent Election Commission (IEC) in
moving and securing elections materials. Canadian military and
civilian police in Kandahar City provided basic training for 679
ANP officers in preparation for the election, up from only 200 in
the previous quarter (although the report failed to report on the
total percentage of ANP in Kandahar with such training, unlike in
the previous report). There was progress toward the 2011 goal of
having 80 % of the ANP units capable of planning and executing
near-autonomous operations. Two (of 17) ANP units representing 12%
of the officers were assessed as capable of conducting basic law
and order operations with occasional assistance from international
advisors or police mentor team (Capability Milestone 2), up from
one in the last quarter.
Priority Two: Strengthening Afghan Capacity to Deliver Core
Services
¶6. (U) The report noted that the ability of the Afghan Government
to provide dependable basic services such as education, healthcare,
sanitation, roads, and water is a key test of its ability to gain
public confidence. Two of Canada's "signature projects" are
designed to reinforce the Afghan Government's institutional
capacity to deliver these services. Toward the 2011 goal of
building, expanding, or repairing 50 schools in key districts,
construction was completed during the quarter on seven schools, up
from zero during the last reporting period. Twenty-one schools are
currently under construction; no new school projects began this
quarter. This quarter, 13,500 individuals continued in various
literacy training programs, identical with the previous quarter.
¶7. (U) Another 2011 goal for Afghan institutions is to have
completed infrastructure projects undertaken by locally elected
bodies in 75% of communities in key districts. The report cited
completed projects in 68% of key districts, up from 66% last
quarter. Canadian engineers made progress on technical aspects of
another "signature project," the C$50 million rehabilitation of the
Dahla Dam. When completed, this dam and irrigation system will
ensure reliable water delivery to four out of five Kandaharis and
support licit agriculture. A manufacturer for the gates and weirs
of the associated irrigation system was identified. The project
created 157 new seasonal jobs for a cumulative total of 355 (versus
199 last quarter), against a 2011 target of 10,000. In this
quarter, Kandahar already achieved Canada's 2011 target of loans
for 500 clients through the Microfinance Investment Support
Facility (against a March 2008 baseline of 30 microfinance loans).
¶8. (U) The report recognized that insurgent activity in Kandahar
nonetheless continued to hamper the efforts of both the
international community and Afghan Government to provide basic
services, however. Development partners can travel in key
districts only in armored vehicles with military escort. In other
areas, movement is not possible. While 60% of Kandaharis were
satisfied with the Afghan government's efforts to improve the
quality of life, this was a decline from 75% in the last quarter.
However, the percent of Kandaharis satisfied with the provision of
education grew from 44% to 47%, and those satisfied with employment
increased from 25% to 40% in this quarter. However, about 30 pct
had a favorable opinion of the Taliban, a "modest but steady upward
trend."
Priority Three: Providing Humanitarian Assistance to Vulnerable
People
¶9. (U) Canada's 2011 the goal is that humanitarian assistance
will be accessible to Afghan refugees and internally displaced
persons in Kandahar and nationwide. According to this report,
OTTAWA 00000879 003 OF 004
Canada's third "signature project" -- a campaign designed to
eradicate polio throughout Afghanistan in 2009, in partnership with
the World Health Organization and UNICEF -- inoculated another
380,000 children in Kandahar and another 880,000 nationwide. The
report admitted, however, that it will not be possible to eradicate
the disease in Afghanistan as projected by the end of 2009, and
that there were nine new cases in the quarter, with a nationwide
total of 22 new cases. Canadian funding helped the World Food
Programme to double its food aid from last quarter, reaching an
additional 1.5 million beneficiaries. Removal of landmines and
explosives cleared land in 11 villages (an additional 0.25 square
kilometers of land) during this period, bring the number of
mine-related civilian casualties to fewer than 50 per month, a 10
year low. Estimates are that at least 10,000 explosive hazards
remain, however, scattered across more than 1000 square miles of
Kandahar Province.
Priority Four: Enhancing Border Security and Facilitating Bilateral
Dialogue Between Afghanistan and Pakistan
¶10. (U) Canada's goal for 2011 is that Afghan and Pakistani
institutions will exercise "stronger capacity" to control the
border. The quarterly report cited two Joint Working Group
meetings under the Canadian-facilitated Dubai Process, which
brought together Afghan and Pakistani officials to identify
projects that would contribute to efforts in counter narcotics and
controlling the movement of people. (Two additional meetings on
customs and law enforcement took place after the end of this
reporting period.) Canadian-facilitated discussions also took
place along the Kandahar-Baluchistan border between Afghan and
Pakistani military officers. These Dubai Process meetings have
created a regular mechanism for advancing border cooperation.
Priority Five: Advancing Afghan Democratic Institutions
¶11. (U) Canada's hope for 2011 is that national, local and
provincial institutions in Kandahar will exhibit an "increasing
capacity" for democratic governance. Although the report
recognized the major concerns about irregularities and fraud
related to the Presidential election, it praised the work of the
Independent Electoral Commission and the Elections Complaints
Commission as examples of emerging capacity. It admitted, however,
that voter turnout was less than 40% in the elections. Training
for officials from Kandahar and 21 other provinces began during
last reporting period and continued in this quarter in preparation
for the establishment of long-term provincial strategic plans to
build capacity in conjunction with the Afghan National Development
Strategy.
Priority Six: Facilitating Afghan-led Efforts toward Reconciliation
¶12. (U) The report noted "no further results" on national
reconciliation, which will depend on the "will of the Afghan
people." Canada agreed to provide C$1.6 million to rebuild the
meeting hall of the Kandahar Provincial Council, providing space
for community gatherings.
Reaction in Canada
¶13. (SBU) While the media covered the December 10 release by
Minister Day, virtually all of the questioning related instead to
the on-going controversy over the treatment of prisoners handed
over to Afghan security forces by Canadian soldiers and what the
government knew when (ref c). Minister Day, and -- in a separate
press conference -- Justice Minister Rob Nicholson insisted that
the government would not comply with a December 9 House of Commons
motion (which the ruling Conservatives lost 145-143) demanding full
release of all relevant documents to the Commons. Minister Day
cited operational security, while Minister Nicholas cited legal
restrictions; both suggested individuals (including MPs) who wanted
OTTAWA 00000879 004 OF 004
access to such restricted documents would have to seek them in
court. The three opposition parties are united in seeking to
embarrass the government over this issue and have vowed to call
into session the Special Committee on Afghanistan even during the
holiday recess (which began December 10), but have indicated no
interest in debating the actual Canadian mission in Afghanistan and
the successes - or failures - of Canada's role as documented in the
quarterly reports. As noted in one editorial, the public
similarly has a "curiosity" deficit" when it comes to Afghanistan
nowadays.
JACOBSON